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ANDREW M. MILLER

FROM DELOS TO DELPHI

A Literary Study of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo

LUGDUNI BATAVORUM E. J. BRILL MCMLXXXVI

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BY

ANDREW M. MILLER

LEIDEN E. J. BRILL 1986

ISBN 90 04 07674 3

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY E. J. BRILL

In Memory of E. L. Bundy
(1920-1975)

ἅπαν δ' εὑρόντος ἔργον

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PREFACE

Twice in the course of the *Hymn to Apollo* the poet pauses to ask the god: ''How shall I sing of you, who are in all ways worthy of song?'' The first half of this question (πῶς τ' ἄρ σ' ὑμνήσω) implies that the poet's intention in the hymn is, at least in part, to celebrate Apollo, to praise him in song. The second half (πάντως εὔυμνον ἐόντα) implies that in order to realize this intention the poet must choose from among a bewildering variety of potential themes. Each of these implications invites critical inquiry. How in fact is the poet's general intent to praise carried out?—that is, how do the hymn's constituent elements contribute to the glorification of its divine subject? And why, out of the many specific forms through which that intent might have been realized, did the poet choose the particular form preserved for us in the Homeric corpus?—that is, why did he select precisely *these* materials and arrange them in precisely *this* sequence?

The present study is an attempt to answer these two questions. In the two centuries since David Ruhnken declared that the *Hymn to Apollo* was in reality two independent poems, one honoring Delian and the other Pythian Apollo, the problem of its ''unity'' has so thoroughly monopolized the attention and energy of scholars that the hymn itself, as a literary text with legitimate claims to be *understood* and not merely fought over, has at times seemed almost to disappear from view. In saying this I do not mean to depreciate the wealth of observation and insight that is to be found on either side of the debate—my indebtedness to previous scholars, ''unitarian'' and ''separatist'' alike, is everywhere apparent—but rather to suggest that the forensic modes of attack and defense cannot do justice to the most important qualities of the *Hymn to Apollo*: its beauty and power as a work of poetic craftsmanship, and its ethical seriousness.

My purpose, accordingly, is to explicate the hymn's *rhetorical structure* (i.e., how it is put together) and its *thematic content* (i.e., what it is ''about'') through a sequential analysis of its several parts. In identifying those parts and in defining the intention that they embody I rely in the first instance on comparison with other ''Homeric'' hymns. Of all those hymns, however, the *Hymn to Apollo* is (or so at least I believe) the most ambitiously innovative in its selection and arrangement of materials. As a result the hymnal model provided by the collection as a whole, though valuable as a ''control'' and for the light it sheds on individual elements, is in itself inadequate to the task of exegesis and must be supplemented by a recognition of the *Hymn*'s generic affinity with such non-hymnic forms of praise as the *enkomion* and the *epinikion*. Thus many specific

rhetorical maneuvers are elucidated by parallels in Pindar's encomiastic practice, while the poem's general principle of organization can be shown to resemble closely (in its essentials, if not in all details) the "program" laid down as canonical for the prose *enkomion* by later orators and rhetoricians—the program according to which one begins, after a suitable proem, with the subject's ancestry and birth (γένος), moves on through his upbringing (ἀνατροφή) to his studies and pursuits (ἐπιτηδεύματα), and so comes at last to the crown of all, his deeds and exploits (πράξεις).

In considering why, out of "all the ways" in which Apollo might have been celebrated, the poet chose the *one* way represented by the extant text, my point of departure is what generations of scholars have agreed to be the most striking formal feature of the *Hymn*, its division into predominantly "Delian" and predominantly "Pythian" sections, of which the second is more than twice as long as the first. The climactic position and extended length of the Pythian material suggest that the poet's chief focus of interest is the founding of the Delphic oracle; but why, in that case, does he postpone his account of the deed for some two hundred lines, more than half of which deal with Apollo's birth on Delos? To that question the present study proposes the following answer: in the *Hymn to Apollo* the poet's encomiastic intention has been realized in such a way that the resulting composition is both a poem of praise and a speculative inquiry into the nature and origin of the Pythian oracle—an inquiry which, because institutions perforce bear the impress of their founders, naturally extends itself to Apollo's own nature and origin. On the level of its encomiastic intention the movement of the hymn as a whole is from Apollo's birth on humble Delos to his position of glory at Pytho—a movement that we shall characterize by means of a phrase from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα ("From *that*, to *this*!"). On the level of the hymn's "speculative" intention, however, the implied movement is quite the reverse: having undertaken to account for the existence and peculiar character of the Delphic oracle as an institution, the poet sets about his task by first considering the circumstances of Apollo's emergence into the world, on the reasonable supposition that his early history will shed light on his later actions.

Thus the *Hymn to Apollo* is *aetiological* in its preoccupations, although not in the same way as is (for example) the *Hymn to Demeter*. While the poet of that hymn takes pains to provide mythical prototypes for a number of specific elements in Eleusinian ritual, the *Hymn to Apollo* offers little if anything along those lines beyond three cult-name etymologies. The poet's interest lies not in the particularities of Delphic rite and custom but in the general question of how and why, in what spirit and

with what purpose the Pythian oracle was founded. His implicit answer to this question, we shall argue, is conveyed through a certain constellation of ideas that link "Delian" and "Pythian" portions of the hymn: the infertility of Delos and Pytho as places of habitation, the display of arrogance (ἀτασθαλία) that Delos fears in Apollo but shrewdly manages to avert, the role played by the goddess Themis in Apollo's transformation from infant to mature god, and the paradoxically formulated injunction against "the ὕβρις that is men's θέμις" which forms the climax of Apollo's last speech and of the hymn as a whole. In my explication of these ideas I look largely to Homer and Hesiod for assistance, for if in his handling of narrative and thematic materials the poet of the *Hymn* anticipates the rhetorical practices of choral lyric and epideictic prose, the materials themselves are for the most part those of earlier *epos*.

Although detailed discussion of the matter is postponed to an appendix, a few words should be said here about the "question of unity" to which allusion was made earlier. The present study does not attempt to *prove* the unity—that is, the sequential intelligibility and overall coherence—of the *Hymn to Apollo*; rather it *assumes* that unity from the outset. In view of the critical controversy that the poem has occasioned, controversy which certain scholars would have us believe has now resolved itself into a general acceptance of separate "Delian" and "Pythian" hymns, this assumption may appear to break all ground-rules and beg the very question that has been set for debate. That it begs the question I neither can nor wish to deny. What I do deny is that all critical discussion of the hymn must take that question as its starting-point. A general predisposition to find disunity in the hymn has reigned since Ruhnken's day—a predisposition so strong and so pervasive that even those who believe in one poem by one poet have tended to forget where the *onus probandi* properly lies and thus to regard their task as primarily defensive rather than exegetical. Yet given the hymn's uniformity of meter and dialect, its concern throughout with a single general subject, and the unanimity of the manuscripts in presenting it as a single poem, there is no compelling—or indeed merely adequate—reason for approaching the text with any other presupposition than that it is in fact a single composition and that sentence will follow sentence and topic follow topic with at least as much regard for logic or for psychological probability as is typically evinced by poetic compositions of the archaic period—arguably no mean amount. Of course the multifarious objections raised against the hymn by separatists must be addressed at some point, but I cannot see that they need to be answered as a pre-condition for attempting to interpret the text as we have it, nor that they need be allowed to dictate the form or course of my exposition. For discussion of such objections the reader should look to the notes and to Appendix 1.

A word is in order about the limitations of the present study. It is, as its title indicates, a *literary* study—by which I mean that the context within which it considers the *Hymn* is rather the poetic tradition to which it belongs than the historical conditions under which it was produced. The study does not deal with matters of cult and ritual, comparative mythology, or the history of Greek religion generally, nor does it attempt to be a thorough philological commentary. Furthermore, although it seems certain that the Hymn to Apollo was intended for oral performance on festive occasions, and although the strict linearity of comprehension that such recitation demands of an audience is kept in view throughout my analysis, I do not take up the question of "oral" vs. "written" composition. Important as all these matters are, I believe that the purely literary approach that I have adopted has, together with other approaches, a legitimate and fundamental contribution to make to the understanding of the text.

A final point on which it is well that the reader stand forewarned—and his generous forebearance be entreated—is my use of technical (at times neologistic) terminology. Provided care is taken to define such terms when they are first introduced, they have the advantage of allowing one to discuss recurrent rhetorical phenomena without having to describe them periphrastically on each occasion. My hope is that any esthetic drawbacks are compensated for by economy and precision.

This monograph originated as a doctoral dissertation begun under the direction of E. L. Bundy three months before his untimely death in December of 1975. Extensive revision was undertaken with the assistance of fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D. C., to which admirable institutions I hereby tender my gratitude. In addition, I would like to thank Bernard Knox, Mae Smethurst, Hans-Peter Stahl, Hayden Pelliccia, and the editorial board of *Mnemosyne* for their careful reading of the manuscript and their many suggestions for improvement. Special thanks are due to William Race, whose critical acumen and unflagging encouragement have aided me at every stage of the project. My greatest debt, however, is owed to a man who never saw these pages in any form but whose devotion to the study of ancient Greek poetry served as both spur and guide in their writing.

INTRODUCTION

"CULT" HYMNS, "RHAPSODIC" HYMNS, AND THE PROGRAM OF PRAISE IN THE *HYMN TO APOLLO*

Close analysis of the *Hymn to Apollo* will be facilitated by some preliminary discussion of the genre to which it belongs and of the general structure that it exhibits. In the tradition of Greek hymnody there are two broad categories of composition: the "subjective" or "cult" hymn on the one hand and the "objective," "epic," "Homeric," or "rhapsodic" hymn on the other.[1] These various terms are all modern, and none of them, perhaps, is entirely satisfactory; but the distinction they point to is both real and significant. Although the two types of hymn are genetically related and have much in common, important differences in emphasis can be discerned both in the intentions that animate them and in the formal features through which those intentions are realized.

The "cult" hymn, of which Chryses' prayer to Apollo at *Il.* 1.37-42 and Sappho's "Hymn to Aphrodite" are representative specimens, seeks to persuade a god to grant some specific favor or to take some specific action on the speaker's behalf (or on behalf of others with whom the speaker is closely associated).[2] Such persuasion is the end to which all the formal features of the "cult" hymn are directed. The first standard element, the *invocation*, solicits the god's attention with verbal forms such as κλῦθι "hearken" and λίσσομαι "I beseech" and, typically, attempts to conciliate him by alluding (through epithets or more complex syntactical constructions) to his powers and prerogatives; these usually are selected for their relevance to the request that will follow. Thus Chryses, intending to ask his divine patron and protector for the aid of his bow, begins Κλῦθί μευ, ἀργυρότοξ', ὃς Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας (*Il.* 1.37); thus Sappho, who

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[1] On "cult" vs. "epic" or "rhapsodic" hymns see Meyer 2-8. "Subjective" and "objective" are Wünsch's terms ("Hymnos," *RE* 1st ser. [Stuttgart 1914] 142): "Entweder tritt der Sänger in persönliche Relation zu der Gottheit, er wendet sich an sie, um ihre Hilfe zu erlangen (subjektive H.). Oder er erzählt im Stile des Epos von den Taten der Götter ganz unpersönlich, ohne sich mit ihnen in irgend welche Beziehung zu setzen (objektive H.)."

[2] Meyer 7 makes a theoretical distinction between hymns of either type and "prayers" such as Chryses' to Apollo; but in his discussion of the Homeric "Gebete" themselves (9-14) he points to so many "kulthymnischen Elemente" that his distinction comes to seem academic. Of Sappho's "prayer" Meyer 52 says: "die Struktur des ganzen Liedes in allem Wesentlichen und sogar bis in die Einzelformen hinein dem Kompositionsschema der kultischen Hymnen entspricht" (cf. D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* [Oxford 1955] 16-18).

needs Aphrodite's help in attaining the object of her affections, begins Ποικιλόθρον' ἀθάνατ' Ἀφρόδιτα, παῖ Δίος δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε (1.1-2).

The function of the second major element in the "cult" hymn, the so-called *hypomnesis* or "reminder," is (as the term implies) to present a claim on the god's consideration by recalling a previous occasion (or occasions) on which devotion was displayed by the one party and/or assistance rendered by the other.[3] The "reminder" very often takes the form of a conditional protasis ("if ever in the past ...") to which the apodotic conclusion, in thought if not syntactically, is the request itself ("then on this present occasion also ..."). Thus Chryses says to Apollo, "If ever I roofed a lovely temple for you, or if ever I burned for you fat thigh-pieces of bulls and goats" (*Il.* 1.39-41); thus Sappho says to Aphrodite, "If ever at another time as well you heard my cries from afar and came ..." As Sappho's poem demonstrates, the hypomnesis can be developed into a narrative of some length without impairment of its essential function in the "argument" of the hymn as a whole.

The third and last major element in the "cult" hymn, and (at least ostensibly) its *raison d'être*, is the actual *request* for which the invocation and hypomnesis have been persuasive preparation. Typically this appears at the end of the hymn, but other positions are possible. "Fulfill this wish for me," says Chryses at the conclusion of his prayer: "may the Danaans pay for my tears with your arrows" (*Il.* 1.42). Sappho's request is made twice, once (in largely negative terms) before the hypomnesis (1.3-5 "do not subdue my heart with sickness and distress, but come") and then again (more positively) at the end (1.25-28 "Come to me now as then, release me from my harsh cares, accomplish all that my heart desires to have accomplished, and be yourself my ally-in-arms").

Whereas the "cult" hymn formally presupposes but a single hearer, the god himself, who is addressed in the second person ("du-Stil"), the rhapsodic hymn regularly speaks *about* the god in the third person ("er-Stil") and thus presupposes the presence of a human audience in addition to the divine.[4] Moreover, whereas the end that the "cult" hymn has in view is a potential benefit to the speaker which lies within the god's dispensation, the rhapsodic hymn seeks primarily to *please* the god (and its human audience) through "objective" (that is, essentially disinterested) praise. As with the "cult" hymn, the constituent elements of the rhapsodic hymn reflect its basic purpose.[5] The opening of the rhapsodic hymn takes the form not of a "du-Stil" invocation but of an "*exordium*" (as I shall term it) that explicitly announces the intent to praise. In this exordium a first-person verb form (ἀείδω, ᾄσομαι, ἄρχομ' ἀείδειν, or the like) or an imperative addressed to the Muse(s) (ὕμνει, ἔννεπε, or the like)[6] is combined with a specification of the theme of song (i.e. the god's name); the latter is typically adorned with one or more epithets, a genitive of parentage, or other honorific phrases. At the point where the declaration of encomiastic intent is syntactically complete (usually within the first line or line and a half), further epithets may be added, ranging in number from a single pendant word to a list that occupies several lines.[7]

[3] The "Erinnerungselement" was given the name "Hypomnese" by Meyer 5 (with an eye to μνῆσαι in e.g. *Il.* 15.372ff. and *Od.* 4. 762ff.).

[4] On "du-Stil" and "er-Stil" see E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 4th ed. (Stuttgart 1956) 143-166. The "du-Stil" characteristic of the cult form is in the rhapsodic hymn normally restricted to the epilogue: the *Hymn to Apollo* is highly unusual in its frequent use of direct address in the body of the hymn.

Following the exordium, which announces the hymnist's intent to praise, appears the substance of the praise itself, the hymnal "*mid-section*" that constitutes, in all but the very shortest rhapsodic hymns, the bulk of the composition. This section, which is regularly attached to the exordium by a relative pronoun (the "hymnal relative"), takes two basic forms. One is a generalized description of the god's nature as reflected in his haunts, his companions, his offices and functions (τιμαί, δυνάμεις), or his habitual pursuits. The other is an "epic" narrative recounting a particular episode or sequence of episodes from the god's life-history; favorite subjects are births, epiphanies, love-affairs, and the founding of religious institutions.[8] These two types of mid-section I shall call the *descriptio* and the *narratio* respectively. The shorter hymns in the Homeric collection are more likely to contain mid-sections of the descriptive sort, although a narrative account of a deity's birth and reception in Olympus appears in *h.* 6 (Aphrodite) and *h.* 28 (Athena) among others. The mid-sections of the four "great hymns" (to Demeter, Apollo, Hermes, and Aphrodite) are all *narrationes*. Occasionally narrative and descriptive modes are combined in a single hymn, as for example in *h.* 5, which in-

[5] On the structure of the rhapsodic hymn see P. Friedländer, "Das Proömium der Theogonie," *Hermes* 49 (1914) 1-16 (= *Studien zur antiken Literatur und Kunst* [Berlin 1969] 68-80, Meyer 19-24, L. H. Lenz, *Der homerische Aphroditehymnus und die Aristie des Aineias in der Ilias* (Bonn 1975) 9ff. and Appendix I, Janko, "Structure" 9-24.

[6] Cf. Friedländer 70. First person: ἀείδω (12, 18, 27), ἄρχομ' ἀείδειν (2, 11, 13, 16, 22, 26, 28), ᾄσομαι/ἀείσομαι (6, 10, 15, 23, 30), μνήσομαι (3, 7), ἄρχωμαι (25; cf. ἀρχώμεθ' ἀείδειν in *Theog.* 1). Second person: ἔννεπε (5, 19), ἔσπετε (32, 33), ἀείσεο/ἀείδεο (17, 20), ὕμνει (4, 9, 14), ὑμνεῖν ἄρχεο (31). On the implications of ἄρχομαι in this connection see Keyssner 9-13, Race, "Aspects" 5-8.

[7] Cf. Janko, "Structure" 10. Setting *h.* 8 (Ares) aside, clearly not a rhapsodic but a "cult" piece, the longest epithet-catalogues are found in *h.* 27 and 28.

[8] Cf. Wünsch (above, note 1) 147, Friedländer 71. Janko, "Structure" 11 terms the two types of mid-section "Attributive" and "Mythic."

terjects a lengthy excursus on Aphrodite's power and its limits between the opening announcement of the goddess's ἔργα as theme and the tale of her union with Anchises to which most of the poem is devoted.[9] As we shall see shortly, the *Hymn to Apollo* is of this mixed type, although considerably more complex in its mixture than the *Hymn to Aphrodite*.

Following the narrative or descriptive mid-section of the rhapsodic hymn is the *epilogue*. In its minimal form the epilogue does no more than salute, with imperatives such as χαῖρε and ἵληθι, the god in whose honor the hymn has been performed. More commonly, however, and especially in the more substantial hymns, the salutation is combined either with a request of some sort, or with a statement pertaining to the poet's future plans for song, or with both together.[10] The request, when found, is the clearest evidence to support the view that the rhapsodic and the "cult" hymn share a common origin, but the role it plays in the total composition is quite different in the two forms. Even when the request is for something as concrete as "soul-satisfying sustenance" (*h.* 30.18 βίοτον θυμήρε' ὄπαζε) or "victory in this contest" (*h.* 6.19-20 δὸς δ' ἐν ἀγῶνι νίκην τῷδε φέρεσθαι), it still has the flavor of an afterthought, a "By the way ..." The hymnist's real concern is not with the incidental advantages he may gain from his performance but with the god's own satisfaction and pleasure: χαῖρε means "rejoice," not simply "hail" or "farewell," and specifically it bids the god to "take delight" *in the song that has just been sung* (cf. *h.* 9.7 and 14.6 καὶ σὺ μὲν οὕτω χαῖρε θεαί θ' ἅμα πᾶσαι ἀοιδῇ).[11]

In case this outline of the two major hymn-types has appeared to overstate the differences between them, it should be reiterated that they have much in common, not only in their formal elements (honorific epithets, for example, or the request) but in their purpose. Both types concern themselves with the praise of a god. In "cult" hymns, however, the praise is part of a general strategy of persuasion whereby the god may be brought to grant the speaker's plea for aid; it is a means to a quite different end.[12] Except incidentally, the rhapsodic hymn does not look beyond the rendering of the praise itself and the god's pleasure therein.

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[9] See below, pp. 29-30.

[10] On the varieties of epilogue see below, pp. 60-61 and Miller 176-177, Janko, "Structure" 15-16.

[11] Cf. *Il.* 10. 462 χαῖρε, θεά, τοῖσδεσσι "take pleasure in these offerings," and see Keyssner 131-132, Bundy, "Quarrel" 49-50, Race, "Aspects" 8-10. In καὶ σὺ μὲν οὕτω χαῖρε the demonstrative οὕτω points, like τοῖσδεσσι, to the offering at hand, i.e. the performance that is now drawing to a close; the singer bids the god to accept the song "thus," "as it now stands," with an implication of inevitable imperfections that he will generously overlook.

[12] Cf. Meyer 3 on "Lobpreisung, deren eigentlicher Sinn darin besteht, die Gottheit auf diesem Umwege zur Erfüllung der Bitten besonders willig zu machen."

The rhapsodic hymn, in other words, is in its *primary* intention encomiastic; the "cult" hymn is encomiastic only secondarily. As such the rhapsodic hymn bears a close generic affinity with other types of praise-poetry (including the epinician) and with the prose encomium of later periods. The affinity is explicitly recognized in the rhetorical handbooks of late antiquity. Theon of Alexandria, for example, having first discriminated between ἐγκώμιον (for living men), ἐπιτάφιος (for the dead), and ὕμνος (for gods), goes on to affirm: "But whether it is the living or the dead, or heroes and gods, that one praises, one and the same rhetorical approach is involved" (ἀλλ' εἴτε ζῶντας εἴτε τελευτήσαντας, ἢ καὶ ἥρωας καὶ θεούς τις ἐγκωμιάζοι, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῶν λόγων ἔφοδος).[13] Although no doubt the kind of hymn that Theon chiefly has in mind is the prose hymn of contemporary practice (Aelius Aristides provides numerous examples) rather than metrical compositions of the "Homeric" type, the one is demonstrably a lineal descendant of the other, and despite many centuries of development considerable common ground among the various encomiastic genres—verse and prose, hymnic and non-hymnic—remains in evidence.

One part of that common ground is the central role given to αὔξησις or "amplification," which Aristotle discusses in *Rhet.* I.9.[14] Having defined praise (ἔπαινος) as "language that sets forth the greatness of virtue" (I.9.33 λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς), Aristotle remarks that "amplification is with good reason ranked as one of the forms of praise, since it consists in superiority, and superiority is one of the things that are noble" (9.39 πίπτει δ' εὐλόγως ἡ αὔξησις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν). Furthermore, since the actions dealt with by "epideictic" orators (i.e. those concerned with praise and blame) are not open to dispute like those treated in forensic or deliberative rhetoric, "all that remains is to attribute beauty and importance to them" (9.40 τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος). Aristotle reasonably concludes that of the *topoi* common to all three branches of rhetoric *auxesis* is the "most appropriate" (9.40 ἐπιτηδειοτάτη, II.18.5 οἰκειότατον) to that branch that has praise and blame as its special function (ἔργον). In the rhapsodic hymn, as to a lesser extent in the "cult" hymn, "amplification" in a

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[13] L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* II (Leipzig 1894) 109.24-26; cf. Hermogenes (II. 13.21-23) οὐχ ἀγνοεῖς ὅπως θεοὺς ἐγκωμιαστέον, ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι τὰ εἰς θεοὺς ὕμνους κλητέον, Menander (III. 331.18-20) ἔπαινος δέ τις γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν εἰς τὰ θεῖα, ὁτὲ δὲ εἰς τὰ θνητά, καὶ ὅτε μὲν εἰς θεούς, ὕμνους καλοῦσιν, Aphthonius (II. 35.28-29) τὸν μὲν ὕμνον εἶναι θεῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον θνητῶν.

[14] The translation quoted is by J. H. Freese (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1926). On *auxesis* cf. also *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1425b36-1426b22, Quintilian 8.4, and see H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (Munich 1960) 220-227.

quite general sense is, as we have seen, a prime objective: whether simply in order to please the god, or in order thereby to gain some personal advantage, the hymnist undertakes to "make great" the god's power and glory. In achieving this end he can, and frequently does, avail himself of "amplification" in Aristotle's technical sense, imparting μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος to his subject through rhetorical means. The multiplication of honorific epithets common to both hymnal types (though more typical of "cult" hymns) is transparently "auxetic" in this sense, and in the descriptive and narrative mid-sections of rhapsodic hymns topics are selected and treated with an eye to the same effect. In our analysis of the *Hymn to Apollo* we will frequently have occasion to note rhetorical devices through which the poet makes vivid to his audience the δύναμις of his chosen subject.

Another feature of encomiastic rhetoric that is relevant to hymnal practice, and particularly to the *Hymn to Apollo*, is the notion of a standard sequence of topics—a "program" or "agenda"—through which the intent to praise is realized.[15] As prescribed by the rhetorical handbooks, a fully developed encomium begins with a proem appropriate to its general subject and then proceeds to treat the following κεφάλαια in order:

1) *origin* (γένος), often subdivided into race (ἔθνος), country or city (πατρίς, πόλις), ancestors (πρόγονοι), and parents (πατέρες);[16]
2) *upbringing* (ἀνατροφή), comprising both physical nurture (τροφή) and training or education (ἀγωγή, παιδεία);[17]

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[15] For a brief historical survey of "epideictic practice and theory" see the Introduction to D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford 1981) xi-xxxiv; for discussion of the specific "program" at issue see xxv-xxviii. Menander recommends the sequence (with minor variations) for use in a number of epideictic "kinds" (e.g. praise of cities, *basilikos logos*, *epibaterios*, *genethliakos*, *stephanotikos*, *epitaphios*). The pattern is already evident in the *epitaphioi* of the fourth century B.C.; cf. *Menex*. 237a τὴν εὐγένειαν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐγκωμιάζωμεν, δεύτερον δὲ τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τὴν τῶν ἔργων πρᾶξιν ἐπιδείξωμεν, [Dem.] 60.27 (ἃ μὲν οὖν κοινῇ πᾶσιν ὑπῆρχεν τοῖσδε τοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἰς τὸ καλῶς ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν, εἴρηται, γένος, παιδεία, χρηστῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων συνήθεια. Hyperides (*Epitaph*. 6-9) begins his praise of the fallen by asking, "What shall I mention first? Their γένος? No, that is not necessary when one is speaking of Athenians. Their παιδείᾳ, then, ὡς ἐν πολλῇ σωφροσύνῃ παῖδες ὄντες ἐτράφησαν καὶ ἐπαιδεύθησαν? Again, not necessary. ἁπλούστατον οὖν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ διεξελθεῖν ἀρετήν ..."

[16] Cf. Aphthonius (Spengel II. 36.9-11) προοιμιάσῃ μὲν πρὸς τὴν οὖσαν ὑπόθεσιν· εἶτα θήσεις τὸ γένος, ὃ διαιρήσεις εἰς ἔθνος, πατρίδα, προγόνους, καὶ πατέρας, Nicolaus (III. 479.30-480.1) διαιρεῖται οὖν μετὰ τὰ προοίμια πρώτῳ κεφαλαίῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους, ὅπερ λαμβάνεται ἀπὸ ἔθνους, ἀπὸ πόλεως, ἀπὸ προγόνων. ἔθνος and πόλις are of course irrelevant categories in connection with Apollo. The hymn's γένος-section has much to say about πατέρες (i.e. Leto) and πατρίς (i.e. Delos): Nicolaus (III. 480.32-33) gives warrant for dwelling on the actual birth εἴ τι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ὠδῖνος ἔξομεν λέγειν συμβεβηκὸς περὶ αὐτόν (cf. Hermogenes II. 12.7-9).

[17] Cf. Nicolaus (III. 481.6-9) εἶτα μετὰ τὸ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν παραληψόμεθα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀνατροφῆς, ἂν ἔχωμέν τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἐξαίρετον λέγειν καὶ οἷον μὴ ἑτέροις γέγονεν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Ἀχιλλέως, ὅτι μυελοῖς ἐλάφων ἐτράφη, καὶ ὅτι ὑπὸ Χείρωνος. To literal τροφή (exemplified once again by

3) *studies* and *pursuits* (ἐπιτηδεύματα), including choice of *métier* (τέχνη) or career (βίος), e.g. philosophy, rhetoric, politics, military service;[18]
4) *exploits* (πράξεις), generally agreed to be the most important of the topics as attesting most directly and persuasively to the abilities of the person being praised.[19]

The somewhat dry schematization of this outline should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the topics listed are essentially identical with the major topics of praise in rhapsodic hymns.[20] The single most frequent theme for song in the Homeric collection is the god's parentage and birth—that is to say, his *genos*. Dionysus' upbringing at the hands of the nymphs of Nyse—that is to say, his *anatrophe*—is the subject of one short hymn (*h*. 26). Hymns with descriptive rather than narrative mid-sections typically concern themselves with a god's habitual and characteristic activities—that is to say, his *epitedeumata*. The five longest hymns are devoted (wholly or in part) to particular deeds of note—that is to say, *praxeis*—performed by a god in interaction with human beings. One of these hymns, the *Hymn to Hermes*, combines a brief account of the god's birth with a far longer and more detailed recitation of the "famous deeds" (16 κλυτὰ ἔργα) performed on his first day of life. And in the *Hymn to Apollo* all *four* of the standard encomiastic topics are treated, though with varying degrees of elaboration; they are, moreover, arranged in the

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Achilles' peculiar diet) Hermogenes (II. 12.10-12) adds ἡ ἀγωγή, πῶς ἤχθη ἢ πῶς ἐπαιδεύθη. In the *Hymn* τροφή appears in Apollo's consumption of the nectar and ambrosia (127) and his subsequent transformation from infant to adult; the period of ἀγωγή and παιδεία unavoidable in a mortal career is by-passed completely.

[18] Cf. Hermogenes (II. 12.17-18) ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷον ποῖον ἐπετήδευσε βίον, φιλόσοφον ἢ ῥητορικὸν ἢ στρατιωτικόν, Nicolaus (III. 481.10-12) μετὰ ταῦτα, ἅπερ ἐν τῇ νέᾳ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπετήδευσεν, εἰ ῥητορικὴν, ἤσκησεν ἢ πολιτικὴν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων. In 131-132 Apollo announces his choice of βίοι or τέχναι (κιθαριστική, τοξευτική, and μαντική), each of which is demonstrated in the course of the *Hymn* (see next note).

[19] Cf. Nicolaus (III. 481.12-13) εἶτα ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένα, Aphthonius (II. 36.12-13) εἶτα το μέγιστον τῶν ἐγκωμίων κεφάλαιον ἐποίσεις τὰς πράξεις, Hermogenes (II. 12.18-20) τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον αἱ πράξεις· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αἱ πράξεις, οἷον στρατιωτικὸν βίον ἑλόμενος τί ἐν τούτῳ κατέπραξε. A frequent recommendation (e.g. by Theon, Menander, Nicolaus) is that the various *praxeis* be dealt with under the rubrics of the "four virtues" (courage, justice, temperance, wisdom). The *praxeis*-section of the *Hymn* begins with the second theme-selection (207ff.) and runs to the end; its great length relative to the other topics is in accord with the scholiast's comment on Aphthonius: μέγιστον αὐτὸ φησὶν ... ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιτετμημένως καὶ κατὰ παραδρομὴν παρερχόμεθα, ἐν δὲ ταύταις ἐμπλατυνόμεθα. Hermogenes' comment on the relation of *praxeis* to *epitedeumata* sheds light on the programmatic force of 131-132; see below, p. 54.

[20] *Genos* (i.e. birth) in *h*. 1, 3, 4, 6, 16, 17, 28; *anatrophe* in 26 (on which see below, pp. 51-53); *epitedeumata* in 9, 11, 14, 27; *praxeis* in 2, 3, 4, 5, 7. *H*. 19 (Pan), apparently one of the younger hymns, artfully subordinates a birth-*narratio* to a generalized account of *epitedeumata*; cf. Friedländer 72.

same order—the order "according to nature" (κατὰ φύσιν)—that is canonical in later encomiastic rhetoric.[21]

A central thesis of the present study is that the presence of this "program" in the *Hymn to Apollo*, far from being a mere coincidence or oddity, reflects both the general continuity of "encomium" (broadly conceived) as a literary mode and the particular intentions of a "rhapsodic" hymnist committed to celebrating one of the most diverse of all Greek deities. The validity of the thesis must be judged by the close analysis that follows, but it may perhaps be found helpful if the general rhetorical structure of the hymn which that analysis will reveal is set forth in summary fashion at the outset.

1) *Prooimion* (1-18), comprising the hymnal exordium proper (1), a *descriptio* "amplifying" the announced hymnal subject (2-13), and a parenthetical salute to Leto as mother of Apollo and Artemis (14-18);
2) *Genos* (19-126), comprising a formal selection of Apollo's birth as the first theme of song (19-29) and a *narratio* of the birth itself with its antecedent and attendant circumstances (30-126);
3) *Anatrophe* and *Epitedeumata* (127-206), comprising a brief narrative account of Apollo's maturation and claiming of τιμαί (127-139) and a much longer "descriptive" treatment of his geographical preferences (with special emphasis on Delos) and his characteristic activities as lyre-master (140-206), into which is inserted an apostrophe to the chorus of maidens who perform at the Delian festival (165-176) and a re-affirmation of the hymnist's intent to praise Apollo (177-178);
4) *Praxeis* (207-544), comprising a formal selection of Apollo's quest for an oracle as the current theme of song (207-215) and an extended *narratio* of Apollo's search for a suitable site, his building and safeguarding of the temple at Pytho, and his drafting of Cretan merchants to be his priests (216-544), into which is inserted a digression on the birth of the monster Typhon (305-355);
5) *Epilogue* (545-546).

[21] On Apollo's "Lebensgang" as the "Leitfaden" of the *Hymn* cf. Unte 104. For an example of the encomiastic scheme in a prose hymn cf. Aristides 38.5ff. (to the sons of Asclepius), where a brief treatment of ancestry and *anatrophe* (5-7, summarized οὕτω δὲ φύντες καὶ τραφέντες καὶ παιδευθέντες) is followed by a more detailed account of their deeds at Troy and elsewhere. In Call. *h. Zeus* the sequence is slightly different: *genos* in 4ff. (with *dubitatio* about the place of birth), *anatrophe* in 28ff. (with details of swaddling, cradling, feeding of milk and honey, and cf. 34 παιδεύοιο, 54 καλὰ μὲν ἠέξευ, καλὰ δ' ἔτραφες), a summary treatment of *praxeis* in 56ff. (cf. ἀλλ' ἔτι παιδνὸς ἐὼν ἐφράσσαο πάντα τέλεια, 65 ἔργα δὲ χειρῶν), *epitedeumata* (i.e. Zeus's προαιρέσεις) in 69ff. (cf. 69 εἵλεο, 72 ἐξέλεο, 79 ἐκρίναο). In Menander's Περὶ Σμινθιακοῦ the *genos*-section is similarly developed through *dubitatio* (was Apollo born on Delos or in Lycia?); *epitedeumata* and *praxeis* are treated jointly in the single category of δυνάμεις or ἀρεταί (τοξική, μαντική, ἰατρική, μουσική). Russell and Wilson (above, note 15) 355 remark: "The idea gives an atractive scheme for an encomium on the same scale as the four cardinal virtues in the encomium of human beings" (cf. above, note 19). In the *Sminthiakos* only *anatrophe* is missing—but then of all the standard encomiastic topics that is naturally most likely to be given short shrift in relation to deities. Cf. Wilamowitz 449 (*à propos* of *h. Ap.* 127ff.): "Der Glaube verweilt zwar gern bei der Erzeugung und Geburt seiner Götter, aber eine lange Zeit der Hilflosigkeit, des Wachsens und Lernens kann er sich nicht denken."

In the *Hymn to Apollo* the tripartite structure of the typical rhapsodic hymn—exordium, mid-section, epilogue—has undergone a process of quite extraordinary elaboration; indeed, only the epilogue, a formulaic couplet that (with appropriate variations) concludes nearly one third of the hymns in the Homeric collection, retains its typical simplicity. Except for the apostrophes to Leto and to the Deliades (elsewhere in the collection "du-Still" is reserved for the formally announced subject of the hymn), the individual elements outlined above can be paralleled from other hymns. What makes the *Hymn to Apollo* unique is the cumulative complexity of the total composition. In a literary exegesis of the hymn that complexity is both a challenge and a reward, for it proves to mirror on the level of poetic *form* a corresponding complexity of thought in the poet's handling of his *themes*. In the study that follows an attempt is made to do justice to the poet's achievement on both levels.

LINES 1-18: THE PROEM

Nearly all the hymns in the Homeric collection move from the exordium, the poet's formal announcement of his intent to praise, directly to the narrative or descriptive "mid-section" that constitutes the substance of the praise itself.[22] One of the many ways in which the *Hymn to Apollo* departs from the typical is in the prolonged postponement of its first item of narrative "business," the celebration of Apollo's birth. Not until lines 19ff. is this topic formally selected by means of an "aporetic priamel"; not until lines 45 ff. is the narrative itself unmistakably revealed to be in progress. As an independent and clearly articulated unit that stands apart from both the birth-narrative and the priamel that introduces it, the first eighteen lines of the hymn can with some justice be viewed as a *prooimion* to the work as a whole. This proem consists of the "hymnal exordium" proper (1), a brief *descriptio* of Apollo as archer entering the halls of Zeus (2-13), and an apostrophe or salutation to Apollo's mother Leto (14-18).[23]

Line 1: The Exordium

In this brief exordium the subjective and objective poles of the hymnal situation are set in balanced relation on either side of the caesura: Μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι forcefully declares the poet's encomiastic intention, 'Απόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο announces the object toward which his efforts will be directed. Though formally equivalent to ἀείδω, ἀείσομαι, and the like, μνήσομαι suggests, from its regular appearance in hymnal epilogues, an attentive devotion to the deity that will not be exhausted by the present performance; the poet seems to be asserting not merely that he will *on this occasion* praise Apollo rather than pass over him in silence, but also that he will *always* be mindful of the god and *never* neglect his due.[24] The

[22] On *h.* 5, a notable exception, see below, pp. 29-30.

[23] The distinction between the "proem proper" of 1-18 and the *propositio* or "engere Themastellung" of 19-29 is noted by both Jacoby 701 and Drerup 114. Van Groningen 307, note 2, admits the validity of the distinction but warns that over-stressing it "court le risque de faire perdre de vue ce que tout le passage a de mobilité et de grace vivante"—a point that is, as we shall see, well taken. That 1-13 alone form the proem of the *Hymn* (or at least of "D") is a critical commonplace; cf. Burckhardt-Biedermann 9, Cessi 871, Kalinka 389, Deubner 269, Regenbogen 50, Allen-Sikes 65, Roux 1.

[24] Cf. van Groningen 305: "L'idée reste encore très générale; l'auteur y proclame son intention de ne pas oublier le dieu, mais de se souvenir de lui, ce qui implique l'idée de parler de lui. Apollon sera (toujours) présent à son esprit et un sujet fréquent de ses poèmes." No such resonant generality is to be felt in *h.* 7.1f. ('Αμφὶ Διώνυσον Σεμέλης ἐρικυδέος υἱὸν μνήσομαι, ὡς ἐφάνη παρὰ θῖν' ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο), where word-order and the con-

repetition of thought in οὐδὲ λάθωμαι, moreover, a verb itself more usually epilogic than proemial, intensifies the tone of scrupulous care by raising, while rejecting, the possibility of forgetful neglect and its adverse consequences for worshipper and singer alike.[25]

Lines 2-13: The First Olympian Scene

The "hymnal relative" ὅν, which might have effected an immediate transition to the main *narratio*, serves instead to introduce a short *descriptio* of Apollo's arrival among the assembled deities on Olympus.[26] Partial parallels for this scene are provided by *Il.* 1.533-535 and 15.84-88. All three passages are set in the house of Zeus; in all three the gods leap up *en masse* at the sight of the newcomer. Both *h. Ap.* 4 and *Il.* 1.534 include the detail of the seats so hastily vacated and specify the newcomer's actual approach as the catalyst of action. In *Il.* 15.86, as in *h. Ap.* 10-11, the newcomer is given a cup and toasted. That a feast is either in progress or is about to begin is implicit in all three passages; in *Il.* 1, this feast is described in summary fashion some sixty lines later (601-604). The essential point of difference between the scenes, of course, lies in the identity of the new arrival and in the precise nature of the emotional response that he evokes. In *Il.* 15 the reaction to Hera's angry entrance is apparently one of respectful welcome untinged by fear, for rather than shrink from her approach the others straightway offer her pledges with their cups. In *Il.* 1 healthy respect for a father seems to be balanced by healthy awe before a monarch; Zeus is not angry (yet), nor is there

struction with ἀμφί require that μνήσομαι be taken closely with the clause that follows and mean little more than "make mention" or "recount." See further Keyssner 14.

[25] On the dangers attendant upon forgetfulness cf. *Il.* 9. 533-549, *Od.* 4.351-353, Call. *h. Art.* 1-2, *h. Del.* 7-8

[26] The presence of an imperfect (μίμνε) and a series of aorists (ἐχάλασσε, ἐκλήϊσε, ἀνεκρέμασε, εἷσεν, ἔδωκε) between the present-tense forms of 2-4 (τρομέουσιν, ἀναΐσσουσιν, τιταίνει) and 12 (καθίζουσιν, χαίρει) has led some scholars to interpret 2-13 as a historical *narratio* of Apollo's first appearance on Olympus after his birth (e.g. Deubner 271-272, Kroll 182, Unte 22, Forderer 64) or as a clumsy conflation of habitual and one-time actions (e.g. Burckhardt-Biedermann 23, West 163, Janko, "Structure" 17). The chief argument used in support of this interpretation is that only under such a supposition do Apollo's brandishing of the bow and the reaction of the other gods become explicable. In fact, however, the motivation of the scene is to be sought elsewhere (see below, pp. 14-16), and although the reception of a new god by his fellow immortals is a typical hymnal motif (cf. *h.* 6.15-18, 19.42-47, *Theog.* 68, 202), it invariably concludes account of the god's birth. As for the question of the tenses, it should be noted (1) that whereas "gnomic" aorists are not uncommon in hymnal *descriptio* (cf. 5.2-6, 36-39, 19.12-13), the historical present is not found elsewhere in *narratio* (or indeed in early *epos* at all; cf. Kühner-Gerth 134, Förstel 101-109), and (2) that the passage begins (ὅν τε) and ends (χαίρει δέ τε) with the generalizing force of an "epic τε", what C. J. Ruijgh, *Autour de "τε épique"* (Amsterdam 1971) calls the "τε digressif-permanent." On the "typifying" force of the imperfect ἔμιμνε see M. L. West, *Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 156.

anything particularly threatening in his demeanor. Apollo's entrance, however, inspires a far more intense reaction than either respect or awe, for it is in outright "fear and trembling" (2 τρομέουσιν) that the gods vacate their seats at his approach—"when," that is to say, "he is bending his shining bow." The limitative force of ὅτε φαίδιμα τόξα τιταίνει (4) is significant, for it shows that it is Apollo's stance at the moment, not Apollo in and of himself, that is the cause of panic.[27] Once Leto has disarmed him and hung up his weapons on the golden peg, the trepidation immediately subsides; Zeus toasts his "dear son" in nectar, the gods resume their seats, and the feast which by implication was in progress or about to begin when Apollo enters proceeds in perfect harmony.

The rhetorical function of this little vignette is not far to seek: opening as it does with the gods' terror as Apollo "bends his shining bow" and closing with Leto's joy in a son "who wields the bow and is mighty," it serves as a kind of dramatized gloss on ἑκάτοιο in line 1, an epithet which, as a shortened by-form of ἑκηβόλος, ἑκατηβόλος, ἑκατηβελέτης, typifies Apollo in his capacity as archer.[28] By setting the scene in an Olympian context, moreover, the poet is implicitly propounding an argument *a fortiori*: if Apollo's *dynamis* evokes such a reaction from his fellow immortals, immune as they must be to any real injury at his hands, how can mere human beings hope even to comprehend, let alone withstand, it?[29] Thus lines 2-13 constitute the first of the numerous stratagems of rhetorical "amplification" (auxesis) through which the poet of the *Hymn* will, in the course of his work, make Apollo's greatness more perspicuous to his hearers.[30] To regard the lines as nothing more

[27] On the force of τιταίνει cf. Forderer 166, note 17: "Apollon hat in Vers 4 den Bogen sicherlich nicht gespannt, indem er die Sehne aufzog ... sondern indem er den Pfeil anlegte, wodurch der Bogen zum Kreis gezogen wird (wie Il. 4, 116-126; 5, 97; 11, 370)." It need not follow, of course, that Apollo is deliberately *aiming* at the other gods (a relation expressed by ἐπί with the dative in the last two passages cited by Forderer), merely that he is flexing the bow in a general posture of readiness.

[28] Cf. H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologischen Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960) 474.

[29] In the longer *Hymn to Aphrodite*, which alone in the Homeric collection resembles the *Hymn to Apollo* in inserting a *descriptio* between exordium and main narrative, a similar argument *a fortiori* is found: Aphrodite's dominion over animate nature is magnified by the assertion that, Athena, Artemis, and Hestia aside, nothing and no one escapes her influence—not even Zeus himself, ὅς τε μέγιστός τ' ἐστί, μεγίστης δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς (37). The explicit exception of the three professional virgins throws Aphrodite's otherwise unlimited sway into greater prominence, just as in *h. Ap.* 2-13 the imperturbability of Leto and Zeus only heightens the impression of panicked confusion amid the rest of the divine assembly.

[30] The auxetic force of 2-13 is most clearly recognized by Floratos 294, Roux 1, van Groningen 305, note 2, Unte 23, Förstel 170. Quintilian (VIII. 4.15) calls amplification of this type *ratiocinatio*: "One thing is magnified [e.g. the reaction to Apollo's entrance] in order to effect a corresponding augmentation elsewhere [i.e. in Apollo's *dynamis*], and it is by reasoning that our hearers are led on from the first point to the second which we desire to emphasize" (tr. H. E. Butler [Cambridge, Mass. and London 1921]).

than an evocation of Apollo's awesome power, however, is to overlook their true complexity, for they present, mirrored in the gods' response, not one but *two* aspects of Apollo's nature, one revealed by the presence of the tautened bow, the other by its relinquishment. The apparent problem of motivation that the scene poses, namely why Apollo should enter the house of Zeus with his bow at the ready as if threatening the bodily safety of his fellow Olympians,[31] disappears once we see that the hymnist is making use, in boldly elliptical fashion, of a conventional contrast between a divine figure as violent actor in the world at large and that same figure, all instruments of violence laid aside, at leisure amid a divine assembly.

To see this contrast set forth *in extenso* we can turn to *h.* 27, which describes how Artemis, roaming hill and dale, "bends her golden bow" (5 παγχρύσεα τόξα τιταίνει) while the mountain tops "tremble" (6 τρομέει) and the woodland "echoes terribly with the clamor of beasts" (7-8 ἰαχεῖ ... δεινὸν ὑπὸ κλαγγῆς θηρῶν) until, having had her fill of hunting, the goddess goes to her brother's house at Delphi, hangs up her weapons (16 κατακρεμάσασα παλίντονα τόξα καὶ ἰούς), and leads a choir of Muses and Graces in dance and song. The structural articulation of the hymn could scarcely be more overt: antithetical scenes of Artemis at hunt and Artemis in festival are juxtaposed on either side of a pivotal couplet (11-12) that marks the point at which satiety in the pleasures of the one pastime leads to its abandonment in favor of the other. On the one side we find a solitary figure abroad in the world, on the other one figure among many within the fastness of a divine mansion; on the one side a passionate engagement in violent activity, on the other the peaceful and measured movement of the dance; on the one side the bow launching arrows thick and fast, on the other the bow hung up in idleness; on the one side the discordant sounds of terror, on the other the harmony of "ambrosial song."[32]

The contrasts set out with such clarity in *h.* 27 are operative as well in the first book of the *Iliad*. The main action of that book is framed on the one side by the wrathful Apollo's assault on the Greek host, loud with the rattle of arrows and the dire twang of the bowstring (*Il.* 1.44-52), and on the other by the feast of reconciliation on Olympus, where the gods' appetite for the meal itself is no more keen than for Apollo's "surpassing-

[31] West 163 calls Apollo's behavior "a peculiar business"; to Kirk 167 it is "well outside the limits of Homeric *ethos*, where the gods on Olympus can sulk or be rebuked, but indulge in no generic posturings, and where only Ares and Aphrodite ever devolve, as Apollo does here, into figures of burlesque." Some scholars have explained the scene by reference to iconography in the plastic arts (e.g. Wilamowitz 442, Fränkel *DPh* 289, note 7) or to Near Eastern μυθολογούμενα (e.g. Kroll 181-185, Guida 12, Càssola 84).

[32] On *h.* 27 in relation to *h. Ap.* 1-13 cf. Gemoll 116, Dornseiff, *AM* 53.

ly beautiful lyre" and the "lovely voices" of the Muses (1.601-602). Although here the solitary feats of archery and the participation in general good cheer are separated by a lengthy interval of action rather than being directly juxtaposed as in *h.* 27, they clearly stand in the same relation of balanced contrast. Once again violent activity in the world at large finds its antithesis in the festive tranquillity of the divine assembly, where harsh sounds of anger, fear, and pain give way to song and the bow is laid aside in favor of the lyre.[33]

The relevance of *h.* 27 and *Il.* 1 to *h. Ap.* 2-13, then, lies not in mere echoes of diction and mood but in the set of thematic contrasts that they embody, for these provide the context in which Apollo's behavior, at first glance so bizarre, becomes explicable. His bow is at the ready because he has been wielding it in the world at large and has not yet, at the moment of entering Zeus's halls, adjusted his mood and bearing to his new surroundings. As Leto step by step disarms him, she is undoing a state of vigilance which, though proper to the realm from which Apollo has just returned, is at odds with decorum in the realm of harmonious leisure in which he now finds himself.[34] Once the bow has been unstrung and suspended from its golden peg,[35] the fearful incongruity of an instrument of violence in a festal context is eliminated and Apollo is ready to be absorbed into the spirit of the occasion. Whereas in *h.* 27 and *Il.* 1, however, the relationship between the scenes of archery and festivity is that of "before" and "after," the poet of the *Hymn to Apollo* melds them into one by focusing on the "in-between," the moment of transition. That Apollo has been plying his bow in the world beyond Olympus is *implied* by the way he enters and by the reaction of the other gods; that shortly a feast will follow, a feast of which song and the lyre are the natural accompaniments, is *implied* by the cup of nectar and the toast.[36] All that the poet allows his audience to *see*, however, is what happens between the threshold and the chair, the sequence of small events by which

[33] On *Il.* 1.43ff. and *h. Ap.* 2-13 see Burckhardt-Biedermann 3, note 2, Defradas 62, Jacoby 728; the latter hints at the relevance of *Il.* 1.601ff. as well. Cf. Ludwich 184: "Die Gegenüberstellung des ἑκηβόλος und κιθαριστής ist dieselbe wie im ersten Ilias-Buche (48 und 603)."

[34] The comment of Wilamowitz 442 ("Sie lehrt den Sohn, was sich auf dem Olymp schickt") captures the point but misrepresents the tone of the passage; see Jacoby 727, note 1.

[35] The taking down of Odysseus' bow from the πάσσαλος on which it has been stored is a moment of fateful significance for Penelope in *Od.* 21.53ff.; cf. Lycaon's lament in *Il.* 5.209ff.

[36] A feast follows the toast of welcome in *Il.* 9.196ff., *Od.* 3.41ff., 4.59ff., etc. Song and the *phorminx* are an integral part of the feast in *Il.* 1.601ff.; cf. also *Od.* 8.99 φόρμιγγος θ᾽ ἣ δαιτὶ συνήορός ἐστι θαλείῃ, 21.430 μολπῇ καὶ φόρμιγγι, τὰ γάρ τ᾽ ἀναθήματα δαιτός, 1.150-154.

the god is translated from the wide world of energetic action to the calm harmony of the Olympian retreat. By asking his hearers to supply for themselves, as they easily can, the antecedent and subsequent action, he is free to create a single brief scene of extraordinary concentration and dramatic power.[37]

The general significance of the opening scene as it bears upon Apollo himself has now been defined; it remains to be noted that for most of the twelve lines not Apollo but Leto is in the foreground of our attention. Against the backdrop of general panic sketched in lines 2-4, she is singled out as alone unshaken by Apollo's fierce epiphany (5 Λητὼ δ' οἴη μίμνε παρὰ Διὶ τερπικεραύνῳ). Since it is inconceivable that Zeus himself should be mastered by fear, he can serve as the fixed point by which Leto's own imperturbability is measured. Their physical proximity suggests, moreover, the intimate bond of shared interests and reactions that naturally links Apollo's parents on such an occasion.[38] While Zeus remains on the periphery, however, Leto takes active charge of the situation: it is she who removes the bow from Apollo's hands and unstrings it, then, shutting the quiver and lifting it from his shoulders, hangs all the weaponry against a pillar, and finally leads him to his chair and sits him down.[39] Throughout Apollo submits passively to her ministrations; it is her movements that catch and hold the eye. The momentary shift of focus while Zeus is welcoming his son and the other gods are resuming their seats makes the final return to Leto in lines 12-13 all the more emphatic. An observer and no longer an actor, she sits to one side, as it were, and looks on in pleasure at her son, rejoicing in those very qualities that have ceased to be evident to the gathering at large. Being herself the mediator through whom he has quit the wide world of action, she now contemplates with inward eye the awesome potentiality of Apollo in repose. Though his bow hangs unused, he is still τοξοφόρος; though his

[37] For further discussion of the scene and its significance for the world-view of the *Hymn* as a whole see Appendix 2.

[38] From the fact that Leto sits παραὶ Διί and Hera is not mentioned, Burckhardt-Biedermann 8, Bethe 15, and Kroll 183 conclude that to the poet of 1-13 (unlike the poet of 98ff.), Leto, not Hera, is Zeus's legitimate consort; but see Jacoby 704. Pindar not infrequently uses the metaphor of the πάρεδρος to express community of interest; cf. *O.* 2.76, 8.22, *N.* 7.1, *I.* 7.3.

[39] Since Apollo is "stretching his bow" in line 4, Leto cannot take it *from his shoulders* in line 7, nor can she plausibly unstring it in that position. The apparent inconcinnity in sense has been regarded as evidence for multiple authorship (e.g. by Jacoby 723-730, West 163). Deubner 273-274 suggests that Apollo is carrying a bow-case (γωρυτός) over his shoulders, into which Leto places the bow before removing the whole assemblage and hanging it on the peg; Forderer 166, note 17 proposes to take φαρέτρην as the object of ἑλοῦσα rather than τόξον, which is governed by ἀνεκρέμασε alone. "Τόξον ... universum telum significat et comprehendit arcum (βίον) et pharetram" (Baumeister 118).

might is circumscribed by the decorum of the feast, he is still καρτερός. To her who bore him the two aspects of his nature are visible at once.

In concluding his introductory *descriptio* with a reference to the emotional response of Leto as an onlooker, the poet is making use of a technique not infrequently found in Homeric similes. In *Il.* 8.555-559, for example, an evocation of a starry night is capped with the words γέγηθε δέ τε φρένα ποιμήν, and similarly in *Od.* 6.102-108 the comparison of Nausicaa to Artemis at play among her nymphs is punctuated by γέγηθε δέ τε φρένα Λητώ.[40] This "pleasure-motif," as it might be called, is also found in hymnal style, as is shown by *h.* 28 (Athena), which concludes γέγηθε δὲ μητίετα Ζεύς, and *h.* 19 (Pan), where the device is combined with a linguistic *aition* (Πᾶνα δέ μιν καλέεσκον ὅτι φρένα πᾶσιν ἔτερψε). In the *Hymn to Apollo* the motif is used with closural force on several occasions; indeed, it proves to be the chief means by which the major sections of the work are articulated. Here it signals the end of the proem proper (lines 14-18, as we shall see shortly, are formally a kind of coda). In lines 125-126 it demarcates the account of Apollo's birth, the poet's first topic, from the account of *anatrophe* and *epitedeumata* that follows.[41] In lines 204-206, its most elaborate realization, it sets a seal of completeness on the whole first half of the hymn immediately before the second theme-selection (207-215) announces the third and most important topic on the poet's encomiastic agenda, Apollo's *praxeis* at Pytho.[42]

Lines 14-18: The Salute to Leto

Although the *descriptio* of lines 2-13 is intended to magnify Apollo's stature by evoking the fear that his bow inspires among his fellow Olympians, Leto is in fact the figure on whom the audience's attention is most immediately centered, first as the protagonist in the unfolding action, then as an observer in whom the general effect of the scene is mirrored. For this reason the brief salute to her that follows, though unparalleled by other hymns, in no sense involves a violation of religious or rhetorical decorum.[43]

[40] Cf. also *Il.* 13.493 γάνυται δ' ἄρα τε φρένα ποιμήν, 20.405 γάνυται δέ τε τοῖς ἐνοσίχθων.

[41] See below, pp. 49-50.

[42] See below, pp. 68-69.

[43] Gemoll 122 and Jacoby 724, note 1, survey the various interpretations of the so-called "Letohymnus." Many earlier scholars (e.g. Kiesel, Schneidewin, Priem) regarded 14-18 as an independent hymn interpolated into a foreign context; to Wilamowitz 443 it is "längst ausgemacht" that the lines were intended to form, along with 1-13, "ein kleines Proömium an Leto." It is clear on formal grounds, however, that 14-18 could neither introduce nor end a rhapsodic hymn. For a recent defense of the passage see Förstel 114-118.

χαῖρε μάκαιρ' ὦ Λητοῖ, ἐπεὶ τέκες ἀγλαὰ τέκνα
'Απόλλωνά τ' ἄνακτα καὶ Ἄρτεμιν ἰοχέαιραν,
τὴν μὲν ἐν 'Ορτυγίῃ, τὸν δὲ κραναῇ ἐνὶ Δήλῳ,
κεκλιμένη πρὸς μακρὸν ὄρος καὶ Κύνθιον ὄχθον,
ἀγχοτάτω φοίνικος ὑπ' 'Ινωποῖο ῥεέθροις.

In vivid empathy with Leto's pleasure as reported in lines 12-13, the poet is moved to address her directly in congratulatory terms: "Rejoice indeed, blessed Leto, since you are the mother of such glorious children!"[44] Threefold repetition (χαίρει/χαῖρε, Λητώ/Λητοῖ, ἔτικτεν/τέκες) underscores the close sequence of thought and feeling.[45] Once again Leto's joy is grounded in a causal clause, but whereas line 13 refers to Apollo alone, in ἐπεὶ τέκες ἀγλαὰ τέκνα the focus widens: Leto's blessedness extends beyond a single son, however mighty, to *two* "glorious children." Artemis must be mentioned in this formal felicitation, for otherwise one of Leto's claims to glory would be slighted;[46] yet through the chiastic arrangement of lines 15-18 the poet contrives to satisfy this requirement of decorum in a way that furthers, rather than hinders, the celebration of Apollo that is his chosen task. The god is named first, as befits his preeminence on this occasion; when the respective birthplaces are specified, however, Ortygia precedes Delos, and so Artemis yields the emphatic final position to her brother. In scope and detail of treatment too Apollo is given preference: four words dispose of Artemis's birth, while his is circumstantially described in seventeen. Introduced in accord with propriety but formally irrelevant to the subject of the *Hymn*, Artemis and Ortygia are foil for Apollo and Delos; the focus widens momentarily only to be narrowed again with greater precision.

Closely linked through verbal repetition with what precedes, the salute to Leto functions partly as an epilogic dismissal of the opening *descriptio*, partly as a focusing device by which an irrelevant theme is introduced as foil for the real object of interest, and partly as a kind of "ethical proof" guaranteeing the poet's sincerity of feeling in his encomiastic endeavor.

[44] Cf. Forderer 64, van Groningen 306. Although χαῖρε cannot be a "farewell noise" (West 163) in any literal sense, since in that case the causal force of ἐπεί would be nonsensical, the epilogic associations of the imperative are not without their effect. The poet is "taking leave" not of Leto, who will play a major role in the upcoming narrative, but of the proemial *descriptio* itself. On the force of the imperfect ἔτικτεν see Förstel 354, note 239.

[45] On the repetition and its effect cf. Kirchhoff 917, Ludwich 183, Pfister 148, Deubner 264. Some (e.g. Altheim 433, Jacoby 726) regard the repetition as evidence that several hands were at work in the passage.

[46] The fact that Artemis and Ortygia are mentioned is for some scholars further evidence that 14-18 do not belong to the *Hymn*; cf. Baumeister 120, Altheim 436, Bethe 14. On the assumptions underlying Altheim's objection ("Für die Teilnahmer der Panegyris konnte nur eine delische Geburtsgeschichte Interesse haben") see Appendix 1.

This last effect is produced above all by the artfully artless associative movement from χαίρει to χαῖρε, which suggests that the apostrophe is an unpremeditated outpouring of piety and affection. The procedure is unorthodox, for nothing resembling such an "aside" is to be found in other hymns in the Homeric collection;[47] but it is precisely through this "impulsive" departure from the hymnal norm that the poet contrives to reveal an aspect of his character as a singer of praises. He is, he implies, a man attentive to religious proprieties, prompt to render what is due; yet his readiness springs rather from affectionate sympathy than from the calculations of scrupulosity. Instead of pursuing his chosen theme with mechanical rigor, he allows himself to be diverted momentarily by deep feeling, to risk the charge of formal irrelevance for the sake of a word from the heart.[48] Like the Pindaric claim to sing φυᾷ ("by nature") rather than merely as a "man of art," this stroke of ethical self-portraiture offers a credential of sincerity: it assures the audience that when their hymnist utters praise, he does so out of genuine and unconstrained enthusiasm, "meaning it," and is not simply reciting formulas by rote.[49]

[47] Janko, "Structure" 17-18 notes that the "Salutation to a deity ... not introduced at the start" is, as handled by the poet of the *Hymn*, "unique" in the Homeric collection.

[48] The "ethical" implications of the apostrophe are well brought out by Baumeister 120, who is however arguing for the ejection of the passage: "Nam quis, quaeso, poeta postquam Apollinem carmine se celebraturum promisit, deinde ad Latonam transeat? qua re non *argumentum* solum pessumdet, verum etiam *pietati*, credo, officiat" (emphasis mine). The (apparent) spontaneity is noted by Kalinka 389 ("ungezwungen") and Dornseiff, *AM* 3 ("diesen liebenswürdigen kleinen Seitensprung")—a phrase that captures the exuberance of the projected *ethos* but not its dignity. Dornseiff's interpretation of the *Hymn* as an elaborate joke often leads him to mistake the tone of particular passages; see below, notes 79 and 236.

[49] On "ethical proof" (πίστις ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος) see Arist. *Rhet.* I. 2.3-4. On τέχνα and φυά in Pindar, see Bundy, *SP* 15-17, 29-32; on *N.* 4.33-43, where Pindar asserts the inferiority of the mere "technician" as a way of justifying an apparent digression from the business at hand, see below, note 73.

LINES 19-126: *GENOS*

The main body of the *Hymn to Apollo* falls into two major sections (19-206, 207-544), demarcated on the one hand by the "pleasure-motif" of lines 204-206, on the other hand by the elaborate selection of a new theme of song in lines 207-215. The first of these two sections is itself bipartite, combining an account of Apollo's birth (*genos*) (19-126) with an account, partly in the narrative and partly in the descriptive mode, of his maturation and habitual pursuits (*anatrophe* and *epitedeumata*) (127-206). It is significant that the formal articulation of these two sub-sections through the "pleasure-motif" of lines 125-126 does not coincide with the shift from *narratio* to *descriptio* effected by lines 140-146, for by this overlap the formal unity of lines 19-206 as a whole is preserved.[50]

A similar overlap, moreover, is found between the *propositio thematis*, the formal announcement of Apollo's birth as the first topic on the poet's encomiastic "agenda" (19-29), and the narrative in which that topic is developed, for the geographical catalogue of lines 30-44 simultaneously concludes the one and introduces the other.[51] With line 45, however, the *narratio* is unmistakably under way. It falls into two major sections of approximately equal length, the first summarizing Leto's wanderings and reporting her interchange with Delos (45-88), the second being concerned with the intrigue surrounding Eileithyia's absence and with the birth itself (89-126). No other hymn in the collection that recounts a god's birth is as leisurely in its approach to the actual event as is the *Hymn to Apollo*; not until line 119 does the infant divinity "leap out toward the light." Before that happy moment can arrive first one and then another obstacle must be removed. Rejected by all other lands, Leto must persuade Delos to welcome her unborn son, and Eileithyia's presence on the island, a necessity if the labor is to be successful, must be secured despite the malicious interference of Hera.

Lines 19-29: The First *Propositio Thematis*

Drawing back abruptly from the narrow focus of the preceding apostrophe and shifting his direct address from Leto to Apollo himself,

[50] That the "delische Teil" as a whole is composed of an "epischer Bericht" (30-139) and a "hymnische Beschreibung" (140-206) is noted by Heubeck 145. Drerup divides the "Delian" from the "Pythian" hymn at line 206 rather than at 178 like other separatists because he is persuaded that 1-206 form "eine kunstvolle, festgeschlossene Einheit von hoher dichterischer Kunst" (121).

[51] See below, pp. 31-33. The term *propositio* is applied to lines 19ff. by Jacoby 701-703.

the poet in lines 19ff. professes bewilderment at the unlimited variety of themes for praise that the god in his greatness offers:

> Πῶς γάρ σ' ὑμνήσω πάντως εὔυμνον ἐόντα;
> πάντῃ γάρ τοι, Φοῖβε, νομὸς βεβλήαται ᾠδῆς,
> ἠμὲν ἀν' ἤπειρον πορτιτρόφον ἠδ' ἀνὰ νήσους.
> πᾶσαι δὲ σκοπιαί τοι ἅδον καὶ πρώονες ἄκροι
> ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ποταμοί θ' ἅλα δὲ προρέοντες,
> ἀκταί τ' εἰς ἅλα κεκλιμέναι λιμένες τε θαλάσσης.

The abundance of encomiastic material that in some rhetorical situations might be viewed as an enormous advantage is here regarded as an obstacle: εὐπορία issues in ἀπορία.[52] Two adverbs of manner, πῶς and πάντως, define the difficulty. Although Apollo is *in all ways* a worthy subject of song, a merely mortal encomiast must choose *one particular way* in which to begin if he wants to say anything at all, and on what basis is he to make this choice? The significant juxtaposition of encomiastic object (σε) and encomiastic intention (ὑμνήσω) in line 19 duplicates, in slightly sharper focus, the equally significant juxtaposition of Μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι and Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο in the exordium; what is new here is the poet's explicit concern with the proper qualitative adjustment of object and intention.[53] The *aporia* thus propounded is then elaborated by a "summary priamel" that translates the poet's thematic *embarras de richesse* into the concrete language of metaphor (20-23).[54] As the spatial adverb πάντῃ glosses πάντως, so νομὸς ᾠδῆς glosses εὔυμνον: "Everywhere, Phoebus, the range of song is laid down for you."[55] πάντῃ is then defined more closely as "on the mainland and throughout the islands"—a formulation of the conventional "land and sea" doublet that is of special relevance to a work concerned with Delos and Pytho, the "insular" and "continental" centers of Apolline worship.[56] When that broad geographical sketch is redrawn in somewhat finer detail in the next three lines, the land-sea polarity is preserved in the movement from high up

[52] For an excellent survey of the aporetic mode in all its variety see Bundy, "Quarrel" 57-77. The following discussion of *h. Ap.* 19ff. incorporates material from Miller 184-185.

[53] Cf. van Groningen 306: "... le verbe principal (ὑμνήσω) indique le thème avec une peu plus de précision, puisqu'il promet un hymne; l'adverbe πῶς fait savoir qu'une précision définitive devra encore être donnée."

[54] On 19ff. as a priamel see W. Kröhling, *Die Priamel (Beispielreihung) als Stilmittel in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung* (Greifswald 1935) 58, Race, *Priamel* 47-49. In the priamel in general see, in addition to Kröhling and Race, F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* (Berlin 1921) 97-102, W. A. A. van Otterlo, "Beitrag zur Kenntnis der griechischen Priamel," *Mnemosyne* 3rd ser. 8 (1940) 145-176, Bundy, *SP* 5-10.

[55] Though a pun on the musical sense of νομός may be intended, the primary reference on the literal level is to pasturage, "grazing-land for the flocks of songs"; cf. Gemoll 124, Forderer 172, note 32, Càssola 488.

[56] On the programmatic implications of line 21 cf. Roux 6, Baltes 25.

and inland (σκοπιαί, πρώονες) downward (ποταμοί) to the shore and the sea itself (ἀκταί, λιμένες θαλάσσης).[57] Literally these lines refer to topographical features in which the god takes special pleasure (τοι ἅδον), but in the context of lines 19-21 they are clearly figurative as well, evoking Apollo's spacious "range of song," and it is implied that his pleasure springs at least in part from the fact that every place "has a tale to tell" that contributes to his glory.[58]

Such, then, is the teeming background against which, in lines 25ff., a specific theme is proposed: "how first Leto bore Apollo as a joy to mortals."

> ἢ ὥς σε πρῶτον Λητὼ τέκε χάρμα βροτοῖσι,[59]
> κλινθεῖσα πρὸς Κύνθου ὄρος κραναῇ ἐνὶ νήσῳ
> Δήλῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ; ἑκάτερθε δὲ κῦμα κελαινὸν
> ἐξῄει χέρσον δὲ λιγυπνοίοις ἀνέμοισιν·
> ἔνθεν ἀπορνύμενος πᾶσι θνητοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις ...

The poet's *aporia* is thus resolved: out of "all the ways" (πάντως) in which Apollo can be celebrated, he chooses the one "way" (ὡς) of his birth; out of all the god's νῆσοι he chooses the κραναὴ νῆσος of Delos; out of all his ὄρεα, the ὄρος of Cynthus. In addition to announcing Apollo's birth on Delos as a subject of song, however, the *propositio* also adumbrates what proves to be, both structurally and thematically, a central principle of organization in the poem, namely the contrast that exists between Apollo's humble origins and his later greatness. The exploitation of such a contrast for auxetic purposes is a commonplace of encomiastic rhetoric for which Aristotle provides a convenient label. In discussing various qualities and actions that are generally reckoned to be worthy of esteem, Aristotle observes:

> Also, [praise is deserved] if the tendency of what is done is better and nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected; for instance, if a man is moderate in good fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when he becomes greater, he is better and more forgiving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates, "Look what I started from!" (ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα) and of the Olympian victor: "Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea."[60]

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[57] The land-to-sea movement is well analyzed by Roux 4-6.

[58] Cf. Wilamowitz 443, note 1: "... an jedem Fleck der Erde liegt ein Lied von ihm, besser seine Grundlage, ein apollonischer Stoff, der besungen ist oder besungen werden kann." See also Jacoby 703, Kröhling (note 54) 58.

[59] On the force of ἢ ὥς in line 25 (most editors read ἠ ὡς) see Race, *Priamel* 48, note 39; on χάρμα βροτοῖσι as an example of hymnal "Appositionsstil" see Keyssner 120-121.

[60] *Rhet.* I. 9.31, tr. J. H. Freese (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1926); cf. also I. 7.32 καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρξε ταῦτα. Theon (Spengel II. 111) offers this advice:

> If [the man to be praised] enjoys none of the aforementioned goods, one should say ... that though he was from a small city he becames illustrious, like Odysseus and Democritus ... Also praiseworthy is the man who, though of humble family, became great, like Socrates the son of Phaenerete the midwife and Sophroniscus the herm-carver.

The hymn's double focus on Delos and Delphi is ultimately but Apollo's ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα writ large, and the tension between the two poles of his career is prefigured in the juxtaposition of lines 25-28 and 29.[61] The brief but vivid sketch of Apollo's birth in lines 25-28 reveals, upon comparison with the even briefer sketch in lines 16-18, a marked shift of emphasis in the choice of descriptive detail. Whereas in the earlier passage the poet catalogues with loving piety certain sacred landmarks on Delos—mountain, palm, stream—that have remained to his day as mute witnesses to the astounding event that he is celebrating, in the *propositio* local topographical details are curtailed and the stress falls rather on Delos' relation to the wider world—that is to say, on her nature as an *island.* Thus while the hendiadys μακρὸν ὄρος καὶ Κύνθιον ὄχθον (17) is compressed into the less graphic Κύνθου ὄρος (26) and the palm and the streams of Inopus are omitted entirely, the phrase κραναῇ ἐνὶ Δήλῳ (16) is expanded and elaborated in such a way (26-27 κραναῇ ἐνὶ νήσῳ, Δήλῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ) that Delos' rockiness, though a motif of great importance in the *Hymn*, is momentarily eclipsed by her isolation in mid-sea. The meaning of ἀμφιρύτῃ is then defined in vividly pictorial terms by the parenthetical gloss that follows: to be "flowed around" is, in Delos' case, to be a tiny speck of land precariously exposed "on either side" (ἑκάτερθε) to the rough mercy of wind and wave.[62] The point of the shift of emphasis becomes clear with line 29: it is from this stony, straitened isle, an isle that could scarcely afford his mother and himself protection against the ferocity of nature, that Apollo has risen to the glory of unlimited dominion over men (ἔνθεν ἀπορνύμενος πᾶσι θνητοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις)—and the present glory is all the more impressive for the contrast afforded by its point of origin.

Yet lines 19-29 do not merely announce the topic of Apollo's birth and, in so doing, adumbrate the tension between ἐξ οἵων and εἰς οἷα that will prove so important in the *Hymn*; they also dramatize a process of poetic decision-making. Artistic self-consciousness of this type is scarcely to be found elsewhere in the Homeric collection, for in the fragmentary *h.* 1, the only other piece to enact a poetic decision through formal means, the question under deliberation is much more limited in scope. Although the

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[61] Förstel 194 notes "die Winzigkeit der Insel, ihre Öde und Verlassenheit und der paradoxe Gegensatz zur Größe des auf ihr geborenen Gottes" (cf. also his comments on pp. 111, 120, 151).

[62] On ἑκάτερθε κτλ. as a "nähere Erklärung" of ἀμφιρύτῃ cf. Gemoll 125.

exordium that proclaimed Dionysus as the general subject of the hymn is no longer extant, the "δόξαι-priamel" that is preserved cannot have followed too far behind.[63]

οἱ μὲν γὰρ Δρακάνῳ σ', οἱ δ' Ἰκάρῳ ἠνεμοέσσῃ
φάσ', οἱ δ' ἐν Νάξῳ, δῖον γένος εἰραφιῶτα,
οἱ δέ σ' ἐπ' Ἀλφείῳ ποταμῷ βαθυδινήεντι
κυσαμένην Σεμέλην τεκέειν Διὶ τερπικεραύνῳ,
ἄλλοι δ' ἐν Θήβῃσιν ἄναξ σε λέγουσι γενέσθαι
ψευδόμενοι· σὲ δ' ἔτικτε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε
πολλὸν ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων κρύπτων λευκώλενον Ἥρην.

The point to note here is that the poet presents as a *fait accompli* his selection not merely of a general hymnal *subject* (Dionysus) but also of a specific hymnal *topic* (the god's birth), and the aporetic "how?" implied by the priamel as a whole revolves around a matter of detail merely, namely the locale in which the story of the birth is to be set. Our poet's "how?", by contrast, is a question not of detail but of substance, for the problem he faces is precisely to choose from the multitude of topics (or stories) at his disposal that one theme which will best serve his encomiastic purpose.[64]

The dramatization of this choice performs at least three distinct functions in the economy of the hymn *qua* hymn, functions that might be termed *auxetic*, *ethical*, and *programmatic*. The first of these, the auxetic, inheres in the aporetic mode itself, which is found already fully developed in epic. When, for example, the poet of *Il.* 2.484-493 declares himself incapable of enumerating the Greek contingents at Troy unless he receives divine assistance, he is whetting his audience's appetite for the catalogue by magnifying its dimensions. Similarly, when our poet expresses bewilderment at the multiplicity of themes which, being "in all ways worthy of song," the god offers, he is bringing home Apollo's greatness to his hearers in truly persuasive fashion.[65]

If the aporetic mode tends to be auxetic in relation to subject-matter, however, in relation to the speaker it often has a strong "ethical" force, reflecting favorably on his chapter as a man whose words are to be taken seriously. As the poet of *Il.* 2 displays a commendable concern for accuracy and a clear-sighted recognition of human limitations in achieving it, and as the poet of *h.* 1, by rejecting other versions of Dionysus' birth as false (ψευδόμενοι), presents himself as an uncompromising champion of truth, so our hymnist, in suddenly interrupting himself to survey the full range of topics open to him, reveals his awareness of the vast scope and peculiar difficulty of his undertaking. Merely to praise Apollo is one thing; to praise him *adequately*, to do justice to his complexity and universal reach, is quite another. As the salute to Leto bears witness to the poet's spontaneity and warmth of feeling, so the aporetic priamel of lines 19ff. demonstrates his sense of duty toward his subject and his just appreciation of its truly superhuman dimensions. He may have pretended to yield to a passing impulse in line 14 and have shifted his encomiastic focus momentarily, but here he assures both Apollo and his human audience that he remains fully conscious of his avowed intention and of the enormous difficulties inherent in its realization.

[63] On *h.* 1.1ff. as a priamel of the type in which "rival claims or opinions are listed" see Race, *Priamel* 44-45.

[64] On the poetic self-consciousness manifested in *h. Ap.* 19ff. and its novelty in the tradition of *epos* cf. Jacoby 702: "Dem Ilias- und Odysseedichter steht ihr Thema von vornherein als Entschluß fest und noch dem Hesiod wird es autoritativ gegeben; dieser Dichter steht wählend vor einer Fülle von Möglichkeiten und ist sich bewußt, daß er als Dichter wählen kann. Der Kühnheit dieser 'subjektiven' Gestaltung entspricht die Kühnheit der Form."

[65] On *h. Ap.* 19ff. as auxesis cf. van Groningen 307, Förstel 149-150.

The third function of the selection priamel, the programmatic, is clarified by reference to a second Homeric *aporia*, *Od.* 9.12ff., which unlike *Il.* 2.484ff. bears directly on the organization of the material it introduces:

σοὶ δ' ἐμὰ κήδεα θυμὸς ἐπετράπετο στονόεντα
εἴρεσθ', ὄφρ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω·
τί πρῶτόν τοι ἔπειτα, τί δ' ὑστάτιον καταλέξω;
κήδε' ἐπεί μοι πολλὰ δόσαν θεοὶ οὐρανίωνες.
νῦν δ' ὄνομα πρῶτον μυθήσομαι...

Like our hymnist, Odysseus here faces a subject of such huge dimensions that he is momentarily at a loss as to how he should proceed; to give Alcinous the discourse he desires he must first set clear in his mind the relative priority of its individual topics. As in *h. Ap.* 19ff. the *aporia* is framed as a deliberative question and grounded by a causal conjunction (ἐπεί = γάρ in *h. Ap.* 20) in the superabundance of relevant material (πολλά = πάντῃ, πᾶσαι in *h. Ap.* 20, 22). The particular form in which the question is cast, however—"What shall I say first, what last?"—implies the drawing up of a program or agenda; and when the *aporia* is resolved by the selection of a single topic from the multitude, that topic—Odysseus' personal identity—is explicitly labelled as but the first item on that agenda, which will prove to include as well Odysseus' homeland (21-36) and his journey from Troy (37ff.).

The syntactical role that πρῶτον plays in *h. Ap.* 25 is of course different from that in *Od.* 9.16; rather than modify the unexpressed ὑμνήσω which must be supplied in thought to govern the indirect question introduced by ἢ ὡς, it modifies the action reported by the line as a whole: "how *first*

Leto bore you as a joy for mortals.''[66] Just as the poet of the *Iliad* begins his tale of Achilles' wrath by tracing it to its origin in the quarrel with Agamemnon (1.6 ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε) and as Hesiod asks the Muses to recount the generation of the gods ''from the beginning'' (*Theog*. 108 εἴπατε δ' ὡς τὰ πρῶτα θεοὶ καὶ γαῖα γένοντο, 115 εἴπαθ' ὅτι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν), so our hymnist decides to begin as Apollo himself began—that is, by recounting the god's first appearance in the world.[67] In all these passages a ''first'' that is, strictly speaking, *aetiological* in its force takes on a programmatic function as well, setting up an expectation that the *arche* thus signalled will prove to be but the starting-point for a longer discourse. In view of the stress that the poet of the *Hymn* lays on the multiplicity of potential themes at his disposal, his underscoring of the historical priority of Apollo's birth relative to all else that might be said about him strongly suggests that the birth will in fact be only the first of several topics through which his general intention to ''remember and not forget'' the god will realized.[68] After all, unlike the foil material in *h*. 1.1-5, which is not merely passed over for the nonce but rather is eliminated once and for all from the poet's purview on the ground of its untruth, the thematic abundance so vividly portrayed in the metaphorical geography of lines 20-24 is neither exhausted nor abrogated by the selection of a single topic in 25ff. but remains instead as a reservoir of possibilities to which the poet can have recourse once Apollo's birth has received its due. This open-endedness is in fact explicitly recognized in line 29 (ἔνθεν ἀπορνύμενος πᾶσι θνητοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις), which glances at the god's rise to the position of universal dominion that he now enjoys.[69] Since (in the poet's view) the power, the wealth, and the prestige of Delphi play no small role in that dominion, line 29 should perhaps be understood to prefigure not merely the immediate sequel of the birth-narrative but indeed the whole second half of the *Hymn*. What is incontrovertible, in any case, is that the *propositio* opens a vista of thematic possibilities beyond the immediate choice of Apollo's birth, possibilities over which, nevertheless, the topic of birth takes natural precedence.

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[66] For this use of πρῶτον cf. *Il*. 6.345, *Od*. 14.141, 19.355.

[67] On ''beginning at the beginning'' in hymns (and elsewhere) see Race, ''Aspects'' 6-8, and on its connection with a ''natural'' ordering of topics cf. Plato *Menex*. 237a πόθεν ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀρξαίμεθα ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἐπαινοῦντες ...; δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι κατὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὕτω καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐτούς. ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ φῦναι ἐξ ἀγαθῶν. τὴν εὐγένειαν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐγκωμιάζωμεν ...

[68] Cf. Jacoby 703: ''der Dichter gleich beim ersten Thema innehält, weil es eben das erste ist, was man von Apollon erzählen kann ...'' On the programmatic force of the passage cf. Roux 6.

[69] According to Jacoby 703 *h. Ap*. 25-28 and 29 together announce the double theme of ''Geburt und Leben (Herrschaft) Apollons.''

By emphasizing Apollo's unlimited potential as a hymnal subject, then, the aporetic priamel of lines 19ff. magnifies the dimensions of his greatness; by dramatizing the poet's sense of responsibility toward that subject in all its vastness, it reflects favorably on his character as a singer of praises; by underscoring the primacy of Apollo's birth among the wide range of themes at his disposal, it hints at an encomiastic agenda on which *genos* is but the first item. These auxetic, ethical, and programmatic implications do not, however, exhaust the significance of the passage. An inevitable effect of the many resemblances in diction between lines 25-27 and 14-18 (25 τέκε/14 τέκες, 26 κλινθεῖσα/17 κεκλιμένη, 26 πρὸς Κύνθου ὄρος/17 πρὸς μακρὸν ὄρος καὶ Κύνθιον ὄχθον, 26-27 κραναῇ ἐνὶ νήσῳ Δήλῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ/16 κραναῇ ἐνὶ Δήλῳ) is to drive home the fact that when the poet's deliberations on ''how to sing Apollo'' finally bear fruit, the theme which is formally proposed is *identical* with a theme broached and then suddenly abandoned six lines earlier.[70] Elaborate rhetorical machinery is set in motion, in other words, only to return in the end to its point of departure—an apparently bizarre procedure which the poet is at pains to draw to his audience's attention. As a brief recapitulation of the first thirty lines will show, however, the priamel is merely the last and most overt in a series of diversionary maneuvers through which the hymnist has been eluding the expectations of his listeners from the outset.

Nearly every other hymn in the Homeric collection, as we have already noted, moves immediately from its exordium to the narrative (or descriptive) mid-section that is its main ''business.'' The *Hymn to Hermes*, for example, which like the *Hymn to Apollo* combines the topics of birth and *praxeis*, begins:

> Ἑρμῆν ὕμνει Μοῦσα Διὸς καὶ Μαιάδος υἱόν,
> Κυλλήνης μεδέοντα καὶ Ἀρκαδίης πολυμήλου
> ἄγγελον ἀθανάτων ἐριούνιον, ὃν τέκε Μαῖα
> νύμφη ἐϋπλόκαμος Διὸς ἐν φιλότητι μιγεῖσα ...

Clearly our hymnist could have used the conventional ''hymnal relative'' in an equally expeditious fashion had he so desired, plunging directly from his opening statement of encomiastic intention into the tale of Leto's wanderings: ''I shall remember and not forget Apollo the far-darter, whom Leto bore once on rocky Delos, whither she had journeyed wracked with pains, in search of a place ...'' Instead, as we have seen, the relative introduces a brief *descriptio* which, while painting a graphic

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[70] That 14-18 forshadow the formal announcement of the birth-theme is recognized by many (e.g. Drerup 114, Unte 24, West 163, Förstel 119, Race, *Priamel* 48); see too Forderer 66, who aptly remarks: ''Hier zeigt sich die Hand des komponierenden und reflektierenden Dichters.''

picture of Apollo's awe-inspiring might, is self-contained and makes no advance toward the poet's narrative goal. Like the hymnal relative itself, the line and a half with which the *descriptio* concludes (χαίρει δέ τε πότνια Λητώ, οὕνεκα τοξοφόρον καὶ καρτερὸν υἱὸν ἔτικτεν) could have served as a transition to the birth-narrative, but once again the poet refuses the opportunity that is offered him, "turning aside" instead to felicitate Apollo's mother. Although this apostrophe involves a temporary shift in encomiastic focus and is thus, formally speaking, an excursus or digression from the task at hand, it is at the same time so constructed that direct relevance to Apollo is never lost, and the poet is led, by a route that seems inevitable, to a thumbnail sketch of the god's birth on "rocky Delos." The alacrity and relish with which he enters into circumstantial detail might momentarily suggest that he has at last arrived at the "matter" of his hymn and that the expected *narratio* is immediately forthcoming. Instead, as we have noted, he suddenly interrupts himself, simultaneously hinting at an explanation for the interruption with an elliptical γάρ: "(... but I'm much too hasty, rushing into the thick of things like that), *for* out of all the encomiastic possibilities that the god offers, how can I presume to make a particular selection without careful reflection?"[71] Whereas the salute to Leto seems to follow the poet's momentary impulse so smoothly that his ostensible "neglect" of the business at hand is scarcely remarked, the check at line 19 is abrupt and unmistakable. Having allowed himself to drift into his first topic unawares, as it were, he now pulls up short and refuses to proceed until he has retraced his steps more formally through the selection-priamel of lines 20-24. Only in line 25 does he utter the words which, were he the poet of *h.* 1 (or *h.* 4 or *h.* 7), his patient auditors would have heard long since: "How first Leto bore you as a joy for mortals."[72]

[71] For arguments in favor of retaining γάρ, the reading of all the codices, as against Barnes' widely accepted emendation τ' ἄρ, see Forderer 65-66. The presence of τ' ἄρ in 207 should not be taken as determinative for 19; although verbally the two questions are otherwise identical, they stand in different relationships to their contexts, and this difference is signaled by the variation in introductory particles. By line 206 the hymnist has disposed of certain "items" on his encomiastic "agenda" (birth, *anatrophe*, and *epitedeumata*) and is now ready to move on to the last and most important, the god's *praxeis*; thus he asks, "How *then* [i.e., in view of what I have said already] shall I proceed with my hymn!" The same consequentiality is implied in *Il.* 1.8, where, having proposed to tell the wrath of Achilles from the time of his quarrel with Agamemnon, the poet takes up the tale by asking, "Which of the gods was it, then (τ' ἄρ), that caused the strife?" No such relationship obtains between *h. Ap.* 19 and the immediately preceding lines, and thus τ' ἄρ would be, though not impossible, not especially *à propos* either.

[72] "Dreimal setzt der Dichter ein" (Forderer 69). On the variety and vivacity of movement in 1-29, and the poet's mastery in keeping his audience in suspense, see van Groningen 306-307, Förstel 120. For a much less sympathetic account of the opening manoeuvers see Janko, "Structure" 17-18, who concludes: "There seems little doubt that the poet is treating traditional elements in the genre in quite a novel manner, although opinions may vary as to his success."

One effect that the poet achieves by repeatedly postponing the moment of actual commitment to his narrative, and by deliberately drawing attention to the fact that he is postponing it, is to suggest that the performance to follow will as a whole be governed by a spirit of leisure, of σχολή.[73] With critical hindsight, indeed, we can say that in feigning a reluctance to "get down to business" the poet is warning his listeners not to be surprised if they find the birth-story, when it finally gets under way, unfolding at a measured pace, with a long geographical catalogue and an extensive interchange between Leto and Delos before it arrives at the birth itself; or if they encounter apparent "digressions" from praise of Apollo strictly conceived, as for example in the address to the Deliades (165-176) or the Typhon episode (305-355); or indeed if they feel, when they are presented with the second *propositio thematis* in lines 207ff., that the chief subject of the hymn is only then being broached.

A second and perhaps even more important effect of the postponement can be best appreciated by comparison with the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, the only other hymn in the collection to delay its main narrative for a comparable number of lines. Having announced the ἔργα 'Αφροδίτης as his general theme, the poet moves, through a "hymnal relative," into a highly generalized *descriptio* (2-6) that sketches in bold strokes the extent of the goddess's dominion, a series of "universalizing doublets" (gods/men, birds/beasts, land/sea) being capped by the summarizing πᾶσιν δ' ἔργα μέμηλεν ἐυστεφάνου Κυθερείης. Against this backdrop of universal rule three exceptions—Athena, Artemis, and Hestia—are then brought forward which prove her power to be, though great, not absolute (7-33). When the particular concerns of the three virgin goddesses have been detailed and the passage as a whole sealed off by means of ring-form repetition (33 τάων οὐ δύναται πεπιθεῖν φρένας οὐδ' ἀπατῆσαι = 7 τρισσὰς δ' οὐ δύναται πεπιθεῖν φρένας οὐδ' ἀπατῆσαι), Aphrodite's sway over the *rest*

[73] For a discussion of a Pindaric passage in which the claims of σχολή are programmatically asserted amid a context of ἀσχολία, see A. Miller, "*Nem.* 4.33-43 and the Defense of Digressive Leisure" *CJ* 78 (1983) 202-220. Although Pindar sets out discursively what our poet merely implies, the pressures of generic convention (cf. *N.* 4.33 τεθμός) and of the conditions of performance (cf. *N.* 4.34 ὧραί τ' ἐπειγόμεναι) are no less operative in the hymnal than in the epinician situation. To judge from general hymnal practice, one of the audience's expectations is that very shortly after the opening declaration of encomiastic intent (the exordium) the narrative or descriptive mid-section that constitutes the main matter of the hymn will begin; another expectation is that when one god has been announced as the general theme of the ensuing performance, another god will not suddenly be invoked. In the *Hymn to Apollo*, as we have seen, neither expectation is satisfied. The poet's own longing to submit to the attractions of his task, that inner compulsion to which Pindar applies the metaphor of the "love-charm" (*N.* 4.35 ἴυγγι), is in the *Hymn* suggested by the seemingly involuntary prolepsis of the birth-theme in 16ff.; yet this longing too is frustrated, if only briefly. Where Pindar *analyses*, our poet *enacts*, but for both the same issue is at stake: *schole*.

of reality is emphatically restated: nothing, no one, can escape her (34-35). The proof *a fortiori* of this summary statement is Zeus himself, who for all his greatness is still subject to her charms (36-44). Thus the universal dominion outlined in lines 2-6 but immediately limited in lines 7-33 is now, within those limits, forcefully reaffirmed—only to be capped, at the end of the whole sequence, by the retribution that Zeus brings upon Aphrodite in her passion for a mortal man (45-52). The fact that she falls victim to her own spells is a token at once of the limits and the irresistibility of her power. Lines 45-52 are transitional to the *narratio* proper, which begins in 53 with the mention of Anchises' name, and constitute a summary statement of the *praxis* and its significance in relation to Aphrodite's nature and character. Like the repetitions in *h. Ap.* 16-18 and 25-27, the echo of line 2 (ἐπὶ γλυκὺν ἵμερον ὦρσε) in *h. Aphr.* 45 and 53 (γλυκὺν ἵμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ) seems to invite the attentive listener to consider, in passing, how easily the intervening material might have been omitted, and so more consciously to appreciate its effect, which is to provide a "theoretical" perspective from which to view and interpret the narrative details that follow.[74]

It is true that the poet of *h.* 5 does not assert the claims of *schole* with as much pointedness as does our poet; but that the first fifty lines of the *Hymn to Aphrodite*[75] are governed by a spirit of leisure is incontrovertible. Both hymns attest to the broader, more comprehensive, more "theoretical" vision of their subjects that the method of leisure makes possible.[76] The proemial *descriptio* of our hymn, like that of *h.* 5, is not merely auxetic in force; it magnifies Apollo's *dynamis*, yes, but it also elucidates the nature of that *dynamis* by evoking, in strikingly compressed form, a traditional contrast between two realms of divine action. Even more explicitly theoretical, however, is the perspective that the poet gains on the subject of Apollo's birth when he pulls back from it so abruptly and surveys the god's "range of song" in all its immensity.[77] Inwardly passing the host of encomiastic possibilities in review, in the end he does no more than formally ratify the choice to which an apparently spontaneous impulse had led him in 16ff. Yet because in so doing he underscores the natural primacy of Apollo's birth as a topic of discourse (it will be dealt with first because all other topics presuppose it), the final effect of the maneuver is to imply that the poem which follows is not only, as its genre dictates, an encomium or song of praise but also, by the poet's free choice, a speculative inquiry into origins and first principles, into *archai*—an implication that is later confirmed when the πρῶτον that signals the poet's aetiological interest in line 25 (ἢ ὥς σε πρῶτον Λητὼ τέκε χάρμα βροτοῖσι) recurs in the corresponding line of the second *propositio* (214 ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον χρηστήριον ἀνθρώποισι κτλ.). In the end, then, the various rhetorical devices in lines 1-29 serve the same function relative to the birth-story that they introduce as does the birth-story itself relative to the hymn's ultimate subject, the founding of the Pythian oracle: to facilitate interpretation of narrative details by providing context and perspective.

[74] On the relationship of *h. Aphr.* 1-44 to the main narrative see Fränkel, *DPh* 287-288; on *h. Aphr.* generally see P. Smith, *Nursling of Immortality: A study of the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* (Bern 1981).

[75] And not merely the first fifty lines: note the later "digressions" on Ganymede and Tithonus (202-238) and on the mountain nymphs (259-272).

[76] The *locus classicus* on the connection between leisure and theoretical understanding is *Theaet.* 172c-177b, which I discuss briefly in the article cited in note 73.

[77] Cf. Menander's explicit postponement of the topic of Apollo's birth in *Sminth.* 438.6ff.: πόθεν με χρὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιήσασθαι; δοκεῖ δ' οὖν μοι πρῶτον ἀφεμένῳ τέως τοῦ γένους ὕμνον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναφθέγξασθαι. The interjected ὕμνος proves to be a philosophical and scientific *dubitatio* on the proper mode of addressing the god (i.e. on his true nature): ὦ Σμίνθιε Ἄπολλον, τίνα σε χρὴ προσειπεῖν; πότερον ... ἢ ... ἢ πότερον ... ἢ ...; Having reviewed the possibilities, Menander resumes the main thread of his encomium: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν σοφῶν παισὶ φιλοσοφεῖν παραλείπω, ἣν δὲ ἀκήκοα μυθολογούντων γένεσιν, ταύτην καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι λέγειν. Menander himself points out what has been gained by the interruption: his hearers will be better equipped to understand the "truer knowledge" (τὴν ἀληθεστέραν γνῶσιν) that lies "concealed" (κεκρυμμένην) in the story of the birth.

Lines 30-50: The First Geographical Catalogue

The catalogue of place-names in lines 30-44, the first of three such catalogues in the *Hymn*, appears to serve a double syntactical and rhetorical function: introduced as a specification of πᾶσι θνητοῖσιν, a detailed (if necessarily incomplete) listing of "all the mortals" whom Apollo rules as lord, it is suddenly transformed at its conclusion into an itinerary of Leto's desperate search for sanctuary. Though it serves as *amplificatio* in relation to what precedes, in other words, in relation to what follows it is an implicit (and literal) *praeteritio*: as Leto "passes by" the lands that one by one reject her, the field of possible candidates for the hazardous honor of sponsoring Apollo's birth is progressively narrowed. Inasmuch as the pattern of supplication and refusal which lines 45-48 project backward on to the catalogue becomes explicit only when Leto has reached Rhenaia—that is to say, just before it is to be broken—it brings Delos emphatically to the fore (49 πρίν γ' ὅτε δή ῥ' ἐπὶ Δήλου ἐβήσετο πότνια Λητώ). That Delos will in fact break the pattern is of course already known to the audience, but it is also forecast by the particles that accompany the introduction of her name: no land dared to receive Apollo—"*at least* (γε) until the lady Leto set foot on *Delos* (δὴ ῥα)." The auxetic force of the passage as a whole is clear: it is fear of the unborn

god's destined might that leads place after place to reject Leto's plea and condemns her to fruitless wandering; it is Apollo's own greatness that is the chief obstacle to his birth.[78]

But is a double reference in lines 30-44 possible?[79] And if possible, does it have a point, or is it merely the result of muddy thinking?[80] Certainly to assume that a double reference is operative makes sense of an otherwise awkward fact: the personification of the γαῖαι in lines 46-47 (not to mention the whole exchange with Delos) shows that Leto is canvassing the lands themselves, not their inhabitants, yet the passage is clearly introduced as a catalogue of *peoples*.[81] A shift in the antecedent of ὅσσους from πᾶσι θνητοῖσιν to τόσσον, moreover, however illogical it may seem when encompassed by the eye in a single glance, poses no real difficulty when the passage is absorbed by the ear in linear sequence. Once the initial link between lines 29 and 30 has been made some thirty place-names follow, distributed over fourteen hexameters. As it seems highly unlikely that an audience would persist in supplying ὅσσους ἔχει with each new nominative that comes along, the precise syntactical means by which the catalogue is attached to the preceding *propositio* would soon be lost from

[78] The auxetic implications of the fear that Apollo evokes are noted by Floratos 296, Forderer 86, Förstel 184.

[79] Far from being the case that lines 30-44 "nach oben haben ... gar keinen Anschluß, nach unten zu 45 einen wenig geschickten" (Bethe 19), this passage has posed problems to editors and commentators precisely because it makes good syntactical and rhetorical sense construed in either direction. Those to whom such "doppelte Begründung" seems impossible resort to one of two expedients: some follow Hermann in positing a lacuna between 29 and 30 ("Latona, Apollinem paritura, adiit"); others place a full-stop after ἀνάσσεις and regard the resulting asyndeton as justified either by epic precedents like *Il.* 24.544 (so Allen-Sikes 74, Förstel 110) or by the fact that "1-29 Prolog, 30ff. erzählender Hauptteil sind" (Jacoby 701, note 2; cf. Gemoll 126, Baltes 26). Among those who accept the ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction are Wilamowitz 444, Drerup 115, Fränkel, *WF* 72, note 4, H. Koller, *Glotta* 46 (1968) 20-22, West 164, Dornseiff, *AM* 5, Heubeck 140, note 15, Forderer 70, Kalinka 390, Race 49-50. Dornseiff typically regards the procedure as a "kleinen Scherz" ("wie hübsch leitet der Dichter den Hörer etwas in die Irre"), and to Heubeck it is an example of the "elegantes und eigenwilliges Spiel" that he finds characteristic of the poet. Only the last three scholars named discern the real point; see note 84.

[80] As implied by West 164: "The two different purposes that [the catalogue] serves are not properly distinguished and put into relation with one another." To Kirk 169 the change in reference is "clumsy" and a "bare-faced manipulation."

[81] Cf. Wilamowitz 144: "Leto fragt nicht die Einwohner, sondern die Länder." That this fact tells against Hermann's supposition of a lacuna is noted by West 164, note 1; see also Kirk 169-170.

[82] The unusual phenomenon of homoeoteleuton in 43 and 44 (ἠνεμόεσσα, πετρήεσσα) may serve a clausular function and imply a brief pause before 45, well represented in Forderer's text by a dash. The pause in recitation required by a full-stop between 29 and 30 (cf. Förstel 112) is far more problematic; one wonders whether even a brief interval of silence could persuade the audience, faced with the problem of construing ὅσσους, to ignore the masculine plural substantive ready to hand in πᾶσι θνητοῖσιν in favor of an "antecedent" that will not appear for another fourteen lines.

view under the influx of names and epithets. Thus though the catalogue is *formally* a list of peoples, for so it is introduced, by the time it draws to a close it is *in effect* a list of lands, perfectly suited to the new use to which it is put by lines 45ff.[82]

The ambiguity of reference becomes thematically functional, moreover, when the catalogue is understood as further developing the ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα motif of lines 25-29. The vivid evocation of Delos' physical insignificance is now revealed to be the springboard for a rhetorical counter-movement delineating the universal sovereignty to which Apollo has attained: rising from his humble beginnings on that fragment of rock, he now "rules all mortals as lord, those who dwell on Crete and in the district of Athens, on the island of Aegina and Euboea famed for ships, Aegae and Eiresiae and ... " This stately survey of Apollo's dominion, conducted from some distant vantage-point high over the Aegean, continues for fifteen lines, and when once again the poet's focus narrows, it is—unexpectedly—to reveal Leto on Rhenaea, at the penultimate stage of her pain-racked quest.[83] What this sudden shift of perspective does, surely, is more forcefully than ever to impress upon the audience the tension between the "now" and the "then," the εἰς οἷα and the ἐξ οἵων, which was formulated, though in reverse order, in the *propositio*. The catalogue of *inclusions* adumbrating Apollo's present magnificence becomes retrospectively a catalogue of *exclusions* that defines the sorely straitened circumstances of his first appearance in the world. The circuit that he now makes in a lordly, proprietorial mood, his mother made then in the humble attitude of the suppliant.[84]

Of the catalogue's two purposes it is the second, the summarizing of Leto's wanderings, that determines the specific choice and overall arrangement of the place-names.[85] The movement that gradually unfolds through the lines is a slow clockwise spiral from Crete up the western coast of the Aegean, across the Thracian seaboard, down Ionia and the

[83] On the sudden plunge *in medias res* cf. Jacoby 704, Forderer 72.

[84] "Der Kontrast zwischen dieser vergeblichen Suche nach einer Wohnung vor der Geburt und der Allherrschaft des Gottes nach seiner Geburt ist gewiß der denkbar größte. Die Orte, die zunächst als Herrschaftsbereich Apollons erschienen waren und die es tatsächlich auch sind—sie haben ihm erst einmal sämtlich versagt" (Forderer 71); cf. too Kalinka 390, Race, *Priamel* 49-50. Race aptly cites *Od.* 23. 233-240 as a parallel for the unforeseen shift in reference. As introduced the simile is apparently intended to characterize Odysseus' emotional response to the reunion with Penelope (she is as welcome to him as dry land is to shipwrecked sailors), but as formally applied (239 ὣς ἄρα τῇ ἀσπαστὸς ἔην πόσις εἰσοροώσῃ) it represents instead *Penelope*'s point of view. As in *h. Ap.* 29ff., the ambiguity—or better, the simultaneity—of reference makes a poetic point: in their different ways Odysseus and Penelope have *both* been "at sea" during their long separation, each the *terra firma* toward which the other has been struggling.

[85] On the geographical rationale of *h. Ap.* 30-44 cf. Gemoll 126, Allen-Sikes 74, Càssola 489.

eastern islands to Carpathos—that is, nearly full-circle to Crete again—with a final swing inward through the Cyclades to Rhenaea, Delos' closest neighbor. Formal and metrical considerations, however, take precedence over strict geographical sequence. An organization of the lines into triplets is discernible: in the second and fourth of these groups (33-35, 39-41) each line ends with a reference to mountains (ἄκρα κάρηνα, ὄρεα σκιόεντα, ὄρος αἰπύ; ἄκρα κάρηνα, ὄρος αἰπύ, αἰπεινὰ κάρηνα); the first, second, and fifth end with lines containing three names, the only such lines in the passage (32, 35, 44); the third and central triplet ends with a line devoted solely to Chios, the poet's home if we are to believe line 172.[86]

Lines 51-88: Leto and Delos

The tension that was briefly limned in the *propositio* and then developed through the twofold use to which the geographical catalogue is put—the tension, that is, between Apollo's origins and his destiny, ἐξ οἵων and εἰς οἷα—is in the exchange between Leto and Delos fully expounded and made functional on the level of plot. Through this exchange, consisting of Leto's request (51-60), Delos' reply and counter-request (62-82), and Leto's oath (83-88), the first obstacle to Apollo's birth is removed: Leto finds sanctuary. Had the poet's interest in the episode lain purely or even primarily in that outcome, however, the bare fact that a bargain was struck could have been reported through summary narrative and indirect discourse as expeditiously as the Eileithyia episode is handled in 102-114. By setting out the interaction *in extenso*, however, he directs attention to the two contrasting premises on which it is founded, the extreme poverty and physical insignificance of the island and the unbounded power and glory of the god-to-be.

Throughout her address to Delos, which falls into sections of two, three, and five lines, Leto is frank, even blunt, speaking directly to the point without euphemism or flattery. Having perceived that Delos' deficiencies are as great as her own need is urgent, she makes an unembarrassed appeal to the island's self-interest.

> Δῆλ' εἰ γάρ κ' ἐθέλοις ἕδος ἔμμεναι υἷος ἐμοῖο
> Φοίβου 'Απόλλωνος, θέσθαι τ' ἔνι πίονα νηόν·
> ἄλλος δ' οὔ τις σεῖό ποθ' ἅψεται, οὐδέ σε λήσει,
> οὐδ' εὔβων σέ γ' ἔσεσθαι ὀΐομαι οὔτ' εὔμηλον,
> οὐδὲ τρύγην οἴσεις, οὔτ' ἄρ φυτὰ μυρία φύσεις.

[86] On the triplets see Forderer 70-71, Baltes 27: on line 38 cf. Allen-Sikes 75 ("The complimentary reference to his own island is natural for the Chian poet") and van Groningen 307, note 4 ("hommage discret à sa patrie"). The latter errs, however, in claiming that "de tous les endroits qu'il nomme, Chios est le seul à qui il consacre un vers entier," for Lesbos too has a line to itself (37).

Opening with a simple vocative, she adumbrates the burden of her plea in the form of an "ideal" hypothesis: "If you should (conceivably) be willing (εἰ γάρ κ' ἐθέλοις) to be the seat of my son Phoebus Apollo and to have established upon you a rich temple ... "[87] Once she has thus broached the subject, however, she momentarily leaves the protasis hanging without conclusion in order to present Delos with cogent reasons why indeed she *should* be willing to become Apollo's ἕδος. Mincing no words, she first asserts in general terms the island's undesirability, which is such that no one else will ever wish to have anything to do with her,[88] then spells out in detail the physical advantages that she will never enjoy: pasturage for cattle and sheep, vineyards, crops and fruit in general. As the negatives mount up (οὔ τις, οὐδέ, οὐδέ, οὔτε, οὐδέ, οὔτ' ἄρ) the motivation behind Leto's aposiopesis at the end of line 52 becomes perspicuous. To a land possessed of such meager resources Apollo's "rich temple" would be an inestimable boon, but Leto wishes Delos to draw that obvious inference *herself*, to realize *on her own* that to do as she is asked would be to act in her self-interest.

Only when she has let the implications of Delos' poverty sink in does Leto formally restate her protasis and supply an apodosis, shifting mood (as, having given Delos good reasons for taking her offer seriously, she can now afford to do) from the optative of ideality (εἰ γάρ κ' ἐθέλοις) to the subjunctive of anticipation (αἰ δέ κ' ... ἔχησθα):

> αἰ δέ κ' 'Απόλλωνος ἑκαέργου νηὸν ἔχησθα,
> ἄνθρωποί τοι πάντες ἀγινήσουσ' ἑκατόμβας
> ἐνθάδ' ἀγειρόμενοι, κνίση δέ τοι ἄσπετος αἰεὶ
> δημοῦ ἀναΐξει, βοσκήσεις θ' οἵ κέ σ' ἔχωσι
> χειρὸς ἄπ' ἀλλοτρίης, ἐπεὶ οὔ τοι πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας.

Granted a single condition which she is now confident will be fulfilled, the consequences delineated in 57ff. are a future certainty: "You will see sacrificial smoke rising in untold abundance, and you will feed your inhabitants from the hand of strangers,[89] since you have no fatness in your soil." The final clause, which in form recurs to the negative statements

[87] For κεν (ἄν) + optative in a conditional protasis cf. D. B. Monro, *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect* (Oxford 1891) 285-286. On the syntax of 51ff. see Forderer 72-73, Heubeck 135, note 7.

[88] K. Förstel, *Amici Amico Graeco Tubingenses K. Merentitis zum fünfzigsten Geburtstag* (Tübingen 1956) 17, note 1, argues that in line 53 the manuscript reading οὐδέ σε λίσσει should be retained. Among modern editors Humbert and Càssola adopt Ernesti's emendation τίσει, Allen adopts Agar's λήσει; van Groningen 306, note 6, suggests θελήσει.

[89] Like νηὸς ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίης in *Od*. 9.535 and 11.115, χειρὸς ἄπ' ἀλλοτρίης implies a condition of total dependence on the charity of others: just as Odysseus is to be stripped of all means and resources and forced to rely completely on external aid, so Delos, poor and stony as she is, can expect to provide a livelihood for her people only from the offerings of visiting pilgrims.

of lines 53-55, in sense extracts their gist: it is precisely because Delos lacks all πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας that she has no hope of flocks or pasturage, vines or crops. At the same time, however, the presence of πίονα νηόν in line 52 throws a highly significant emphasis on to the last two words: Delos may have no richness *in her soil*, but if she consents to receive Apollo she will be free to claim the unbounded *piar* of his temple.

The honor and wealth that Leto holds out to Delos are clearly conceived as inevitable consequences of Apollo's nature, accruing automatically to whatever place sponsors his birth. The only contingency lies with Delos and her decision, and she too takes Apollo's greatness as axiomatic. Her reply, like Leto's request, is tripartite in structure, the first section (62-65) expressing her basic inclination, the second and longest (66-78) pointing to an obstacle, the third (79-82) proposing a resolution. Even before she begins to speak, her immediate response to Leto's offer is revealed as one of simple and unqualified joy (61 χαῖρε δὲ Δῆλος), and from this joy springs her first impulse, which is to welcome Apollo with open arms (62-65):

> Λητοῖ κυδίστη θύγατερ μεγάλοιο Κρόνοιο,[90]
> ἀσπασίη κεν ἐγώ γε γονὴν ἑκάτοιο ἄνακτος
> δεξαίμην· αἰνῶς γὰρ ἐτήτυμόν εἰμι δυσηχὴς
> ἀνδράσιν, ὧδε δέ κεν περιτιμήεσσα γενοίμην.

By her use of the potential optative in lines 63 and 65 (κεν ... δεξαίμην, κεν ... γενοίμην), however, she hints that the transformation of her spontaneous impulse into action cannot be regarded as a certainty but is in some as yet unspecified way contingent on external circumstances—an implication that the emphatic ἐγώ γε in line 63 underscores ("if it were entirely up to *me* ...").[91]

With the ἀλλά of line 66 Delos brings this unspoken reservation out into the open:

> ἀλλὰ τόδε τρομέω Λητοῖ ἔπος, οὐδέ σε κεύσω·
> λίην γάρ τινά φασιν ἀτάσθαλον Ἀπόλλωνα
> ἔσσεσθαι, μέγα δὲ πρυτανευσέμεν ἀθανάτοισι
> καὶ θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν.

She has heard a rumor, she says, that Apollo is destined to be "an exceedingly arrogant sort" who will "lord it mightily" over gods and men. At this rumor she "trembles," for she is "terribly afraid" (70 αἰνῶς δείδοικα) that Apollo will take offense at the poverty of her soil (72 ἐπεὶ ἦ κραναήπεδός εἰμι) and thrust her contemptuously under the waves. Her

[90] On retaining the manuscript reading Κρόνοιο in line 62 see Jacoby 705, Forderer 175, note 45.

[91] Forderer 73 renders the force of ἐγώ γε as "was an ihr liegt."

fear recalls and retrospectively clarifies the reaction of the lands that Leto canvassed earlier in her journey (46-47):

> αἱ δὲ μάλ' ἐτρόμεον καὶ ἐδείδισαν, οὐδέ τις ἔτλη
> Φοῖβον δέξασθαι καὶ πιοτέρη περ ἐοῦσα.

Nothing in these lines (or elsewhere in the poem) suggests that, as in the version of the tale told by Callimachus, the γαῖαι have been intimidated by the dire threats of a jealous Hera; it is the unborn god himself of whom they, like Delos, stand in dread.[92] Unlike Delos, however, they are said to be trepidatious *irrespective of their objective merits* (καὶ πιοτέρη περ ἐοῦσα); they evidently believe that the god's potential greatness immeasurably outstrips the worthiness of *any* earthly place, however blessed by nature, to sponsor its actualization.[93] Thus in reporting what she has heard and in representing her specific apprehensions as the consequence (cf. 70 τῷ ῥ') of the general character that "they" attribute to the god, Delos is implicitly constructing an argument *a fortiori*. If even lands with abundant "fatness in the soil" feel that they have reason to fear Apollo's scorn, how much more must an island whose shortcomings are so many and so obvious?[94] Although Delos seeks to protect herself by requiring that Apollo make her the site of his first foundation, she knows that his destiny extends far beyond her own limited horizons and will not attempt to hinder him from establishing centers of worship elsewhere (79-82). The neat balancing of ἐπεὶ ἦ πολυώνυμος ἔσται at the end of Delos' speech ("for truly his fame will be great and his names many") against ἐπεὶ ἦ κραναήπεδός εἰμι at its exact center ("for truly my soil is stony") encapsulates the auxetic significance of the whole episode, setting Apollo's present glory off to great advantage against the meager resources of his birthplace.[95]

The topos of ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα, however, can be no less potent as a strategy of depreciation or "meiosis" than it is of amplification, as many an

[92] The Callimachean motivation is assumed by Baumeister 123, AHS 209, but cf. (among others) Burckhardt-Biedermann 4, Gemoll 130-131, Ludwich 182, Dornseiff, *AM* 5, Càssola 491, Förstel 181-182.

[93] The point is well made by Förstel 183: "Die Länder vergleichen sich mit der angekündigten furchtbaren Größe des Gottes und fühlen sich ihr nicht gewachsen. Erst aus diesem Gefühl der vollkommenen Unterlegenheit heraus fühlen sie sich bedroht, resultiert ihre Furcht."

[94] Cf. Förstel 184: "Bei der mutigen Entscheidung der Delos für die Aufnahme Apollons wird ihre Kleinheit zu einem besonderen Ruhmestitel; denn sie hatte den meisten Grund, sich von der unberechenbaren Gewaltsamkeit des Gottes bedroht zu fühlen." Förstel also recognizes (182) that Apollo's self-esteem is (in Delos' view) at issue: "Aus dem gewalttätigen Wesen des Gottes fürchtet sie für sich, er konnte sie nach seiner Geburt für seiner nicht würdig halten ..."

[95] On the implications of πολυώνυμος see Keyssner 46-47 and cf. Call. *h. Art.* 7, Theocr. 15.109.

Iphicrates learns to his chagrin when the proud boast "Look what I started from!" is turned to his disadvantage.[96] If in one way Apollo's present stature is *enhanced* by contrast with the circumstances of his birth, in another way it is (or can be viewed as) quite markedly *undercut*—a "meiotic" effect that the poet in his handling of the narrative seems at pains to intensify rather than diminish. Looking at the birth-story as a whole (and thus anticipating our discussion of its later stages) we note how Leto is portrayed in her quest for sanctuary as a vagabond and a suppliant, without a place to call her own and at the mercy of others for the provision of what is needful; how Apollo himself, through Leto, is rejected by the world at large, and how only the most insignificant of places consents in the end to receive him; how Leto in her nine-day labor undergoes an extreme of physical suffering that she herself is powerless to terminate or relieve, and how Apollo by the same token is powerless to "leap toward the light" without the assistance of Eileithyia; and finally how, once Apollo is permitted to enter the world, he experiences, if only fleetingly, the helpless passivity of infancy like any human newborn and requires the ministrations of Themis before his godhead can be made actual.

All these are facts that, however effectively they may highlight the greatness of Apollo's realized divinity, simultaneously qualify and delimit it: as the god is now, they say, so he was not always. Of course we need not—indeed, should not—infer from the inherent two-sidedness of the ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα topos that the poet seriously intends to minimize or to subvert Apollo's glory; his choice of genre and the religious sensibility of his age preclude that possibility. Yet though in the eyes of poet and audience alike Apollo's greatness remains uncompromised by the circumstances of his origin, that fact need not prevent either poet or audience from entertaining the hypothesis that *Apollo himself*, once born and in full possession of his divinity, might conceivably have been tempted to ignore or deny the facts of his birth as derogatory of the status that he now enjoys. Only in connection with the nature and character of his birthplace, as it happens, is the possibility of such an attitude on Apollo's part explicitly raised, but in that connection it proves to be, as regards both plot and theme, an issue of central importance in the hymn, bearing closely on the otherwise problematic characterization of Apollo in line 67 as λίην ἀτάσθαλος.

Of that line one scholar observes: "Ἀτάσθαλος von Apollon gesagt befremdet," and another objects: "Apollon ἀτάσθαλος? Der Gott von großer Erhabenheit und Würde, der in der Religion der archaischen Zeit

[96] On μείωσις as the opposite of αὔξησις see Arist. *Rhet.* II.18.4, 26.1.

die Strömung des Legalismus und Ritualismus trägt, kann das nicht sein."[97] Attempts have been made to account for the epithet by referring to Apollo's behavior in the proemial *descriptio*;[98] but though the god is certainly revealed in that scene as at least potentially violent, no reason is given for supposing that that violence springs from *hubris*—and that ἀτάσθαλος means "recklessly arrogant" in the hubristic sense is abundantly attested by Homeric usage.[99] Although of course it is not Delos herself who applies the word to Apollo, let alone the poet *in propria persona*, but an unspecified "they" whose gossip the island is reporting, it remains remarkable to find so negative a term used in connection (however indirect) with a god who as promulgator of the maxims Γνῶθι σεαυτόν and Μηδὲν ἄγαν was to archaic Greek belief the arch-enemy of *hubris* in human beings. The fact that the hymn as a whole ends with Apollo solemnly warning his ministers against "the *hubris* that is customary among mortal men" (541 ὕβρις θ' ἣ θέμις ἐστὶ καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων) suggests that the earlier appearance of the semantically kindred word, however startling in its effect, is both deliberate and significant.

If an essential meaning of ὕβρις in the archaic period is the overstepping of "what is laid down" by nature, by the gods, or by society and its traditions—in a word, any violation of θέμις—in its widest and most "philosophical" sense it denotes an arrogant disregard of the fundamental limitations inherent in man's nature as a corporeal and contingent being. Penelope's suitors, the ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀτάσθαλοι ἄνδρες *par excellence* of early epic, transgress against the dictates of *themis* in a variety of ways. They neglect the rituals of sacrifice; they are contemptuously indifferent to omens and to divinely inspired prophecy; they violate property rights without compunction; they totally ignore the established proprieties of courtship—and, confronted with the ragged wanderer who comes among

[97] Regenbogen 55, Kroll 185. Cf. Càssola 492: "l'idea di un dio ἀτάσθαλος (violento, sfrenato) è molto lontano dall'idea omerica e classica di Apollo, dio inesorabile ma saggio, e maestro di moderazione agli uomini." So too Guida 13: "L'aggettivo ... rivella una sconsideratezza e un'irrazionalità poco consona alla figura di Apollo che nel V secolo, dal suo santuario di Delfi, esortava l'umanità alla misura e all'autocritica." To Kirk 170 the use of the adjective is "extravagant, or insensitive."

[98] E.g. Baumeister 132, Gemoll 133, Wilamowitz 442, Altheim 431, Dornseiff, *AM* 5, Förstel 170 and 183.

[99] Cf. *Od.* 16.86 λίην γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον ὕβριν ἔχουσιν, 24.352 ἀτάσθαλον ὕβριν ἔτισαν, 17.588 (= 20.170, 370) ἀνέρες ὑβρίζοντες ἀτάσθαλα μηχανόωνται, 24.282 ὑβρισταὶ δ' αὐτὴν καὶ ἀτάσθαλοι ἄνδρες ἔχουσι, *Il.* 11.695, 13.633-34, *Theog.* 514-516, Theognis 749-751, Alcman 7 (Page), Anacreon 100 (Page). Although Förstel 416-417, note 459, attempts to argue that the word is "wertneutral" in *h. Ap.* 67, its negative connotations are recognized by Baumeister 132 ("superbientem insolentiam"), Burckhardt-Biedermann 4 ("ein übermüthiger Frevler"), Defradas 62 ("d'un orgeuil sans limite"), Guida 13 ("tracotante oltre ogni limite").

them to ask for scraps of food, pleading hard luck and the belly's compulsion, they are unable or unwilling, in their aristocratic pride, to reflect upon the inherent instability of human fortunes and so to recognize themselves in the beggar's plight.[100] The disguised Odysseus is at pains to drive the lesson home—"I too was rich once," he says, "and gave alms to vagabonds such as I am now"(*Od.* 17.415ff., 19.71ff.)—but they resist the imaginative leap from his (ostensible) case to their own. With Amphinomus Odysseus attempts a full-scale sermon on the contingency and "ephemerality" of human life, applying the specific example of his own experience to the situation at hand (18.138-43):[101]

καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ ποτ' ἔμελλον ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὄλβιος εἶναι,
πολλὰ δ' ἀτάσθαλ' ἔρεξα βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων,
πατρί τ' ἐμῷ πίσυνος καὶ ἐμοῖσι κασιγνήτοισι.
τῷ μή τίς ποτε πάμπαν ἀνὴρ ἀθεμίστιος εἴη,
ἀλλ' ὅ γε σιγῇ δῶρα θεῶν ἔχοι, ὅττι διδοῖεν.
οἷ' ὁρόω μνηστῆρας ἀτάσθαλα μηχανόωντας...

After the slaughter both Odysseus (22.413-416) and Penelope (23.63-67) draw a connection between the suitors' fate and their fundamental lack of respect for fellow human beings of any station.

τούσδε δὲ μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα·
οὔ τινα γὰρ τίεσκον ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ὅτις σφέας εἰσαφίκοιτο·
τῷ καὶ ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐπέσπον.

ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων κτεῖνε μνηστῆρας ἀγαυούς,
ὕβριν ἀγασσάμενος θυμαλγέα καὶ κακὰ ἔργα.
οὔ τινα γὰρ τίεσκον ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ὅτις σφέας εἰσαφίκοιτο·
τῷ δι' ἀτασθαλίας ἔπαθον κακόν.

Thus in the final indictment brought against them by the poem as a whole their obdurate blindness to certain elemental facts of the human condition figures at least as importantly as their specific crimes against Odysseus's family and household.

Now it may seem at first blush that gods, whose nature exempts them from mortality, mutability, and the γαστρὸς ἀνάγκη, are necessarily incapable of *hubris* in this "existential" sense. As the poet of the *Hymn to Apollo* is at pains to demonstrate, however, there is in fact one condition to which gods are no less absolutely subject than mortal men: natality.

[100] On the significance of the beggar and of his "testing" of the suitors cf. J. H. Finley, Jr., *Homer's Odyssey* (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1978) 163-164, E. A. Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1978) 161-176.

[101] On ἐφήμερος as "Kennwort für die menschliche Natur" see Fränkel, *WF* 23-39; he discusses the relevance of the concept to *Od.* 18.130ff. on pp. 27-28.

Gods may be (in the formulaic phrase) "deathless and ageless forever," but they are not eternal; they live in the world of space and time, and in order to do so they must first *be born*. In entering the world, moreover, a god depends on the same biological mechanisms of conception, gestation, and parturition as do mortal creatures, human or animal; and the coming-into-being thus effected is a contingent, not a necessary event, for it conceivably could not happen were circumstances different.[102]

In his account of Apollo's birth the poet of the *Hymn* consistently and emphatically draws attention to these elements of contingency and dependence, as our summary of the action (above, p. 38) makes clear. His purpose in so doing may be surmised from the effect achieved, which is to raise the (at least theoretical) possibility that a god of Apollo's power and aristocratic pride might take offense at the existential implications of his own natality. Once *in* the world, Apollo can (and does) range at will, without spatial or temporal restriction; before he can enjoy that position of liberty, however, he must first *enter* the world at one particular time and place. Through his selection of narrative detail the poet contrives to suggest that Apollo might conceivably have felt the discrepancy between his fully realized divinity and the zero-point of his emergence into being as an intolerable affront to his dignity and so have been prompted to wreak his resentment on the surroundings in which he first found himself. Fear of just such an eventuality, as we have seen, leads place after place to reject Leto's suppliant plea; and if it is conceivable that Apollo could regard even the "rich and fertile" among those lands as unworthy of his greatness, how much more likely is he to spurn a small and stony island that has "no fatness in the soil"? And yet if Apollo were to look around him in his first few moments of life and, outraged by the sudden revelation of humiliating dependency, were indeed to subject Delos to the contemptuous violence she fears and deprecates, he would be refusing to acknowledge both his specific indebtedness to her good-will and services and, more generally, the ineluctable limitations inherent in his immortal but not eternal being. To reject the place of his nativity, in other words, would prove Apollo to be no less an ἀτάσθαλός τις, no less

[102] This "historical" dimension of divinity is a chief focus of attention in Hesiod's *Theogony*, which represents the existing cosmic order not as something timelessly "given" but as the end result of a lengthy and complex evolutionary process. In this process of proliferation and interaction, significantly, not all potentialities are realized: the attempt to forestall the emergence of new gods that fails in the case of the Titans and the Olympians succeeds in the case of the son of Metis, "overwhelming in might and spirit," who, if born, would have become king of gods and men in Zeus's place (see below, note 121). Where potentialities *are* realized against opposition, moreover, it is only through the aid and intervention of already existing powers; Zeus himself, after all, would have disappeared into Cronus' belly with his brothers and sisters had Rhea not turned to Earth and Sky for help.

hubristic in the existential sense, than the human being who fails to acknowledge his mortality or to recognize his own potential condition in the misfortunes of his fellow men.

In fact Apollo does not spurn Delos, and it is in the very contrafactuality of his ἀτασθαλία that the poet's real point lies. Whatever may be the case with Penelope's suitors, in Apollo aristocratic *hubris* is no more than a theoretical possibility debarred from realization by the course of events.[103] Delos feels no less trepidation before the unborn god than do the other lands, but whereas they are led by their fear to reject him, she contrives in a highly practical fashion to accommodate Leto in her difficulty while simultaneously safeguarding her own interests, asking the goddess to swear that Apollo will publicly acknowledge her good offices by building his first temple on her soil, "to be an oracle for mankind." What Leto swears is in fact different from what Delos asks in one important respect, as we shall see in a moment, but she does promise that Apollo will maintain an "altar and precinct" on the spot and will pay her special honor (88 τίσει δέ σέ γ' ἔξοχα πάντων). By exacting an oath that obliges Apollo to hold his place of origin in abiding respect, Delos not only succeeds in averting the display of ἀτασθαλία that might otherwise have endangered her well-being but also indirectly ensures that, for all his greatness and his glory, Apollo will henceforward remain cognizant of the metaphysical and ethical implications of his natality. It is necessarily impossible, after all, that he should feel or express gratitude to Delos for her indispensable assistance without thereby acknowledging the elements of contingency and dependence that limit divine existence at its origin. So mighty a πρύτανις might well wish to forget the far from flattering circumstances of his birth, disavow his former reliance on a small and rocky island, and pretend that he has always been what he is in the present moment. Delos and Leto together, however, see to it that the hypothetical possibility will never be realized.

The ethical significance of Apollo's natality is further developed by the masterly ἠθοποιία displayed in Delos' speech. From first to last, her character is distinguished by a quality perhaps best described as "proud humility" (in Spenser's phrase) or as "modest pride" (in Milton's).[104] Far from taking offense at Leto's blunt summation of her deficiencies, she admits its justice with disarming frankness: "Truly I am terribly ill-spoken of among men,"[105] she says, and then again, "Truly my soil is

[103] The contrafactuality of Apollo's ἀτασθαλία is overlooked by those who use an alleged contrast between "non-ethical" and "ethical" conceptions of the god as an argument for separate authorship of "D" and "P"; see, for example, Förstel 172, 279-280.

[104] *Epithalamium* 306 (describing Spenser's bride on her wedding-night), *Paradise Lost* 4.310 (describing Eve in her conjugal relation to Adam).

[105] On δυσηχής see Förstel 427, note 490.

stony." Equally revealing of character are the terms of the oath that she proposes. Apollo may (and will) extend his worship and his sway "to all mankind" (82 πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους), far beyond her own narrow compass, but if in so doing he continues to recognize his debt of gratitude for her services she will be content.[106] *Priority* in his affection and regard, not exclusivity, is all she asks.

Yet, though Delos disclaims all qualities that are not properly hers, her humility is no abject self-abasement: in her an acute awareness of limitations is balanced by an equally clear-sighted recognition of basic rights. She gratefully acknowledges the opportunity that Leto offers her to find compensation for natural disadvantages in the τιμή that will accrue to Apollo's birthplace (66 ὧδε δέ κεν περιτιμήεσσα γενοίμην), but she is not so dazzled by the prospect as to put at risk the τιμή that is already hers by virtue of her identity as a νῆσος ἀμφιρύτη:

τῷ ῥ' αἰνῶς δείδοικα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν
μή ὁπότ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ἴδῃ φάος ἠελίοιο
νῆσον ἀτιμήσας, ἐπεὶ ἦ κραναήπεδός εἰμι,
ποσσὶ καταστρέψας ὤσῃ ἁλὸς ἐν πελάγεσσιν.
ἔνθ' ἐμὲ μὲν μέγα κῦμα κατὰ κρατὸς ἅλις αἰεὶ
κλύσσει, ὁ δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀφίξεται ἥ κεν ἅδῃ οἱ
τεύξασθαι νηόν τε καὶ ἄλσεα δενδρήεντα·
πουλύποδες δ' ἐν ἐμοὶ θαλάμας φῶκαί τε μέλαιναι
οἰκία ποιήσονται ἀκηδέα χήτεϊ λαῶν.

Νῆσον ἀτιμήσας: Delos may be a poor and rocky island, totally without the assets enjoyed by other more fortunate places, but she is an *island* nonetheless, not a reef, a suitable home for *human beings*, not merely for octopuses and seals, and she refuses to commit herself without protection to a course of action that threatens to set that essential nature at naught.[107] What she is, she is; if she pretends to no more, she will settle for no less. Thus the intimate and enduring bond between Delos and Apollo that is established (or confirmed) by Leto's oath can be seen to entail a relationship of symbolic complementarity that is of the utmost

[106] Cf. Forderer 75: "Delos ruft sich wieder zur Bescheidenheit zurück: des allgewaltigen Apollons Aufbruch wird natürlich durch keine Abmachung zwischen Leto und Delos zu verhindern sein."

[107] Jacoby 707-708 (seconded by Càssola 492) objects to line 72 ("nicht darauf kommt es an, daß Delos Insel ist, sondern auf ihre Ärmlichkeit") and decides that it is simply a weak "doublet" of 73: "Es hat ... jemand die gewaltsame Aktion Apollons gegen die arme Geburtsinsel ... abgemildert, an Stelle des energischen, 'archaisch' rohen Fußtrittes das blaßes ἀτιμάζειν gesetzt." Once Delos' line of argument is understood, however, νῆσον ceases to be otiose and ἀτιμήσας pallid. What she fears is that Apollo in his arrogance will "deprive her of her rights as an island," as Agamemnon "deprived Chryses of his rights as a priest" in *Il.* 1.11 (τὸν Χρύσην ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα). On the asyndetic juxtaposition of the participles ἀτιμήσας and καταστρέψας see AHS 211.

importance to the poet's ethical concerns. God and island share a fundamental self-knowledge, an essential awareness of who and what they are, such that in the one enormous (and justifiable) pride is tempered by an ever-present sense of ultimate limitations and in the other profound (and justified) humility is tempered by irreducible self-respect.

One final point: although Leto readily accepts the idea of an oath, the terms to which she swears, after the conventional invocation of Styx, are not the same as those proposed by Delos—and the discrepancy is significant.

> ἀλλ' εἴ μοι τλαίης γε θεὰ μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμόσσαι,
> ἐνθάδε μιν πρῶτον τεύξειν περικαλλέα νηὸν
> ἔμμεναι ἀνθρώπων χρηστήριον, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα[108]
> πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολυώνυμος ἔσται.
>
> 87 ἦ μὴν Φοίβου τῆδε θυώδης ἔσσεται αἰεὶ
> βωμὸς καὶ τέμενος, τίσει δέ σέ γ' ἔξοχα πάντων.

The substitution of θυώδης βωμὸς καὶ τέμενος for περικαλλέα νηόν need be of little consequence; "altar and precinct" can easily represent "temple" periphrastically.[109] Of the oracular function that Delos wishes that temple to possess, however, Leto breathes not a word—and that "altar and precinct" can mean "oracle" without some more explicit qualification is too much to credit.[110] For all her modesty, we may conclude, Delos is still demanding something that lies beyond her scope; she cannot know, as Leto presumably does, that Apollo's prophetic gifts are destined to find expression elsewhere. Rather than refuse the χρηστήριον outright, however, Leto simply maintains a tactful silence on the point; adhering to the spirit, though not the letter, of Delos' request, she promises no more than that the island will possess an Apolline sanctuary in perpetuity and that Apollo "will honor her pre-eminently among all." Although

[108] AHS 213 and Càssola 492 follow Hermann in positing a lacuna between 81 and 82; according to Baumeister 133, Dornseiff, *AM* 6, Forderer 75, and Förstel 428, note 491, the words omitted by ellipsis (νηοὺς τεύξειν or the like) can be supplied in thought by the hearer. Humbert 81 also dispenses with the lacuna, but the sense he wrests from the lines does impossible violence to the Greek: "son oracle sera d'abord celui des 'gens' (du pays), pour devenir enfin celui de toute l'humanité." "Prétensions à l'universalité" are precisely what Delos *lacks*.

[109] Cf. Unte 31, note 3: "βωμὸς καὶ τέμενος bedeutet Tempelbezirk und schließt πίονα νηόν (52) bezw. περικαλλέα νηόν (80) nicht aus, sondern ein"; so too Förstel 429, note 492, Baltes 29, note 18. For a different view see Eitrem 130. On αἰεί in 87 (as in 248, 259, 288, 299, 485, 536) as an instance of the "hyperbolische Stil" typical of hymns see Keyssner 42-43.

[110] For discussion of the "Delian oracle" see Bethe 19-20, AHS 212-213, West 165. Kalinka 391 seems to have been the first to recognize the significance of Leto's silence on the point: " ... es verdient immerhin Beachtung, daß dieses Orakel in der Rede der Delos nur als frommer Wunsch erscheint, dessen Erfüllung Leto in ihrem folgenden Schwur nicht ausdrücklich bekräftigt"; cf. also Floratos 295-296.

Delos herself, in keeping with her character, accepts this emended oath without quibble or rancor, the discrepancy between what is requested and what is granted is of programmatic importance, for it points, like Apollo's χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι in line 132, to the second half of the hymn.[111] If an important aspect of Apollo's nature cannot be realized within Delos' boundaries, then encomiastic justice will not be done to the god so long as Delos holds the foreground of the poet's attention.

Lines 89-114: Hera and Eileithyia

One obstacle to Apollo's birth is removed when Leto secures a place of sanctuary, but straightway a second arises to take its place: no sooner does Delos joyfully agree to the oath than Leto enters into nine days and nights of desperate labor-pains. In lines 92-101, in form and function a priamel of which πᾶσαι (92), ἄλλαι (95), νόσφιν (95), and μούνη (97) are the operative terms, the immediate and ultimate causes of Leto's anguish, Eileithyia's absence from the island and Hera's malicious envy, are isolated and defined. In attendance upon Leto are "all the noblest goddesses," four of whom are cited by name *exempli gratia*: Dione and Rhea, who are plausibly present as mother-figures of the earlier generation, Themis, who plays the role of τροφός in lines 124-125, and "loud-moaning" Amphitrite, who presumably is representative of the marine realm to which Delos as a νῆσος ἀμφιρύτη belongs. To this highly selective list an "etc." is appended in the phrase ἄλλαι τ' ἀθάναται—an "etc." from which one goddess, however, is expressly and emphatically excepted: "white-armed" Hera sits apart in the halls of Zeus.[112] This climax is capped in turn by line 97 (μούνη δ' οὐκ ἐπέπυστο μογοστόκος Εἰλείθυια). Though Hera is not among the goddesses assembled on Delos, she *is* aware of what is happening there; Eileithyia alone, of all the goddesses including Hera, remains in ignorance of the impending birth, for by Hera's contrivance she is sitting "high on Olympus, wrapped in golden clouds."[113]

[111] Cf. Heubeck 136, note 8: " ... was Delos für sich erbittet, tut Apollon erst in Pytho, und das wird im pythischen Teil des Hymnos erzählt." Ludwich 183 notes that the "Hauptthema" of the *Hymn* "bereits in 82 anschlägt, um auf seine weitere Ausführung vorzubereiten"; cf. also Forderer 75.

[112] On the supposed "contradiction" between 95ff. and the proemial *descriptio* see above, note 38; cf. also West 169, who wishes to eject 95, 98-101, 105-106: "There just was not room in this poem for Hera besides Leto." Jacoby 704 is right in observing that the poet "hat mit höchster Kühnheit, mit einer genial naiven, aber zweifellos bewußten Selbstverständlichkeit ... Heres Namen genannt, ihre Person und Aktion allein da hineingebracht, wo sie notwendig wurde, um die Handlung in ihrem Fortschritt verständlich zu machen."

[113] By such means Ares is prevented from perceiving that his son Ascalaphus has fallen in *Il.* 13.521ff. In 19.119 Hera delays Alcmene's parturition by withholding the

Thus expounded and traced to its causes, Leto's difficulty is in the following thirteen lines (102-114) speedily resolved. Dispatched to Olympus with a gift and instructions to treat with Eileithyia "apart from Hera" so as to elude her interference, Iris accomplishes her journey without delay, delivers her message, and succeeds in persuading Eileithyia to return with her to Delos. In its formal structure this passage is not without art: the giving and the discharging of the instructions occupy six lines each (102-107 and 109-114), while at the center, poised between two αὐτὰρ ἐπεί clauses, is a single line in which Iris "swiftly traverses all the distance between" (108 ταχέως δὲ διήνυσε πᾶν τὸ μεσηγύ). The baldness and the business-like haste of the narrative style, however, suggests that the significance of the episode to the poet's encomiastic strategy has already been established. One point, clearly, is the auxesis involved in Hera's jealousy, prompted as this is by the preeminent quality (100 ἀμύμονά τε κρατερόν τε) of her rival's destined offspring. As Delos and the other lands fear the unborn god's lordly pride, so the Queen of Heaven hates him for his excellence and might; the fear and the hate alike are eloquent proof that a force to be reckoned with is about to make its appearance in the world.[114] Although the particular consequence of Hera's *phthonos*, namely Eileithyia's absence, is speedily set right, the *phthonos* itself remains unappeased in the *Hymn*, emerging again with startling force in the digression on Typhon's birth in lines 305-355.

The second point of the episode is to be found in the figure of Eileithyia, who as the *sine qua non* of successful parturition seems to represent symbolically the existential equality that underlies all being and against which essentialistic differences in rank, power, talent, and the like stand out in high relief. So, at least, she is portrayed by Pindar in the opening lines of *Nem.* 7. It is true, says the poet there, that "we do not all draw breath to equal ends" (5 ἀναπνέομεν δ' οὐχ ἅπαντες ἐπὶ ἴσα), for each of us, unique in his essence, is "yoked to destiny" in a different fashion (6 εἴργει δὲ πότμῳ ζυγένθ' ἕτερον ἕτερα). We *are* all equal, however, as regards the fact of birth itself: without the "daughter of mighty Hera, producer of children," none of us can make his way into this world of days and nights or come to achieve that prime of youth in which, as has happened in the case of the boy-victor Sogenes, his natural gifts can begin to manifest themselves.[115] Since this dependency upon Eileithyia's services is as inescapably a part of the divine as of the human condition, we should recognize in the intrigue that surrounds her prolonged absence and ultimate intervention yet another instance of a now-familiar encomiastic stratagem. In entering the world at all Apollo requires Eileithyia's assistance as absolutely as the merest mortal creature, but once *in* the world, he will surpass in power and glory all but the mightiest of the race of heaven: ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα. At the same time, however, the episode draws attention, as did the interchange between Leto and Delos, to the fact that (theoretically, at least) Apollo's birth might not have happened had certain conditions not been met. For all the manifold perquisites of divinity that Apollo now enjoys, at the point of his emergence into the world he displayed a radical dependence upon wills and potencies other than his own and upon circumstances outside of his—or his mother's—control. Although from the perspective of "historical" hindsight the outcome of the story is predetermined, the poet is at pains to raise alternative possibilities. Delos *might* have refused to yield to Leto's persuasion, Hera *might* have succeeded in detaining Eileithyia indefinitely, and it is only because, in the event, they did *not* that Apollo now "lords it mightily over gods and men."

Lines 115-126: The Birth

Eileithyia is still in the act of stepping on Delian soil (115 ἔβαινε) when τόκος "seizes" Leto; the words τότε δή ("then it was, and not before...") underscore the absolute indispensability of her presence upon which the preceding twenty lines have been predicated.[116] Sketched in preliminary fashion in lines 16-18 and formally proposed as a theme for song in lines 25-28, the divine birth is now at last narrated in full, its importance and wonder heightened by the long postponement. When Leto braces herself against the sacred palm,[117] the earth smiles, and Apollo "leaps toward

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"Eileithyiai," who in the *Iliad* are indifferently plural (so too in 11.270) and singular (16.187, 19.103).

[114] On the auxetic implications of Hera's jealousy cf. Floratos 296, Forderer 86, Förstel 185.

[115] On *N.* 7.1-8 cf. Fränkel, *DPh* 551, D. Young, *TAPA* 101 (1970) 635-640. Young compares such passages as *I.* 7.42f. θνᾴσκομεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες· δαίμων δ' ἄϊσος and remarks: "I doubt that many poets besides Pindar would take a trite idea such as 'We all must die,' turn it upside down, and open a serious poem with 'We all must be born'." If "we" in *N.* 7. 1ff. means, as no doubt it does, "we mortals," that is because the gods are irrelevant to Pindar's rhetorical strategy on this particular occasion, not because they are exempt from the general truth. In *N.* 6.1ff. a similar point is made, although the symbolic figure used is Earth rather than Eileithyia: *all* living beings, mortal *and* divine, are equal in respect of the fact of physical existence (they "share one mother")—a fact that only underscores the radical differences in essential nature (cf. 2-3 πᾶσα κεκριμένα δύναμις) that obtain between them.

[116] On the force of the imperfect ἔβαινε cf. Gemoll 137. It may be noted that Eileithyia is given her regular Homeric epithet μογοστόκος on the first (97) and last (115) mention of her name, framing the account of her absence and arrival.

[117] In 16-18 Leto is said to lean against Cynthus "hard by the palm"; in 25-27 she leans against the hill, but no mention is made of the palm; here she "throws her arms about the palm" and no mention is made of the hill. To fret at a supposed "discrepancy" (cf. Bethe 18) is of course to miss the point: our hymnist is not a student of obstetrics concerned to describe Leto's posture with clinical accuracy but a religious poet attempt-

the light," the long-awaited epiphany is greeted on the one hand by the ritual ὀλολυγῄ of the attendant goddesses, on the other by the poet's own sudden outburst in direct address, ἔνθα σε ἤιε Φοῖβε—the first instance of "du-Stil" since the *propositio*.[118] Apollo is bathed "in lovely water, holily and purely" (120-121 ὕδατι καλῷ, ἁγνῶς καὶ καθαρῶς), then wrapped "in a fine, white, new-woven cloth" (121-122 φάρεϊ λευκῷ λεπτῷ νηγατέῳ) and secured by a "golden band" (122 χρύσεον στρόφον). The accumulation of descriptive detail is reminiscent of *h*. 6.5-13, where the Horai clothe and adorn the foam-born Aphrodite in preparation for her first appearance among the Olympians, but whereas Aphrodite, like Athena in *h*. 28, enters the world fully developed, fully possessed of her divinity, Apollo is—for the moment—truly an infant, submitting passively to the ministrations of others. This fact gives point to the emphatic οὐδ' ἄρα of line 123. In the case of a human newborn the inevitable next step, after bathing and swaddling, would be to put him to his mother's breast, but that is *not*, in fact, what happens here. Apollo's fleeting resemblance to a human baby ceases as soon as the question of sustenance arises, for the nectar and ambrosia which Themis offers him in lieu of mother's milk will shortly transform him from infant to mature god in one miraculous instant.[119]

Indeed, as lines 127ff. will soon make clear, the poet conceives of Apollo as undergoing a *double* birth of sorts: first out of Leto's womb, then out of the swaddling clothes. During the moments that elapse between the two epiphanies he exists in some minimal fashion, but he does not yet exist *qua* Apollo-the-god. If it is Eileithyia who makes possible his initial emergence into the world, it is Themis through whom he realizes his essential nature—a fact that cannot fail to be thematically significant in light of the poet's preoccupation with Apollo's hypothetical capacity for *atasthalia*. Θέμις, "what is laid down" by natural law, forms with ὕβρις one pole of a conceptual antithesis central to archaic ethical thought. To commit *hubris* is to ignore the norms and limits defined by *themis*, and conversely, to respect *themis* is to abjure the transgressions and excesses

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ing to bring specific, still visible topographical features on Delos into association with the tremendous event that he has chosen to celebrate. The "soft meadow" on which Leto rests her knees, however, is perhaps a detail of a different order: not a sacred landmark invoked as μάρτυς but rather, like the "smiling earth," an *ad hoc* token of Delos' tender concern for mother and son.

[118] Cf. Altheim 434: "Solange Apollon noch nicht geboren ist, wendet sich also der Dichter nicht mit unmittelbarer Anrufung ihm zu."

[119] The gods' special diet is not infrequently regarded as the source and substance of their divinity (cf. *Il*. 5.341f. οὐ γὰρ σῖτον ἔδουσ', οὐ πίνουσ' αἴθοπα οἶνον, τούνεκ' ἀναίμονές εἰσι καὶ ἀθάνατοι καλέονται) and as a means of immortalization in human beings (cf. *h. Dem*. 235ff., Pind. *P*. 9.62ff.).

of *hubris*.[120] By personifying *themis* and representing her as the agent that confers divinity on Apollo (or actualizes the potential divinity within him), what the poet is doing is recapitulating in symbolic fashion the point established by implication in the birth-story as a whole and in Leto's negotiations with Delos in particular:[121] Apollo is a god in whom respect for natural limit and hostility toward *hubris* are innate.[122]

Before Apollo's transformation takes place, however, the treatment of his birth *qua* hymnal topic is brought to a formal conclusion by the "pleasure-motif" in lines 125-126 (χαῖρε δὲ Λητὼ οὕνεκα τοξοφόρον καὶ καρτερὸν υἱὸν ἔτικτεν).[123] As Zeus "rejoices" in his new daughter Athena at the end of *h*. 28 and as the infant Pan "delights the hearts of all the immortals" at the end of *h*. 19, so here Leto, as she contemplates the ministrations of Themis, "rejoices" in a son whose skill and might she recognizes though as yet they exist solely *in potentia*. Thematically, the verbatim repetition of lines 12-13 (χαίρει δέ τε πότνια Λητώ, οὕνεκα τοξοφόρον καὶ καρτερὸν υἱὸν ἔτικτεν) underscores the similarities between this

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[120] Cf. P. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907) 166: "Was θέμις und δίκη mit einander verbindet, ist der gemeinsame Kampf gegen die ὕβρις, gegen jede Art von Ueberhebung," and H. Vos, Θέμις (Assen 1956) 21: "Beide, θέμις und ὕβρις, hängen eng zusammen, weil die ὕβρις der Gegenpol zu θέμις ist: wer die nicht kennt ... verfällt der ὕβρις."

[121] A similar "allegorical" recapitulation is evident in *Theog*. 886-900 (Zeus's marriage to Metis). The preceding narrative has demonstrated that Zeus's supremacy is not founded on brute force and naked will like the regimes of his predecessors, who suppressed heterogeneous elements at all cost and any risk, but on the methodical integration of all reality into a true cosmos, a dynamic but coherent hierarchical structure in which individual claims and prerogatives are recognized and physical force is tempered by rational persuasion (cf. F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* [Ithaca 1949] 51-55, 73-75). Thus when in 886ff. Zeus is represented as "placing Metis in his belly" in order to forestall the emergence of a successor (892f. ἵνα μὴ βασιληίδα τιμὴν ἄλλος ἔχοι Διὸς ἀντὶ θεῶν αἰειγενετάων), the symbolic significance of the action is transparent: what gives the order established by Zeus its lasting stability is his "internalization" of intelligence (μῆτις), an internalization already evident *in its effects* throughout the account of his rise to power but here concretely re-enacted with retrospective and summarizing force. (The Metis-episode is rejected as an interpolation by Jacoby and Solmsen in their editions of the poem, accepted by Rzach, Mazon, and West. For a refutation of the standard arguments against it see M. C. Stokes, *Phronesis* 7 [1962] 36-37.)

[122] According to Wilamowitz 449 Themis is here "die Vertreterin der ewigen Weltordnung, mit der Zeus sich zu beraten pflegt"—an interpretation that is rejected by Vos (note 120) 44 as "zu erhaben." Although Vos himself (followed by Càssola 496) maintains that she is merely discharging her function as "die Leiterin der göttlichen Mahlzeit," the deeper ethical significance of her role is hinted at in his comments on line 541 (on which see below, note 263): "Zwei Sachen charakterisieren den Apoll in der archaischen Zeit: erstens erhebt er den Anspruch, zu verkünden, was Recht und Gesetz ist, zweitens, ist der wichtigste Inhalt seiner Lehre die Warnung gegen die ὕβρις."

[123] That the repetition of 12f. is intentional and significant is recognized by Gemoll 139, Dornseiff, *AM* 7, Unte 38, Forderer 135; Jacoby 705 sees in it an "Abgrenzung" of "Geburt" and "Leben" as hymnal topics.

scene and the opening *descriptio*, both of which involve an epiphany witnessed by other deities. Structurally, it drives home the fact that the poet has chosen the "pleasure-motif" as his means of marking major points of articulation in his hymn.

LINES 127-206: *ANATROPHE* AND *EPITEDEUMATA*

This section of the *Hymn* displays, in contrast to those that precede and follow it, a marked heterogeneity of encomiastic modes and materials. Although the section begins with Apollo's sudden transformation from infancy to maturity, his formal proclamation of τιμαί, and his first excursions into the wider world, within twenty lines a shift is effected from *narratio* to *descriptio*, and it is from a "typical" rather than a "historical" perspective that the poet proceeds to celebrate the Delian *panegyris* (147-164) and its heavenly counterpart in the halls of Zeus (186-206). Between the descriptions of the two festivals, moreover, appears the notorious "address to the Delian maidens" (165-176) and a connective passage (179-185) that has been much castigated for awkward abruptness.[124]

The topical and structural coherence of the whole, however, can be clarified by comparison with the brief *h.* 26 (Dionysus), which, uniquely among the hymns in the Homeric collection, takes a god's upbringing rather than his birth or deeds—in the terms of encomiastic rhetoric, his *anatrophe* rather than his *genos* or *praxeis*—as the theme of its central narrative.

Κισσοκόμην Διόνυσον ἐρίβρομον ἄρχομ' ἀείδειν
Ζηνὸς καὶ Σεμέλης ἐρικυδέος ἀγλαὸν υἱόν,
ὃν τρέφον ἠΰκομοι νύμφαι παρὰ πατρὸς ἄνακτος
δεξάμεναι κόλποισι καὶ ἐνδυκέως ἀτίταλλον
Νύσης ἐν γυάλοις· ὁ δ' ἀέξετο πατρὸς ἕκητι
ἄντρῳ ἐν εὐώδει μεταρίθμιος ἀθανάτοισιν.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τόνδε θεαὶ πολύυμνον ἔθρεψαν,
δὴ τότε φοιτίζεσκε καθ' ὑλήεντας ἐναύλους
κισσῷ καὶ δάφνῃ πεπυκασμένος· αἱ δ' ἅμ' ἕποντο
νύμφαι, ὁ δ' ἐξηγεῖτο· βρόμος δ' ἔχεν ἄσπετον ὕλην.

Four lines (3-6) and three imperfective verbs (3 τρέφον, 4 ἀτίταλλον, 5 ἀέξετο) sketch Dionysus' gradual development from infancy, the state in which the nymphs of Nyse receive him from Zeus, to a maturity in which, "by his father's will" (5 πατρὸς ἕκητι), he is "numbered among the immortals" (6 μεταρίθμιος ἀθανάτοισιν). This period of nurture and

[124] In light of this heterogeneity it is not surprising that most "analytical" attacks on the *Hymn* have been concentrated within these eighty lines. In announcing his intention "die gedankliche Ordnung in dem Komplex 140-206 zu verstehen und ihm seinen Platz im Ganzen zu geben," Heubeck 134 manifestly believes that to demonstrate the coherence of this portion of the *Hymn* will go far toward vindicating the unity of the whole. That the section properly begins with line 127 is recognized by Forderer, who calls it "Nach der Geburt"; see in particular 134-137.

scene and the opening *descriptio*, both of which involve an epiphany witnessed by other deities. Structurally, it drives home the fact that the poet has chosen the "pleasure-motif" as his means of marking major points of articulation in his hymn.

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growth is then summarized in the complexive aorist ἔθρεψαν (7), while the emphatic δὴ τότε (8) marks the moment at which the god, now fully mature, can no longer be confined within the "fragrant cave" and the "hollows of Nyse" but must give his newly realized nature active expression in the world at large. Although strictly speaking the imperfective forms in lines 8-10 are, like those in 2-6, historical in their temporal reference, the iterative φοιτίζεσκε announces an aspectual shift to the typical: the woodland wandering upon which Dionysus embarks, the wearing of ivy and laurel, the leading of the nymphs as ἔξαρχος are not unique historical events but activities that henceforth will be habitual with the god, life-long *epitedeumata* of the sort that in another hymn would most likely be reported in a *descriptio*.[125] The first half of *h.* 19, for example, describes how Pan roams through woods and over hills, piping tunes for the mountain nymphs who join him in dance and song; aside from length and detail of treatment, the only real difference between the two passages lies in the temporal perspective, *h.* 26.8-10 reporting typical action in past time, *h.* 19.1-26 in the "hymnal present." In thus rounding out his account of Dionysus' upbringing with a brief glance at some of his characteristic pursuits the poet of *h.* 26 is anticipating the rhetorical theorists who rank *epitedeumata* after *anatrophe*, or as a subdivision of *anatrophe*, in the canonical sequence of encomiastic topics.[126]

Short as it is, *h.* 26 resembles *h. Ap.* 127-206 in a number of important ways. Like *h.* 26, this section of the *Hymn* takes the god's infancy (rather than birth) as its point of departure, and like *h.* 26 it reports the god's subsequent transformation through τροφή, although this is represented as a single infusion of divine substance (the ἄμβροτον εἶδαρ of line 127) rather than (as in *h.* 26) a process of nurturing through time. Like Dionysus the transformed Apollo takes his place as an immortal among immortals (with 130 ἀθανάτῃσι μετηύδα cf. *h.* 26.6 μεταρίθμιος ἀθανάτοισι) and then turns, his *anatrophe* completed, to the realm of action: "Having thus spoken, far-shooting Apollo of the unshorn locks began to walk about on the wide-pathed earth ..." (with 133 ἐβίβασκεν cf. *h.* 26.8 φοιτίζεσκε). Despite enormous differences in length and elaboration of treatment, the next seventy lines of the *Hymn* (through 206) are topically equivalent to the last three lines of *h.* 26—a fact that is even more readily apparent when the latter passage is supplemented by the relevant portion of *h.* 19. Predominant throughout the seventy lines is the topic of "geographical preferences" or "favorite haunts" that is represented in *h.* 26 by φοιτίζεσκε καθ' ὑλήεντας ἐναύλους and fully developed in *h.* 19.2-13 by an

[125] This shift to the generalized and the typical, and its relevance as a parallel to *h. Ap.* 127ff., is noted by Förstel 359, note 260.

[126] See above, notes 17 and 18.

extensive catalogue of types of terrain dear to Pan. To this topic, initiated in lines 140-142 just before the shift from narrative to descriptive mode occurs, the lengthy celebration of the Delian *panegyris* is formally subordinated as an excursus, and once that excursus has been brought to a decorous close through the use of epilogic conventions (165-176) and the encomiastic intention of the *Hymn* as a whole has been reaffirmed (177-178), the same topic of "geographical preferences" comes again to the fore in lines 179-185. The section ends with a celebration of one particular *epitedeuma* or *techne*, portraying Apollo in his role as κιθαριστής for the Olympians in festival just as Dionysus is ἔξαρχος for the nymphs in *h.* 26 and as Pan provides music on his pipe for their dancing in *h.* 19.

Lines 127-139: Apollo's Maturation and Claiming of *Timai*

As a mark of punctuation the "pleasure-motif" in lines 125-126 is a semi-colon rather than a full-stop, strong enough to demarcate *genos* from *anatrophe* as hymnal topics but not strong enough to interrupt the narrative. The moment of contemplative stasis that concluded the previous section is now itself brought to an end by a pivotal αὐτὰρ ἐπεί clause: "But when, Phoebus, you ate the immortal food ..." It is noteworthy that all Themis does with the nectar and ambrosia in line 124 is to "make a beginning" or "offer preparatory rites" (ἐπήρξατο); only with line 127 does Apollo actually ingest them.[127] The ἄμβροτον εἶδαρ effects in him an instantaneous transformation from infancy to maturity, so that childhood, the period of growth and development, is by-passed dramatically.[128] As the potentialities that hitherto lay quiescent suddenly demand actualization, the swaddling clothes and the golden band become "chains" or "fetters" (δεσμά) against whose imprisoning grasp he must violently resist, "boundaries" or "limits" (πείρατα) from whose narrow confinement he must escape.[129] He struggles briefly, the bonds fall away, and amid the assembled goddesses he formally proclaims the instruments and offices that define the dimensions of his nature. Once

[127] On the "sakrale Bedeutung" of ἐπάρχεσθαι see Gemoll 138-139, Förstel 433, note 508.

[128] Both Wilamowitz 449 and Jacoby 709 note the skill and tact with which the transition is accomplished.

[129] "Der Genuß der Götterspeise macht das Kind zu dem Gott, der es werden soll, der in ihm steckt" (Wilamowitz 449). Line 129, athetized as a "doublet" of 128 by Jacoby 711, is defended by Deubner 275, van Groningen 308, note 2, Forderer 179, note 57, Förstel 433, note 512. The connotations of violence and desperation in ἀσπαίροντα should not be overlooked; though used elsewhere to describe the restless squirming of an unhappy baby (*h. Dem.* 289, Herod. I.111), its commonest Homeric context is the death-struggle of human beings or animals (e.g. *Il.* 3.293, 10.521, 12.203, *Od.* 8.526, 22.473); in *Il.* 13.571 it is used of a bull resisting entanglement in ropes.

again the *topos* of ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα is in evidence: the utter passivity and helplessness of Apollo's first few moments of life bring the dynamic efficacy of his suddenly realized being into superbly sharp focus, heightening the sense of wonder that will soon find explicit expression in lines 134ff.[130]

Although Apollo's announcement of his *timai* uses the diction and syntax that are conventional in such contexts,[131] the range of activity and interest that it delineates is unusually broad and heterogeneous (131-132):

> εἴη μοι κίθαρίς τε φίλη καὶ καμπύλα τόξα,
> χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν.

By having Apollo himself proclaim his chosen skills rather than reporting them indirectly in his narrative voice the poet shows that Apollo is aware of his own complex diversity from his first moments of conscious being. Equally significant, however, are the programmatic implications of the lines. Of the three *timai* or *technai* it is Apollo's oracular ability that is given the greatest emphasis—by its position as last in the series, by the fact that an entire line is devoted to it, by the shift from nominal (κίθαρις, τόξα) to more vigorous verbal (χρήσω) predication, and by the replacement of an optative of wish with a voluntative future. Following as it does Leto's tacit denial of a *chesterion* to Delos, the stress laid on Apollo's mantic faculty cannot help but drive home the fact that there is an essential aspect of Apollo's nature which is beyond the island's scope and which thus cannot be adequately treated so long as she remains to the fore. The climactic line 132 looks forward, in other words, to the climactic item on the poet's encomiastic agenda, the deeds or exploits (*praxeis*) performed by Apollo in his quest to found "an oracle for mankind" (214, 248, 288 χρηστήριον ἀνθρώποισι) that will offer them "unerring counsel" (252, 292 νημερτέα βουλήν).[132]

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[130] Cf. Förstel 191: "Aber vor allem zeigen es die detailliert berichteten Pflegehandlungen doch als das *kleine* Kind—damit das nun plötzlich einsetzende unglaublich schnelle Heranwachsen zum großen Gott durch den Gegensatz in seiner ganzen Wunderbarkeit hervortrete."

[131] Cf. *Il.* 5.891 (Ares) αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε, *h.* 14.3f. (Magna Mater) ἣ κροτάλων τυπάνων τ' ἰαχὴ σύν τε βρόμος αὐλῶν εὔαδεν, *Theog.* 917 (Muses) τῇσιν ἅδον θαλίαι καὶ τέρψις ἀοιδῆς. For the combination of nominal and verbal predication cf. *h.* 11.2ff. (Athena):

> ἣ σὺν Ἄρηϊ μέλει πολεμήϊα ἔργα
> περθόμεναί τε πόληες ἀϋτή τε πτόλεμοί τε,
> καί τ' ἐρρύσατο λαὸν ἰόντα τε νισόμενόν τε.

On τιμαί as a term for a god's "powers" or "functions" (δυνάμεις) see Keyssner 55-61.

[132] On the programmatic implications of lines 131-132 cf. Dornseiff, *AM* 7, Eitrem 131, Unte 105. On Dornseiff's characterization of the lines as Apollo's "Lebensprogramm" Deubner 252 objects: "Kithara, Bogen, und Orakel sind so

When Apollo has proclaimed his *timai* and begun to walk about on the "wide-pathed earth," all the goddesses are filled with wonder (135 ἐθάμβεον) at the sudden revelation of his powers. A miraculous demonstration of natural ability (φυά) provokes the same reaction in Pind. *Nem.* 1.55ff., where Amphitryon stands rooted in wonder (θάμβει) at the sight of the infant Heracles triumphant over the serpents, and in *Nem.* 3.50ff., where Artemis and Athena marvel (ἐθάμβεον) at the six-year-old Achilles hunting deer without dogs or nets. To think of Apollo as precocious, however—at least in the sense in which these heroes are precocious—is to miss the point: he is no "puer divinus"[133] but a god possessed of full maturity. So Athena, bursting fully grown and fully armed from Zeus's head, inspires awe (σέβας) in the assembled company (*h.* 28.6), and so when Aphrodite, attired and adorned by the Horai, is first brought to Olympus, the gods marvel (θαυμάζοντες) at her beauty (*h.* 6.18).

While the goddesses marvel, Delos *becomes* a marvel: gazing upon the offspring of Zeus and Leto she "blooms with gold, like a mountain-slope with woodland flowers."[134] Perhaps this blossoming is to be understood as symbolic, not as literal fact: as with pride and joy Delos contemplates her foster-son's triumphal progress over the earth, secure in the knowledge that she has been "chosen from islands and mainland to be his home," she experiences a spiritual transfiguration in which her poverty is redeemed by Apollo's respect and love.[135] Rhetorically, the miraculous transformation unites with the θάμβος of the goddesses in producing an effect of emotional climax. The conventional force of the "θαῦμα-motif," as it has been called, is to signal, by heightening the emotional pitch of one theme or topic, an upcoming transition to another.[136] Here, however, the approaching shift lies rather in *mode* than

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bekannte Betätigungsgebiete des Apollon, daß sie in jedem Gedicht, das diesen Gott preist, auftreten können und der auf sie gerichtete Wunsch und Wille des eben Geborenen ohne weiteres vollkommen begreiflich ist ..." (cf. Bethe 20, Drerup 112-113). What confers programmatic force on the lines, however, is not the mere mention of the "Betätigungsgebiete" but the relative emphasis that obtains among them and the connection between this proclamation and Delos' earlier request for a *chresterion*; see Kakridis 108.

[133] Eitrem 131. Thus the presentation of Hermes in *h. Herm.* 15ff. provides not a parallel (*pace* AHS 221) but an instructive *contrast*, for there the incongruity between the god's physically infantile appearance (cf. 151f. σπάργανον ἀμφ' ὤμοις εἰλυμένος ἠΰτε τέκνον νήπιον) and his far-from-infantile strength and cunning is deliberately exploited for humorous effect.

[134] For a full discussion of and likely solution to the textual problem posed by 135-139 see Forderer 89-94.

[135] Forderer 92 links the passage with 61 (χαῖρε δὲ Δῆλος) and 90 (Δῆλος μὲν μάλα χαῖρε) as "die dritte, stärkste und endgültige Freude der Delos" (cf. Wilamowitz 449).

[136] For the "θαῦμα-motif" in Pindar and Bacchylides cf. *P.* 10.48ff., *P.* 2.46ff., *P.* 1.26ff., *O.* 13.83f., Bacch. 3.57, and see Bundy, *SP* 3, 8-9, 14.

in topic: the historical *narratio* that began with Leto's wanderings is drawing to a close, and within ten lines the poet's perspective on his material will have become that of the generalized *descriptio*. The identical motif will be found in lines 156ff. (πρὸς δὲ τόδε μέγα θαῦμα), where it brings the account of the Delian *panegyris* to a climax and so prepares for an eventual return to the hymn's main subject.

Lines 140-146: Geographical Preferences

Thus far Apollo has been named three times in this section of the *Hymn*: Φοῖβε (127), Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων (130), Φοῖβος ἀκερσεκόμης ἑκατηβόλος (134). Reverting in chiastic fashion to the direct address of line 127, ἀργυρότοξε ἄναξ ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον (140) forms a fitting climax to this series; the steady addition of epithets progressively magnifies the stature of the new god, to whom attention is recalled from the goddesses and Delos by the emphatic αὐτὸς δ' with which the line begins.

Αὐτὸς δ' ἀργυρότοξε ἄναξ ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον,
ἄλλοτε μέν τ' ἐπὶ Κύνθου ἐβήσαο παιπαλόεντος,
ἄλλοτε δ' ἂν νήσους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠλάσκαζες.
πολλοί τοι νηοί τε καὶ ἄλσεα δενδρήεντα,
πᾶσαι δὲ σκοπιαί τε φίλαι καὶ πρώονες ἄκροι
ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων, ποταμοί θ' ἅλα δὲ προρέοντες·
ἀλλὰ σὺ Δήλῳ Φοῖβε μάλιστ' ἐπιτέρπεαι ἦτορ ...

Apollo was last seen in line 139 "walking over the earth with its broad ways." Rhetorically, lines 140-146 constitute a "summary priamel" in which the spatial and temporal amplitude implied by εὐρυοδείης and by the iterative ἐβίβασκεν is set forth more concretely as foil for the reintroduction of Delos as a subject of discourse. Four clauses introduced by the anaphoric series ἄλλοτε, ἄλλοτε, πολλοί, πᾶσαι present a general picture of Apollo's journeys and destinations, then one further clause sets that general overview aside in light of Apollo's own special preference for his native island.[137] The dismissive ἀλλά and the superlative μάλιστα are conventional features of the climactic or "capping" term of a priamel.[138]

Topically, lines 140-146 embark upon the common hymnal theme of "haunts" or "geographical preferences"—a theme of which *h.* 19 (discussed above) provides the most extensively developed example in the Homeric collection. As Apollo "sometimes" (ἄλλοτε μέν) steps upon craggy Cynthus and "sometimes" (ἄλλοτε δ') wanders over islands and mainland,[139] so Pan roams (8 φοιτᾷ) through thickets and wooded glens, "sometimes" (9 ἄλλοτε μέν) following streams, "sometimes" (10 ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ) clambering over rocks. As to Apollo "all outlooks and headlands are dear," so Pan "possesses all ridges and peaks and stony ways as his portion" (6-7 πάντα λόφον νιφόεντα λέλογχε καὶ κορυφὰς ὀρέων καὶ πετρήεντα κέλευθα).[140] In *h.* 19, however, the treatment remains general throughout; types of terrain are catalogued but no specifically named places. Here, by contrast, Apollo sets out from and returns at intervals to Cynthus, which happens (not coincidentally) to be the very spot where he was born, and this journeying is mirrored in the movement of the poet's own discourse from specific (141 Κύνθου παιπαλόεντος) to highly generalized (142-145) and back (146 Δήλῳ). By the time its attention is thus recalled to Apollo's place of choice, the audience has been given a brief but sweeping view of the world from which the Ionians are said to "gather" in the lines that follow.

With line 146, the capping line of the priamel, the poet also completes his transition from *narratio* to *descriptio*, from unique historical event to typical activity in a timeless present. The shift in aspect begins almost imperceptibly with the iterative suffix in ἐβίβασκεν (133) and is soon accelerated by the explicitly generalizing force of ἄλλοτε/ἄλλοτε (141-142). The temporal shift, which might have entailed considerable grinding of gears, is achieved smoothly enough through the perfectly natural omission of verb-forms in lines 143-145, which thus serve as a buffer between ἐπιτέρπεαι and the ostensibly historical ἐβήσαο and ἠλάσκαζες.[141] From this point on through the end of the section (that is, to line 206) the poet uses the "hymnal present" exclusively.[142]

Lines 147-176: The Digression on the Delian Festival

Up until line 139 Delos has been of interest to the poet simply as Apollo's birthplace. When, after a brief widening of focus in lines

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[137] On the rhetorical structure of *h. Ap.* 140ff. cf. Dornseiff, *AM* 7, Kalinka 391, Jacoby 713, Drerup 117, Förstel 113, Race, *Priamel* 50-51.

[138] Cf. Bundy, "Quarrel" 62, note 65, Race, *Priamel* 51. A prose hymn to Poseidon by Aelius Aristides provides a close parallel to the rhetorical movement of *h. Ap.* 143-146 (XLVI.20): Καθάπαξ μὲν γὰρ εἰ δεῖ μὴ κατασμικρύνειν τὸν λόγον, πᾶσαι μὲν ἀκταί, πάντες δὲ λιμένες καὶ πάντα μέρη τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἱερὰ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ ἀναθήματα καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ τεμένη καὶ νεῴ. οὐ μὴν οὕτω γε φίλον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἀγαπητὸν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ τίμιον ὡς ὁ ἰσθμὸς οὗτος καὶ ὅδε ὁ χῶρος.

[139] "νῆσοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες - das ist die griechische Welt, die 21 ἀν' ἤπειρον ἠδ' ἀνὰ νήσους heißt" (Jacoby 713, note 1); so AHS 222, Baltes 28-29.

[140] With λέλογχε cf. *h.* 6.2 ἣ πάσης Κύπρου κρήδεμνα λέλογχεν, Pind. *O.* 14.1f. Καφισίων ὑδάτων ... λαχοῖσαι, and in non-geographical contexts *h.* 29.3, *Theog.* 203, 422, 424, Pind. *O.* 9.15, *N.* 11.1, and see Keyssner 62-65.

[141] Cf. Janko, "Structure" 18.

[142] On 140ff. as effecting a transition from "Urzeit" to "dauernde Gegenwart," from "epischen Bericht" to "überzeitlich geltenden Schilderung des Wirkungsbereiches des Gottes," see Jacoby 709, note 2, and Heubeck 136-137; cf. also Forderer 96, Förstel 113-114, 189.

140-145, he returns to the island with renewed enthusiasm in 146ff., it is to celebrate it under another (though related) aspect, as the site of the great Ionian *panegyris* held there in Apollo's honor. The treatment of this festival falls into three sections of approximately equal length. The first (147-155) describes the gathering in general terms; the second (156-164) is concerned with one specific feature, the chorus of Deliades. In the third section (165-176) the poet "says farewell" to the maidens and to the *panegyris* as incidental topics of only temporary interest and prepares for a return to his main encomiastic subject. The digression is fully justified, however, by Apollo's own preference. If indeed he "takes greatest delight" (μάλιστ' ἐπιτέρπεαι ἦτορ) in Delos *as a place*, so he must—and will—in Delos *as a theme*, particularly since the *panegyris* as an institutionalized commemoration of his birth must inevitably remind him of the very services for which the island has so great a claim on his heart.

Quite apart from that formal justification, moreover, the description of the festival has its own relevance to the *Hymn*'s encomiastic purpose, for it is, indirectly, as persuasive a testimonial to Apollo's power as is the opening scene on Olympus. The poet's strategy, here as there, is to argue from effect to cause. First he paints a picture of the festival as a whole with a few vivid strokes: the throngs of "long-robed Ionians" with their children and their wives, the competitions in boxing, dancing, and singing, the ships drawn up along the beaches, the many fair-goods set out on view.

φαίη κ' ἀθανάτους καὶ ἀγήρως ἔμμεναι αἰεὶ
ὃς τότ' ἐπαντιάσει' ὅτ' Ἰάονες ἀθρόοι εἶεν·
πάντων γάρ κεν ἴδοιτο χάριν, τέρψαιτο δὲ θυμὸν
ἄνδρας τ' εἰσορόων καλλιζώνους τε γυναῖκας
νῆάς τ' ὠκείας ἠδ' αὐτῶν κτήματα πολλά.

Such is the "grace" or "charm" (χάρις) of the scene, says the poet, that any visitor "would delight his heart in gazing" and, "encountering the Ionians when they are gathered, would say that they were deathless and ageless forever."[143] This hypothetical observer from outside the pan-Ionian community is a witness whose testimony carries conviction because it is independent of ethnic and cultic allegiances.[144] The reason

[143] The χάρις on which the perception of "divinity" is grounded seems to include not merely such natural graces and excellences as are suggested by adjectives like καλλιζώνους and ὠκείας, but also the transforming glamour that in epic is shed by gods upon human favorites (e.g. *Od.* 2.12 θεσπεσίην δ' ἄρα τῷ γε χάριν κατέχευεν Ἀθήνη) and in epinicians is shed upon victors by song or by the fact of victory itself (e.g. Pind. *O.* 10.93f. τὶν δ' ἀδυεπής τε λύρα γλυκύς τ' αὐλὸς ἀναπάσσει χάριν). As such it resembles the αἴγλα διόσδοτος, the "gleam granted by Zeus," which according to Pindar (*P.* 8.95ff.) can transfigure and redeem man's "ephemeral" nature.

[144] So too in 167ff. (ξεῖνος ταλαπείριος ἐλθών) the poet invokes an "outsider" as a source of impartial judgment. The device is one of which Isocrates is fond; cf. *Peace* 41 τίς γὰρ

that the poet feels the need of such impartial corroboration is that the Ionians' perceived likeness to divinity and the transfiguring grace from which it springs are important to his implicit argument. In displaying their prowess competitively, "mindful" (150 μνησάμενοι) as they do so of the deity whose numinous presence informs the occasion, the Ionians are consciously renewing a tradition of excellence that, under Apollo's patronage, stretches back into the past and forward into the future, and the oneness with divinity that they consequently experience, their momentary transcendance of the limiting conditions of humanity, death and old age, points, like the equally momentary panic of the assembled Olympians in lines 2ff., to one conclusion: this god is a god of power.[145]

From the festival as a whole the poet in lines 156-164 turns to one particular element in it that caps the rest (156 πρὸς δέ) and forms its climax: the chorus of Delian maidens, "servants of the Far-Shooter," who sing to honor their divine and entertain their human audience.[146] About these Deliades, called "a great wonder whose fame will never perish," three things are reported: the general subject-matter of their songs, the general effect of those songs on their audience, and, finally, one aspect of their technique. In obedience to the decorum of the occasion they give Apollo pride of place in their performances (158 πρῶτον μέν), while Leto and Artemis, though they merit inclusion as Apollo's mother and sister (as they do for the poet himself in lines 14-18), are firmly relegated to secondary rank (159 αὖτις δ' αὖ). The celebration of all three gods, however, is but preliminary to tales about "men and women of old," and in these the Deliades share Odysseus' ability (cf. *Od.* 17.514, 521) to "cast a spell" (θέλγουσι) over their hearers. The poet reserves his warmest commendation, however, for a technical feat: their mimicking of different dialects (φωνάς) and "sound-effects" (κρεμβαλιαστύν).[147] Their skill in this is such that "each man would say that he himself was speaking, so closely

ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθὼν καὶ μήπω συνδιεφθαρμένος ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἐπιστὰς τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οὐκ ἂν μαίνεσθαι καὶ παραφρονεῖν ἡμᾶς νομίσειεν, *Paneg.* 133 ἡγοῦμαι δ', εἴ τινες ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθόντες θεαταὶ γένοιντο τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων, πολλὴν ἂν αὐτοὺς καταγνῶναι μανίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν.

[145] On the encomiastic relevance of the Delian excursus see Heubeck 137. Only if one has on *a priori* grounds restricted the poet's announced subject-matter to Apollo's *birth* rather than (in Heubeck's words) "den Gott selbst in seinem überzeitlichen Wirken" does it become necessary to invoke hypothetical "circumstances of performance" in order to account for the passage (e.g. van Groningen 312-313).

[146] The progressive narrowing of focus is noted by Jacoby 714, Race 51-52.

[147] Cf. F. de Martino, *Atene e Roma*, n.s. 26 (1981) 41. Although the exact nature of the maidens' performance remains obscure, this interpretation seems the most likely; cf. AHS 224-225. The important point rhetorically is that the performance constitutes a θαῦμα.

fitted [i.e. to the objects of imitation] is their lovely song" (163-164).[148] It is evidently the "close fit" or verisimilitude of the *mimesis* and the astonishment that such illusionistic skill must arouse in an audience that justifies the introduction of the Deliades as a *thauma*; it is equally clearly implied that as Ἑκατηβελέταο θέραπναι (157) they owe their wondrous abilities to the inspiration of their divine master and patron.

The climactic introduction of the Deliades as a "great marvel" signals that the description of the festival is drawing to a close and that a transition of some sort will shortly be effected.[149] Although sanctioned by the special pleasure that Apollo takes in his birthplace, the celebration of the Delian *panegyris* has, by line 164, assumed what can only be felt as truly digressive proportions; from the single relative adverb ἔνθα (147) that formally subordinates the account of the festival to the topic of "haunts" or "geographical preferences" upon which the poet embarked in line 140, a full eighteen lines are now suspended. Indirectly, of course, Apollo's *dynamis* has been magnified throughout, but on the level of surface appearances the poet does seem to have strayed some distance from his encomiastic agenda. In order to bring this excursus to an end, therefore, he "bids farewell" to the maidens—and with them, to the Delian *panegyris* as a whole—through a sophisticated adaptation of the conventions of hymnal epilogue.[150]

The fullest and most complex epilogues in the Homeric collection combine three standard elements—a salutation to the deity concerned, a request for favor or reward, and a "promise" pertaining to the poet's plans for the future—in such a way that a relation of reciprocity between god and singer is defined or implied.[151] In *h.* 30.17-19 (Earth), for example, one finds an overt *quid pro quo*:

> Χαῖρε θεῶν μήτηρ, ἄλοχ' Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος,
> πρόφρων δ' ἀντ' ᾠδῆς βίοτον θυμήρε' ὄπαζε·
> αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ σεῖο καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' ἀοιδῆς.

[148] "So well does the song hang together" (LSJ), "So ist ihnen schön zusammengefügt der Gesang" (Forderer 101). The clause is clearly intended, however, as explanatory of the preceding statement ("each would say that he himself was giving voice"), and it is difficult to conceive how mere formal excellence could produce such an effect on an audience.

[149] See above, pp. 55-56, and note 136.

[150] On the transitional function of *h. Ap.* 165-178 cf. AHS 190, 227, Heubeck 137-140, Unte 47-49, Forderer 109-111, W. H. Race, "Some Digressions and Returns in Greek Authors," *CJ* 76 (1980) 7f. The following discussion incorporates material from my 1979 article, which should be consulted for a more detailed treatment of the problems posed by the passage and the controversy that has surrounded it. Since the article appeared Förstel has subjected the various arguments on either side to a careful review (pp. 156-157, 162, 405-406, note 416); although he himself believes that the lines in question are epilogic in intention and effect, he admits that "es kann nicht ausgeschlossen werden, daß sie eine singuläre Funktion haben und den Übergang zu einem neuen Teil des Gottespreises im gleichen Lied bezeichnen" (406).

[151] On this "Vertrags-verhältnis" see Keyssner 133-134.

Similar are *h.* 25.6-7 (the Muses) and *h.* 6.19-21 (Aphrodite):

> Χαίρετε τέκνα Διὸς καὶ ἐμὴν τιμήσατ' ἀοιδήν·
> αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ὑμέων τε καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' ἀοιδῆς.
>
> Χαῖρ' ἑλικοβλέφαρε γλυκυμείλιχε, δὸς δ' ἐν ἀγῶνι
> νίκην τῷδε φέρεσθαι, ἐμὴν δ' ἔντυνον ἀοιδήν·
> αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ σεῖο καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' ἀοιδῆς.

In *h. Ap.* 165-176 our hymnist adapts this epilogic pattern to a special purpose:

> ἀλλ' ἄγεθ' ἱλήκοι μὲν Ἀπόλλων Ἀρτέμιδι ξύν,
> χαίρετε δ' ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι· ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθε
> μνήσασθ', ὁππότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
> ἐνθάδ' ἀνείρηται ξεῖνος ταλαπείριος ἐλθών·
> ὦ κοῦραι, τίς δ' ὔμμιν ἀνὴρ ἥδιστος ἀοιδῶν
> ἐνθάδε πωλεῖται, καὶ τέῳ τέρπεσθε μάλιστα;
> ὑμεῖς δ' εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθ' ἀμφ' ἡμέων·
> τυφλὸς ἀνήρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἔνι παιπαλοέσσῃ,
> τοῦ πᾶσαι μετόπισθεν ἀριστεύουσιν ἀοιδαί.
> ἡμεῖς δ' ὑμέτερον κλέος οἴσομεν ὅσσον ἐπ' αἶαν
> ἀνθρώπων στρεφόμεσθα πόλεις εὖ ναιεταώσας·
> οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δὴ πείσονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐτήτυμόν ἐστιν.

After saluting the Delian maidens with the conventional χαίρετε and asking them to vouch for the excellence of his songs in time to come, the poet promises in return to spread their fame wherever he wanders among men. The imperatives μνήσασθ' (167) and ὑποκρίνασθ' (171) are thus equivalent to τιμήσατ' in *h.* 25. 6, while ὑμέτερον κλέος οἴσομεν (174), the promise for the future, corresponds to ὑμέων τε καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' ἀοιδῆς. The reciprocity inherent in the "contract" form of epilogue is underscored by an emphatic use of pronouns (166 ὑμεῖς/ἐμεῖο, 171 ὑμεῖς/ἡμέων,[152] 174 ἡμεῖς/ὑμέτερον): "If *you* advance *my* claim to be the best of singers, *I* shall see to it that *your* skill is celebrated far and wide."[153]

Because his praise of the Deliades in lines 156-164 is, formally speaking, a miniature "hymn" in itself,[154] the poet's secularization of an essentially religious form strikes no jarring note; because the poet's primary allegiance, however, is and must be to Apollo himself, the real subject of the hymn, decorum requires a preliminary gesture of respect in the god's direction. This gesture is neatly executed by ἱλήκοι μὲν

[152] On the text of 171 see F. Marx, *RhM* 62 (1909) 620, J. Humbert, *REG* 51 (1938) 275-281; on the use of the plural for the singular see Forderer 104.

[153] Cf. Forderer 107, 110.

[154] Lines 156-157 announce the theme (ὅου κλέος οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται = κλήσω, ᾄσομαι, or the like); lines 158 ff., introduced by a "hymnal relative," are an account of typical or habitual activities (note the generalizing τε) such as is found in *h.* 9, 10, 19, 27.

'Απόλλων (165). While on the one hand the use of the third person eases Apollo tactfully into the background, on the other hand the functional equivalence of ἵληθι and χαῖρε in epilogic style[155] gives him his due and assures him of the poet's solicitous concern. In context, moreover, some of the literal sense of the verb ("be propitious") is revivified with apologetic force to deprecate the anger and *phthonos* which Apollo might well be supposed to feel when temporarily slighted in favor of his servants.[156] "May Apollo be forgiving"—such is the implication—"and not begrudge this momentary departure from encomiastic duty strictly conceived."

For the specific terms of the "contract" that is established between the poet and the Deliades—recognition of excellence for the one party, celebration and "remembrance" for the other—it is *h.* 6, not *h.* 25, that offers the closest analogue. When the poet of *h.* 6 asks Aphrodite to grant him victory in the contest at hand (δὸς δ' ἐν ἀγῶνι νίκην τῷδε φέρεσθαι), he either conceives of her as literally the judge or κριτής in whose gift the prize lies or is implying that by informing his song with order and beauty (cf. ἐμὴν δ' ἔντυνον ἀοιδήν) she will induce the human judges to single it out for recognition. Although the situation imagined in our passage is not overtly agonistic like that in *h.* 6, it does explicitly involve the forming of critical judgments. Should some "stranger" arrive on Delos and ask the maidens what singer they find "sweetest" and "take the greatest delight in," they are bidden to "remember" the poet in their answer and to advance his claim to pre-eminence. The maidens' reply is not, however, the only act of judgment involved in the little scene. Although it is obvious that the poet could simply ask the Deliades to vouch for his excellence in future without imagining a specific situation in which they would be called upon to do so, he chooses instead to construct a hypothetical dialogue between them and a third party, a wandering stranger "with much experience of suffering." The characterization of the stranger as ταλαπείριος is no idle detail, for it establishes a context and a motive for his quest: he is evidently seeking "the sweetest of singers" because he wishes to find consolation for his suffering in the pleasure that is poetry's proper effect. The power of song to assuage the griefs and losses entailed in hard experience is of course a familiar conception in archaic poetry; one thinks immediately of Hesiod's Muses who provide "forgetfulness of evils and rest from cares" (*Theog.* 53 λησμοσύνην τε

[155] ἵληθι appears in *h.* 1, 20, 23, ἵλαμαι in 19, 21; χαῖρε or χαίρετε elsewhere.

[156] Cf. Forderer 102. ἱλήκω is used with similar apologetic force in Aratus, *Phaen.* 637-638, where the tale of Orion's assault on Artemis is prefaced by the words Ἄρτεμις ἱλήκοι· προτέρων λόγος, οἵ μιν ἔφαντο ἑλκῆσαι πέπλοιο. On the ἵλαος-complex in hymnal style see Keyssner 91-93.

κακῶν ἄμπαυμά τε μερμηράων, 102-103 αἶψ' ὅ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται, οὐδέ τι κηδέων μέμνηται).[157]

The maidens' side of the bargain, then, is to set forth the poet's claim to excellence in his art, a claim that will be tested objectively against the emotional and intellectual needs of an anonymous stranger. The poet's side is to bear report of the maidens throughout the lands he travels in—and this report too, like the maidens' pronouncement on the best of singers, will be judged and verified by third parties: οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δὴ πείσονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐτήτυμόν ἐστι (176). Whereas the specific criterion that has to be satisfied for the ξεῖνος ταλαπείριος is *pleasure* (169 ἥδιστος, 170 τέρπεσθε), the basis on which the poet's various audiences will be persuaded is *veracity*: what he says in celebration of the Deliades "whose fame will never perish" (156 ὅου κλέος οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται) is neither falsehood nor fiction but a strict record of fact (κλέος ἐτήτυμον). This doublet of pleasure and truth is formulated in different terms but to the same effect in *Od.* 11. 367-368, in which Alcinous compliments Odysseus on his abilities as a "singer of tales":

> σοὶ δ' ἔπι μὲν μορφὴ ἐπέων, ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί,
> μῦθον δ' ὡς ὅτ' ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας.

Since in lines 363-366 Alcinous makes much of Odysseus's unlikeness to the common run of cheats and liars, we may assume that φρένες ἐσθλαί alludes to the edifying intellectual and ethical qualities that his (veracious) story-telling reveals, while μορφὴ ἐπέων clearly refers to the formal beauty of language that gives pleasure to an audience.[158] It is because the two elements are combined in Odysseus' nature that he can tell his tale "like a singer, skillfully" (ὡς ὅτ' ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως), and it is because the two are to be found in balance in the blind poet of Chios that "all his songs are best now and hereafter" (τοῦ πᾶσαι μετόπισθεν ἀριστεύουσιν ἀοιδαί).[159]

In the passage as a whole, then, our hymnist makes, directly or indirectly, three claims for his poetic compositions: that they give pleasure, that they are true, and that they are of pre-eminent quality. The first claim is made in terms of the *poet* (τις ... ἀοιδῶν), the last in terms of his *subject-matter* (ὑμέτερον κλέος); the midmost, uniting and subsuming the others, in terms of the *work of art* that he produces (πᾶσαι ... ἀοιδαί). The

[157] On this passage see M. West (note 26) *ad loc.* Its relevance to *h. Ap.* 167ff. is noted by Forderer 103.

[158] Cf. *Od.* 8. 170-171 ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεσιν στέφει, οἱ δέ τ' ἐς αὐτὸν τερπόμενοι λεύσσουσιν.

[159] On the present tense with μετόπισθεν cf. Forderer 105: "für die Zukunft sind schon jetzt—während der Dichter es den Mädchen in den Mund legt und wenn sie es sagen werden—ein für allemal seine Gesänge die besten."

poet's *audience*, the last of what have been called the "four co-ordinates of art criticism,"[160] appears both in the stranger who comes in quest of the "sweetest of singers" and in the far-flung "communities of men" whose belief will be won by the ἐτήτυμον κλέος. Thus all the data that a "poetics" or "theory of literature" must account for are present in the passage, and not merely present but set in meaningful relation to one another. By making his works of verbal art vehicles of pleasure and truth, the poet persuades and consoles both his contemporaries and posterity.

The fact that this dramatized meditation on the nature and function of poetry is cast in the form of a (secularized) hymnal epilogue of the "contract" type gives it an additional theoretical dimension. The notion that poet and theme are necessarily linked in a relationship of mutual obligation and benefit is one frequently encountered in Pindar's epinicians, where of course the contract (χρέος) is a concrete commercial fact as well as a spiritual reality.[161] The performance of noble deeds exacts a debt of praise, but it also offers coveted material for the exercise of poetic virtuosity; in discharging that debt and exploiting that material the poet secures immortality of fame for the athlete and for himself alike. A similar bargain is struck in *h. Ap.* 166-176: the hymnist will assure the survival and propagation of the maidens' *kleos* if the Deliades do all they can to reciprocate the favor. The felicitous refinement here is that the Deliades, the theme of song with which the poet has been concerned and from which he is now taking his leave, do not require a voice to speak on their behalf but are themselves singers of extraordinary talent.[162] By providing an occasion for poetic production even the inarticulate can attest to the ability of those who celebrate them; the Deliades, however, can take matters directly into their own hands and proclaim the poet's surpassing excellence in so many words. Thus by choosing the chorus of maidens as the point of departure for his theoretical reflections and by representing them as the voice of the poetic tradition of which he is both product and continuator, the hymnist gives vivid expression to the thought that poet and theme stand or fall together, inextricably linked by mutual need and reciprocal advantage.[163]

In sum: if the poet's *sole* purpose in addressing the Deliades were to dismiss them as a topic of discourse and thus prepare for a return to his main theme, he obviously could have achieved the desired effect in far

[160] M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* (Oxford 1953) 6-7. The actual terms that Abrams uses are "artist," "universe," "work," and "audience."
[161] Cf. *O.* 3.7, *O.* 10.8, *P.* 8.33, *P.* 9.104, and see W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Tübingen 1966) 19-21.
[162] For a discussion of the poet's role as spokesman for the "speechless" (ἄγλωσσοι) see A. Miller, *GRBS* 24 (1983) 111-120.
[163] Cf. R. Harriot, *Poetry and Criticism Before Plato* (London 1969) 126-127.

briefer compass than twelve lines. Instead he exploits various conventions of hymnal epilogue in such a way that while he is bringing his excursus on the Delian festival to an end he is also offering a compressed but coherent statement of the nature and function of poetry and advancing a claim to pre-eminent stature in the art. Far from being indecorous, of course, such "Aufwertung des Lobes der Dichtung" is a regular feature of encomiastic poetry, as Pindar's epinicians amply demonstrate.[164] If *all* the Chian's songs are "superlative in quality," then the present hymn is no exception; and its value as a tribute to Apollo's glory can only be enhanced by the assertion of its excellence.

Lines 177-185: Geographical Preferences and *Epitedeumata*

Once he has bidden a tactful farewell to the Deliades as a theme of song, and to the Delian digression as a subsection of his hymn, the poet in lines 177-178 then assures his audience, both human and divine, that despite his apparent divagation from the task at hand he still holds to his original purpose, to "remember and not forget Apollo the far-shooter."[165]

> αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οὐ λήξω ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα
> ὑμνέων ἀργυρότοξον ὃν ἠΰκομος τέκε Λητώ.

Whether construed with the genitive of a noun or with a participle, the verb λήγω in epic usage regularly denotes the cessation of an activity in which one is presently engaged.[166] Negated, therefore, it asserts emphatically that the action specified is *not* abandoned but, on the contrary, is *continued*, as when, momentarily interrupted in his slaughter of the Trojans by the intervention of the river Scamander, Achilles declares: Τρῶας δ' οὐ πρὶν λήξω ὑπερφιάλους ἐναρίζων πρὶν ἔλσαι κατὰ ἄστυ (*Il.* 21.224-225). Since λήγω is in addition a *vox propria* for the termination of a hymnal performance,[167] our poet's use of the phrase οὐ λήξω ὑμνέων announces with all possible clarity and directness that, far from bringing his hymn to an end, he intends to proceed with further praises of Apollo. Because the

[164] Cf. E. Thummer, *Die isthmischen Gedichte*, Vol. I (Heidelberg 1968) 82-102. On such "Aufwertung" in *h. Ap.* 156-176 see Floratos 299-300.
[165] Again, the ensuing discussion draws on Miller 178-183. Says Kirk 173: "despite ingenious or obtuse theories to the contrary, 178 is the clearly the end of a Hymn; οὐ λήξω in 177 is a formula of ending by hymnodic usage (not a sign that the poet is immediately continuing, as some have brilliantly argued), and the stress on Apollo's birth in 178 looks back and not forward." In support of his assertion that οὐ λήξω is a "formula of ending" Kirk offers neither evidence nor argument.
[166] E.g. *Il.* 1.210, 6.107, 9.191, *Od.* 8.87; negated, *Il.* 1.224, *Od.* 22.63.
[167] Cf. *h.* 1.17-18 οἱ δέ σ' ἀοιδοὶ ᾄδομεν ἀρχόμενοι λήγοντές τ', *Theog.* 48 ἀρχόμεναί θ' ὑμνεῦσι θεαὶ λήγουσαί τ' ἀοιδῆς, Hes. fr. 305 ἀρχόμενοι δὲ Λίνον καὶ λήγοντες καλέουσιν, and Theoc. 17.1 ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα καὶ ἐς Δία λήγετε Μοῖσαι, and see Keyssner 13.

formal "leave-taking" of 165-176 is itself quite lengthy, heightening the digressive effect while in reality bringing the digression to a close, the way in which he re-affirms his purpose has a peculiar aptness and verisimilitude: he vows that he will *not* stop singing of Apollo just when it might appear that he *has*.

In lines 177-178, as in line 1, encomiastic intention and encomiastic object are juxtaposed, οὐ λήξω ... ὑμνέων being equivalent to Μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι and ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα a clear echo of Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο. The relative clause ὃν ἠΰκομος τέκε Λητώ neatly recapitulates the theme (Apollo's birth) that has bulked largest in the hymn thus far and recalls the programmatic announcement of that theme in line 25 (ὥς σε πρῶτον Λητὼ τέκε).[168] Moreover, by echoing the line that introduces the account of geographical preferences (140 αὐτὸς δ' ἀργυρότοξε ἄναξ ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον) the epithets ἑκηβόλον and ἀργυρότοξον prepare for the imminent resumption of that topic in 179ff.

ὦ ἄνα, καὶ Λυκίην καὶ Μῃονίην ἐρατεινὴν
καὶ Μίλητον ἔχεις ἔναλον πόλιν ἱμερόεσσαν,
αὐτὸς δ' αὖ Δήλοιο περικλύστου μέγ' ἀνάσσεις.

Like 140-146, 179-181 constitute a priamel that culminates in a climactic reference to Delos; indeed, the later passage functions as a brief reprise of the earlier, with the generalized "summary foil" replaced by individual place-names in a series of increasing rhetorical elaboration (name, name + epithet, name + appositive + two epithets) and the capping term marked by other means than the standard superlative: Lycia, Maeonia, and Miletus Apollo merely "holds," Delos he "rules in person." Another reprise can perhaps be felt in the juxtaposition within line 181 of Δήλοιο περικλύστου and μέγ' ἀνάσσεις, which, by recalling Δήλῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ and πᾶσι θνητοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις in the *propositio*, sounds again the note of paradoxical tension between the circumscribed and the limitless, the ἐξ οἵων and the εἰς οἷα, that we have seen to be so pervasively present in the poet's treatment of Apollo's career.[169]

With lines 182ff. the poet begins to supplement his account of "geographical preferences" with the even more common hymnal topic of "favorite pastimes."[170] Comparison with *h.* 26 and *h.* 19 reveals the

[168] The best discussion of *h. Ap.* 177-181 as resumptive of the hymn's main encomiastic thread are to be found in Unte 47-52, Forderer 110-113, Baltes 28-30.

[169] On the connection between *h. Ap.* 181 and 26-29 cf. Forderer 112-113.

[170] That the action introduced by εἶσι (182) is "zeitlos und typisch" is recognized by Altheim 441, Jacoby 737, Heubeck 141, Förstel 104-106, 223. Cessi 871-873, Drerup 118-120, Forderer 114, 127, Baltes 31, note 32, err in regarding the whole of the passage through 206 as a historical *narratio* of Apollo's first appearance among the Olympians, a possibility precluded by the use of the present tense throughout (see above, note 26). The transition between 179-81 and 182ff. has aroused great dissatisfaction and suspicion;

conventional features. Dionysus, as he wanders through the woods, is leading the nymphs in dance and song; Pan, returning at evening from the hunt, plays "sweet music" on his pipe; Apollo, as he "goes toward rocky Pytho," is "playing his hollow lyre." Dionysus is "decked with ivy and laurel," Pan "has the skin of a spotted lynx on his back," Apollo wears "immortal garments fragrant with incense." In *h.* 26 "the outcry resounds through the vast woodlands"; in *h.* 19 "the mountain-peak moans round with echoes"; here "the lyre under the golden plectrum gives forth a lovely sound." The seemingly casual reference to Pytho in line 183 is worthy of note: it anticipates the central theme of the hymn's second half (announced officially in lines 214ff.) much as the brief vignette of Apollo's birth in lines 16-18 anticipates the formal selection of *genos* as the poet's first topic in lines 25ff.[171]

Lines 186-206: The Second Olympian Scene

From Pytho Apollo goes "like a thought" to Olympus and the house of Zeus, where he joins the ὁμήγυρις of the gods. As the echo of line 2 hints (187 Διὸς πρὸς δῶμα θεῶν = 2 θεοὶ κατὰ δῶμα Διός), the scene that follows is intended to recall, and contrast with, the opening *descriptio.*[172] There Apollo is returning to Olympus, his bow at the ready, from forays into the world at large; here he arrives, playing the lyre, from his own sanctuary at Delphi. There he must adapt himself to the Olympian decorum before he can be absorbed into the divine assembly; here he is in the proper spirit already, so that his mere appearance amid the gathering gives rise to instantaneous (188 αὐτίκα) festivity. The two scenes dramatize antithetical aspects of Apollo's *dynamis* by portraying their effect on his fellow Olympians.

The description of the festival itself, in which the relative position and prominence of individual figures are specified by antithetical and adversative particles, reveals an almost painterly eye for composition. The first formal contrast is between *singers* on the one hand and *dancers* on the

cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 74, note 3 ("unverträglich"), Bethe 8 ("keinen verständlichen Anschluß"), Altheim 441 ("ein solcher Wechsel in Thema und Person kann nicht das Ursprüngliche sein"), Förstel 144 ("keinen befriedigenden Zusammenhang"). Once 177-181 are recognized as resumptive, however, it becomes clear that no *change* of theme is involved, merely a further *development*. As for the shift in person, that can be paralleled elsewhere in the poem; cf. in particular the four-fold alternation between "er-Stil" and "du-Stil" in 119-130.

[171] On the function of line 183 cf. Unte 58 and Baltes 31, who calls the line "ein präludierendes Anklingen eines Themas, das bald seine große Durchführung erhält."

[172] The close relationship between the two Olympian scenes is recognized even by separatists (e.g. Bethe 24, Drerup 119, Deubner 265, Jacoby 720). For a thorough discussion of the parallels and contrasts by a unitarian see Forderer 137-139.

other, the nine Muses (μέν) being balanced numerically (αὐτάρ) by the three Charites, the three Horai, and Harmonia, Hebe, and Aphrodite. In a second antithesis this latter group becomes foil or background *first* (τῇσι μέν) for Artemis, whose importance as ὁμότροφος Ἀπόλλωνος is underscored by litotes (οὔτ' αἰσχρὴ οὔτ' ἐλάχεια) and quantitative and qualitative auxesis (μάλα μεγάλη τε ἰδεῖν καὶ εἶδος ἀγητή), *then again* (ἐν δ' αὖ τῇσιν) for two male divinities, Ares and Hermes.[173] Capping the whole catalogue (αὐτάρ) is Phoebus Apollo himself, musician, conductor, and master-of-ceremonies, whose lyre and "lovely high-stepping dance" set the pace for all the others. Made vivid by the physical details of lines 202-203, the glancing radiance of his feet and chiton in movement, this epiphany of Apollo *kitharistes* forms the climax of the scene but does not conclude it: a final adversative δέ introduces two onlookers, Leto and Zeus, names chiastically balanced with epithets at the beginning and end of a line, in whose contemplative pleasure the scene as a whole is summarized.

οἱ δ' ἐπιτέρπονται θυμὸν μέγαν εἰσορόωντες
Λητώ τε χρυσοπλόκαμος καὶ μητίετα Ζεὺς
υἷα φίλον παίζοντα μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.

At the end of the opening *descriptio* Leto "rejoices that she has borne a son who wields the bow and is mighty," but now she and Zeus "delight their great hearts by gazing upon their son playing among the immortal gods." The words τοξοφόρον καὶ καρτερὸν and παίζοντα sum up the contrast in spirit between the two evocations of Apollo.

Yet the second Olympian scene has affinities with the Delian digression as well as with the introductory *descriptio.*[174] Both passages portray festivals of which Apollo is, as it were, the *raison d'être*, presiding over the one in person, over the other in spirit. Both festivals are objects of "pleasurable contemplation" to onlookers (204 ἐπιτέρπονται θυμὸν μέγαν εἰσορόωντες, 153-154 τέρφαιτο δὲ θυμὸν εἰσορόων); both are pre-eminently occasions of music, of dance (196 ὀρχεῦντ', 149 ὀρχηθμῷ) and song (188 ἀοιδή, 149 ἀοιδῇ) in which performance by a female chorus figures largely (190 ὑμνεῦσιν, 158 ὑμνήσωσι, 161 ὕμνον ἀείδουσιν). Like the Deliades, moreover, the Muses observe in their choice of themes the canonical sequence of "gods and men," celebrating the "immortal gifts" (δῶρ' ἄμβροτα) of the former and the "sufferings" (τλημοσύνας) of the latter.[175] Finally, the characterization of the human race as "witless and resourceless" (192 ἀφραδέες καὶ ἀμήχανοι), unable to discover "cure for death or protection against old age" (193 θανάτοιό τ' ἄκος καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ) seems to stand in direct and deliberate opposition to the apparent "immortality and agelessness" (151 ἀθανάτους καὶ ἀγήρως) of the assembled Ionians.[176]

The fact that in theme and diction lines 186-206 call to mind both lines 2-13 and lines 147-164 has structural implications of some complexity. Viewed from one perspective the "heavenly festival" on Olympus joins the "earthly festival" on Delos in forming a kind of diptych around a central point, namely the re-affirmation of encomiastic intention in lines 177-178; in this light the apparent digressiveness of the earlier passage is redeemed, as it were, by the poet's strict concentration on Apollo in the later. From another perspective lines 186-206 join lines 2-13 in forming a kind of frame that sets off the intervening account of *genos*, *anatrophe*, and *epitedeumata* as a unit of discourse with its own structural and topical integrity, whatever internal articulations it may display. Finally, because the second Olympian scene recalls the opening *descriptio* in its content, because it ends, like that passage, with the "pleasure-motif," and because it is followed, again like that passage, by a *propositio thematis* in aporetic form, it takes on something of the force of a "second proem" in relation to the upcoming treatment of Apollo's *praxeis*—a function in respect of which the apparently premature introduction of Pytho in line 183 makes good sense.[177]

173 "Seltsam, daß unter den Tänzern im Verse 202 auch Ares ercheint" (Regenbogen 52). The best commentary on his presence, however, is provided by Pind. *P.* 1.1ff., where the power of Apollo's *phorminx* is established by its various effects, among them its effect on the god of war (καὶ γὰρ βιατὰς Ἄρης, τραχεῖαν ἄνευθε λιπὼν ἐγχέων ἀκμάν, ἰαίνει καρδίαν κώματι) (cf. Förstel 234). Ares, as the embodiment of war, strife, and turmoil, and Hermes, as patron of heralds, travelers, merchants, thieves, and athletes, are representative of the sphere of practical action in its violent and its peaceful aspects respectively (see Appendix 2); the fact that even *they* are "sporting" or "playing"—that is, engaging at leisure in a non-violent, non-practical activity—attests emphatically to the efficacy of Apollo's lyre as an instrument of *schole*. Cf. Forderer 121: "Gegen ihr eigenes Wesen aber kontrastiert ihr Tun: sie 'spielen'."

174 On the relationship of *h. Ap.* 186-206 to 146-164 cf. Kakridis 104-106, Unte 56, Forderer 127-134, Heubeck 142-144.

175 Heitsch's view (*Hermes* 92 [1964] 261-264) that θεῶν δῶρ' ἄμβροτα means "the gifts of the gods to men" is rightly rejected by Càssola 498, Förstel 228, 460, note 632.

176 Cf. Kakridis 105-106, Forderer 119, 129, Heubeck 143. For an even sharper juxtaposition of two radically different perspectives on the human condition cf. Pind. *P.* 8.95-97, *N.* 6.1-7: there clearly is no warrant for concluding from the "pessimism" of *h. Ap.* 190-193 as against the "optimism" of 151ff. that "P" was composed "aus einem anderen poetischen wie religiösen Geiste ... als der delische" (Drerup 133; cf. Deubner 270, W. Schmidt and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* 1 [Munich 1927] 235).

177 On 182-206 as "das Prooimion des 'delphischen Teiles'" cf. Jacoby 720.

LINES 207-544: *PRAXEIS*

With the aporetic selection priamel of lines 207-215 the poet initiates the second major section of the *Hymn*. The two sub-sections of the first half have dealt with Apollo's birth on the one hand and with his *anatrophe* and *epitedeumata* on the other. Now the poet turns to the most important item on his encomiastic agenda, the god's *praxeis*—or rather, one particular *praxis*, the founding of the Pythian oracle.[178] The *narratio* in which this exploit is celebrated falls into two sub-sections of approximately equal length, the first of which (216-387) recounts Apollo's search for a place in which to build his temple, his dealings with Telphusa, and his slaying of the serpent, the second (388-544) his commandeering of the Cretan ship and his installation of the Cretans as ministers at Delphi. This structural articulation bears upon the poet's speculative concern with the character of the Delphic oracle as a religious institution, for different issues are dealt with in the two sub-sections. The first has much to say about what Apollo desires in a temple-site, the qualities that make one place suitable for his oracular activities and another place unsuitable; the second half reveals what Apollo requires and expects in those who will administer the oracle, their mode of life, their duties, their ethical responsibilities.

Lines 207-215: The Second *Propositio Thematis*

The second *propositio thematis* is identical in structure to the first: an aporetic question (207 = 19), list or summary foil (208-213 = 20-24), and a second question in which the theme itself is announced (214-215 = 25-26).

πῶς τ' ἄρ σ' ὑμνήσω πάντως εὔυμνον ἐόντα;
ἠέ σ' ἐνὶ μνηστῆσιν ἀείδω καὶ φιλότητι
209 ὅππως μνωόμενος ἔχιες 'Αζαντίδα κούρην ...;
ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον χρηστήριον ἀνθρώποισι
215 ζητεύων κατὰ γαῖαν ἔβης ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον;

Although the aporetic question is repeated almost verbatim from line 19, its scope, and therefore its meaning, is altered by the new context.[179]

[178] That with 207ff. the poet turns to Apollo's *praxeis* is explicitly recognized by Cessi 873 ("solo ora comincia a cantare le imprese") and AHS 227 ("After this completion of the God's habits and haunts [179-206], the poet considers which of his feats and adventures he shall sing"). Cf. Ludwich 183: " ... es in diesem Festtagsliede nicht genügt, den Gott überwegend passiv darzustellen; er muß ihn durchaus noch activ vorführen, und das thut er in dem zweiten, umfangsreicheren Theile des Hymnus."

[179] On τ' ἄρ vs. γάρ in 209 and 19 see above, note 71.

When the poet, having concluded the proem and its coda, pauses to consider how he should proceed with the body of his hymn, Apollo's entire "range of song" lies open before him, and he is, theoretically speaking, at absolute liberty to choose as he will. In actuality, of course, he has already suggested (in lines 16-18) that Apollo's birth on Delos is uppermost in his mind at the moment, so that the net effect of his deliberations is only to confirm and justify that preoccupation. Now that he finds himself once again in *aporia*, however, the "range of song" from which he can choose is no longer unlimited, not merely because certain topics have by this point already been dealt with but also because those topics have constituted a rationally ordered encomiastic program or agenda. Once *genos*, *anatrophe*, and *epitedeumata* have been treated, "How shall I sing you?" clearly means "Which of your many *praxeis* shall I recount, now that I have arrived at that item on my program?" That the poet in fact regards the field of selection as restricted to *praxeis* is made clear by the ensuing catalogue of possible themes, each of which is a specific incident from Apollo's life-history. The metaphorical geography of lines 20-24, by contrast, is too general in its implications to guide or delimit the poet's choice in any way.

Obscure as the allusions in lines 209-213 are to modern mythographers, the general point of the priamel as a whole seems clear: one entire category of *praxeis*, namely Apollo's amatory exploits performed in company (or rivalry) with *this or that particular hero*, is set aside in favor of his quest for an oracle on behalf of *all mankind*.[180] By reminding his audience that he could just as easily have chosen a theme drawn from Apollo's "private life," the poet throws into relief the public, even universal, significance of the theme he does propose. It is, of course, a commonplace of encomiastic rhetoric than an action undertaken to benefit others is nobler and thus more worthy of praise than one performed purely in one's own interest.[181]

Finally, the πρῶτον that in line 25 marks the historical priority of Apollo's birth as an encomiastic topic appears again in line 214 to signal the poet's continuing concern with origins; in this section of the *Hymn* he will trace the Pythian oracle back to its *arche* just as he does with Apollo himself in the first half.[182] That earlier investigation is a necessary prere-

[180] Cf. Forderer 159: "es handelt sich nicht um bestimmte ausgezeichnete Menschen der Vorzeit wie bei Apollons Brautfahrten, sondern um die Menschen schlechthin, die heutigen einbegriffen." See also Race, *Priamel* 53. On the various mythographical and textual difficulties posed by the passage—difficulties which fortunately do not obscure its general intention—see AHS 230-232, Càssola 449-501, L. Bodson, *AC* 40 (1971) 12-20.

[181] Cf. Arist. *Rhet*. I. 9.16 καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα πράττει τις τῶν αἱρετῶν, Theon 8 (Spengel II. 110) ἐφ' ὧν ὁ μὲν πόνος ἴδιος, ἡ δὲ ὠφέλεια κοινή.

[182] τὸ πρῶτον is of course adverbial here, not adjectival; the poet is concerned to trace the *origin* of the Pythian oracle, not to vindicate its temporal primacy relative to other *chresteria*. Cf. Jacoby 702, note 2.

quisite to the present undertaking: to understand the nature of an institution one must understand the character of its founder, and Apollo's character, in the poet's view, received its definitive stamp from the circumstances of his first appearance in the world.

Lines 216-286: Apollo's Journey to Pytho (with the Second Geographical Catalogue)

The geographical catalogue of 216ff., like the one that initiates the birth-narrative (30-44), is both literally (cf. 217 παρέστιχες) and rhetorically a kind of *praeteritio*. Just as the many lands canvassed by Leto in her quest for sanctuary are foil for the one humble island that finally receives her, so here the places inspected and (explicitly or implicitly) rejected by Apollo on his journey from Olympus are foil for the one which passes muster in the end. The account of the journey is punctuated by a series of pauses of steadily increasing length.[183] The first and last of these, the Lelantine plain (220-221) and Telphusa (244-276), are *narrative* pauses, for in them Apollo himself is represented as halting and passing judgment, negative in the former case (220 τό τοι οὐχ ἅδε θυμῷ), positive in the latter (244 τόθι τοι ἅδε χῶρος ἀπήμων). The second and third, Thebes (225-228) and Onchestus (230-238), are *rhetorical* pauses, so to speak; it is the poet, not Apollo, who lingers, for topographical description in the case of Thebes, for an account of a religious rite in the case of Onchestus. Although the god's opinion of these latter sites is not reported, the fact that in each case he moves on to other places leads one to conclude that they too, like the Lelantine plain, fail for one reason or another to meet with his approval.[184] After each of the last three pauses the narrative *praeteritio* is resumed by the same formulaic line, ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω ἔκιες ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον (229, 239, 277),[185] for even Telphusa, though initially attractive, is eventually abandoned in favor of further wandering. Hastily bypassing one final place, the city of the Phlegyans (278ff.), Apollo reaches Crisa—or rather, as the topographical sketch of lines 283-285 makes clear, Pytho itself[186]—and the end of his quest. Significantly, the "du-Stil" in which the passage as a whole is couched makes its last appearance in line 282 (ἵκεο δ' ἐς Κρίσην ὑπὸ Παρνησὸν

[183] The "Steigerung" is noted by Jacoby 739, Floratos 303, Baltes 32; on the "difficult" geography of 239-243 see AHS 238, Floratos 304, note 1.

[184] Cf. Baltes 32, note 36: "Der Gott ist wählerisch, er nimmt nicht den ersten besten Ort."

[185] Cf. Förstel 239. Odysseus' account of his adventures is similarly punctuated by the formulaic ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω πλέομεν ἀκαχήμενοι ἦτορ (9.62, 105, 565, 10.77, 133).

[186] On the poet's use of the name Κρίση to refer to the general area about Pytho see Förstel 202.

νιφόεντα), as if the poet has been personally escorting Apollo along his way and chooses to leave him only when he sees him settled at last in a place thoroughly to his liking.

From Apollo's eventual decision to build his temple at Pytho, taken together with his repeated rejection of potential locations in the earlier stages of his journey, it is possible to deduce three qualities that he apparently regards as necessary or at least as desirable in an oracle-site.[187] One of these qualities, *tranquillity*, reveals its importance in the course of Apollo's dealings with Telphusa. When Apollo first determines to build his temple near Telphusa's spring, he does so, we are told, because he likes the "place free from vexation" (χῶρος ἀπήμων) that he finds in her vicinity.[188] Telphusa herself elucidates the meaning of the phrase when she warns Apollo that the din and bustle of traffic about her spring, which serves as a general watering-place for the neighborhood, will continually "trouble" or "pain" him (262-263):

> πημανέει σ' αἰεὶ κτύπος ἵππων ὠκειάων
> ἀρδόμενοί τ' οὐρῆες ἐμῶν ἱερῶν ἀπὸ πηγέων.

The same hum of activity, moreover, will distract the attention of visitors to the oracle, for "people will rather gaze at the well-made chariots and at the clatter of swift-footed horses than at your great temple and the many possessions within it" (263-265):

> ἔνθα τις ἀνθρώπων βουλήσεται εἰσοράασθαι
> ἅρματά τ' εὐποίητα καὶ ὠκυπόδων κτύπον ἵππων
> ἢ νηόν τε μέγαν καὶ κτήματα πόλλ' ἐνεόντα.

If Apollo establishes his temple at Crisa, on the other hand, he need fear no such secular distractions, for "there neither will fine chariots be driven, nor will there be the clatter of swift-footed horses about the well-built altar" (270-271):

> ἔνθ' οὔθ' ἅρματα καλὰ δονήσεται, οὔτε τοι ἵππων
> ὠκυπόδων κτύπος ἔσται ἐΰδμητον περὶ βωμόν.

[187] Various reasons have been suggested for Apollo's dissatisfaction with the Lelantine plain: it was (like Onchestus) already in the possession of another god, namely "Artemis of Amarynthos" (Jacoby 739); it bore unpleasant associations because of the Lelantine War (O. Seeck, *Die Quellen der Odysee* [Berlin 1887] 315); "Eretria was unhealthy" (AHS 233). The poet's "asides" on Thebes and Onchestus have been explained by invoking polemical/propagandistic purposes on the one hand (e.g. Eitrem 129, Drerup 124, Defradas 59-62, Frolíková, "Beitrag" 2) and aetiological/antiquarian interests on the other (e.g. Kolk 17). Such "ganz hypothetischen, von außen an den Text herangetragenen Erklärungen" are rightly rejected by Förstel 464, note 645; they obviously do nothing to illuminate the central thematic concerns of the *Hymn*.

[188] In terming Apollo's reaction to Telphusa "ein unbegründetes Gefallen" Baltes 34 fails to recognize the significance of the χῶρος ἀπήμων/πημανέει connection.

The three-fold repetition of κτύπος ἵππων underscores Telphusa's essential point: an institution such as Apollo intends to found requires a circumambience of tranquillity, undisturbed by the hustle-and-bustle of ordinary daily life.[189] From the fact that Telphusa's arguments are successful in changing Apollo's mind we must conclude that he too regards such isolation from the secular world as a necessity in a temple-site.[190]

A second implicit criterion in Apollo's selection of a temple-site is *accessibility*. It is clear from Apollo's statements on the subject that his oracle is by design a philanthropic institution, founded, that is, with the express purpose of benefiting human beings (cf. 132 χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι, 248 ἀνθρώπων τεῦξαι χρηστήριον, 288 ἔμμεναι ἀνθρώποις χρηστήριον). The benefit presumably consists in the offering of reliable advice and guidance to those whose vision of the future is otherwise clouded by the conditions of contingency and finitude to which their mortal status subjects them. By mediating between the "infallible will of Zeus" and the ever-changing realm of human affairs Apollo does what he can to alleviate the helpless ignorance (cf. 192 ζώουσ' ἀφραδέες καὶ ἀμήχανοι) that is necessarily man's lot.[191] We learn too that Apollo conceives of his role as mediator in quasi-contractual terms, for by his use of the middle and active participles χρησόμενοι and χρέων (252-253 = 292-293) he sketches a relationship of reciprocity and mutual obligation whereby people from throughout the Greek world will come, bringing hecatombs, to consult the oracle and he in turn will respond by propounding "unerring counsel." Yet none of this will be possible, of course, if men are unable to make their way to the temple in which Apollo's oracular service is housed. If in order to be suitable the temple-site must be removed from the hurly-burly of the world at large, it cannot be *so* removed that access from that world is impeded or made impossible. This point is established by what the poet says of Thebes (225-228):

> Θήβης δ' εἰσαφίκανες ἕδος καταειμένον ὕλῃ·
> οὐ γάρ πώ τις ἔναιε βροτῶν ἱερῇ ἐνὶ Θήβῃ,
> οὐδ' ἄρα πω τότε γ' ἦσαν ἀταρπιτοὶ οὐδὲ κέλευθοι
> Θήβης ἂμ πεδίον πυρηφόρον, ἀλλ' ἔχεν ὕλη.

Obviously a temple built in the midst of an uninhabited and trackless forest could expect few if any visitors, and so Apollo must move on to other more hospitable regions.[192] The site that he eventually selects, of course, is accessible by both land and sea, and the god himself maps out both routes of approach in the course of the narrative.

The third criterion to be extrapolated from Apollo's various choices—a criterion at first glance less easily explicable than the other two—is *poverty of natural resources*. Apollo explicitly rejects the Lelantine plain, which was in historical times one of the most fertile and productive areas in Greece, and implicitly he rejects as well the "wheat-bearing plain of Thebes" (228)—*potentially* wheat-bearing, that is to say, since as we just noted the poet is at pains to stress that the whole region was at that early time still covered by an impenetrable wood. In preference to either of these places, richly endowed by nature as they are, Apollo chooses in the end a site that is "rough" or "rugged" (285 τρηχεῖ') and that, for all its scenic loveliness, "neither bears crops nor has good meadows" (529 οὔτε τρυγηφόρος ἥδε γ' ἐπήρατος οὔτ' εὐλείμων).[193] In respect of its natural resources Pytho closely resembles Apollo's birth-place Delos, which he is pledged to "honor pre-eminently among all" despite a leanness of soil (60 οὔ τοι πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας) that makes the production of either fodder for livestock or crops of any sort an impossibility (54-55 οὐδ' εὔβων σέ γ' ἔσεσθαι ὀΐομαι οὔτ' εὔμηλον, οὐδὲ τρύγην οἴσεις, οὔτ' ἂρ φυτὰ μυρία φύσεις). Once we observe this similarity we may surmise that Apollo regards Pytho's infertility as a positive advantage rather than as one unfortunate drawback in an otherwise suitable site. *Why* terrain of this sort should seem desirable to Apollo, however, is a point that remains unclear until the hymn's last twenty lines, where the theme of infertility finds its fullest exposition.

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[189] "χῶρος ἀπήμων est h.l. *locus pacatus et ab usu profano vacuus*" (Baumeister 154). Herein may lie the point of the otherwise mysterious lines on Onchestus (231-238). However the details of the rite therein described are to be unraveled (see Roux 6-22, A. Schachter, *BICS* 23 [1976] 102-114), there can be no doubt that its effect is to interrupt or suspend the ordinary activities of secular life. Thus if Apollo fears, as he clearly does, that the unrestricted traffic of ἅρματα εὐποίητα in the neighborhood of Telphusa's spring would intrude to ill-effect on the sanctity of the institution he intends to found, in Onchestus he has already come upon a place where chariot-traffic is subject to rules and limitations and, consequently, a sacred precinct is demarcated from its profane surroundings. Typologically, then, Onchestus may embody a quality that Apollo regards as desirable in an oracle-site; in itself, however, it is not available for his purposes, being already in the possession of another god, and so Apollo must move on.

[190] On this important point cf. Förstel 242.

[191] "Eben diese so umfassend zu verstehende menschliche Blindheit und Hilflosigkeit ist Grund und Voraussetzung für die Orakeltätigkeit des Apollon in Pytho" (Förstel 233). Förstel's whole discussion of "delphische Thematik" in the second Olympian scene (223-234) is extremely valuable.

[192] Cf. Jacoby 739, Kolk 16. Line 227 and the ring-compositional repetition of ὕλη show that the poet's interest lies more in the inaccessibility (and thus unsuitability) of the site than in Delphi's temporal anteriority (on which see Förstel 464, note 645, Baltes 40, note 67).

[193] Cf. Eitrem 133: "Loca abiecta et saxosa, ab aliis deis habitatione indigna habita, quaerit Apollo, ad ea confugit mater—campos vero (cf. v. 220 Ληλάντῳ πεδίῳ, quod aliter explicari non potest) plane despicit."

Lines 247-276: Apollo and Telphusa

Of the various pauses in Apollo's journeying, the encounter with Telphusa is by far the longest and most elaborately reported. One function of the episode, as we have seen, is to dramatize Apollo's desire that his oracle be situated in a place "free from trouble"—that is, removed and protected from the "busy-ness" of secular life. If that point were all that the poet intended to establish, however, he could have done so within much briefer compass. To discover what else is at issue in the episode requires a more detailed examination.

Apollo's confrontation with Telphusa seems quite clearly intended to recall—and, more importantly, to contrast with—the negotiations between Leto and Delos recounted earlier in the hymn.[194] Like Leto, Apollo has been searching for a place suitable to his purposes, and having found it he delivers, like Leto, a short speech in which he declares what is on his mind (247-253). Like Delos, Telphusa replies at some length, raising objections to the plan as proposed and suggesting an alternative course of action, and like Delos she succeeds in her persuasion. Yet although in their general outline the two scenes are parallel, they are radically different, indeed antithetical, in detail. Leto conducts her business with Delos forthrightly and without flattery, but her intention is clearly to conciliate, to show Delos that any risks involved in receiving the unborn god are far outweighed by the advantages. Since Apollo, like Leto, is a stranger in territory to which he has no prior claim, one might have supposed that he would approach Telphusa with similar tactics. What Telphusa stands to lose by the foundation of an oracular shrine on her soil is her own independent *kleos* (276); Apollo might have offered her by way of compensation the far greater fame (not to mention wealth) that would inevitably accrue to the seat of a Telphusian oracle.

As delivered, however, Apollo's speech displays an abruptness and apparent insensitivity quite alien to his mother's character. Where Leto first broaches her request hypothetically, next suggests reasons why Delos should be willing to listen, and finally makes an attractive proposal of *quid pro quo*, Apollo issues a flat statement of intent that totally ignores Telphusa's interest in the matter. Whereas Leto's speech is couched throughout in the second person, Apollo makes no further reference to his auditor after the peremptory vocative with which he begins. The difference is most striking where the words are most closely parallel:

[194] The points of contact between the Apollo/Telphusa and Leto/Delos episodes are noted by Floratos 304, Förstel 246-247, Baltes 34, note 44. Förstel's discussion of the Telphusa episode as a whole is the best in the literature, particularly in its analysis of her character.

56 αἰ δέ κ' 'Απόλλωνος ἑκαέργου νηὸν ἔχησθα,
ἄνθρωποί τοι πάντες ἀγινήσουσ' ἑκατόμβας
ἐνθάδ' ἀγειρόμενοι ...

247 Τελφοῦσ' ἐνθάδε δὴ φρονέω περικαλλέα νηὸν
ἀνθρώπων τεῦξαι χρηστήριον, οἵ τέ μοι αἰεὶ
ἐνθάδ' ἀγινήσουσι τεληέσσας ἑκατόμβας ...

Leto is of course well aware that the hecatombs will be brought primarily to Apollo, but to represent Delos herself as the recipient is more persuasive; nor is it without its foundation in truth, since in fact she will partake of all honors paid to her foster-son. In some such way Apollo might have acknowledged that Telphusa would enjoy a share of the sacrificial honors, but instead he appears to exclude her with his μοι. Having thus brusquely proclaimed his intentions, Apollo begins to lay the foundations for his new temple without pausing to discover whether Telphusa has anything to say on the matter.

Although Leto may be "gentle always, kindly to men and immortal gods, mildest of those on Olympus" (*Theog.* 406ff.), her son is a deity of a fiercer and more formidable stamp.[195] That his high-handed treatment of Telphusa is an example of the kind of blind arrogance or *atasthalia* feared earlier by Delos, however, is precluded by considerations above and beyond the inherent unlikelihood that a poet whose purpose is (among other things) to praise Apollo would portray him in an unfavorable light. On the one hand, the celerity and strong feeling[196] with which, immediately after quitting Telphusa, Apollo removes himself from the vicinity of the Phlegyans, "*hubristai* who care nothing for Zeus," reflect in dramatic fashion his constitutional aversion to *hubris* and all its works.[197] On the other hand, when after killing the serpent Apollo returns to Telphusa to punish her for her deception (375-387), he reveals a fundamental fair-mindedness even in his anger: his desire is not to obliterate Telphusa's *kleos* (as presumably he might easily have done) but to establish his own *as well*, and by founding an altar and grove as the cult-center of Apollo Telphusius he achieves the perpetuation of both.[198]

More important than Apollo's real or apparent intentions, however, are Telphusa's perception of them and her emotional and verbal

[195] Förstel 241 characterizes Apollo's behavior vis-à-vis Telphusa as "souverän und selbstherrlich."

[196] Cf. 281 ἔνθεν *καρπαλίμως* προσέβης πρὸς δειράδα *θύων*, paraphrased by Baltes 34 as "entschlossen und prestissimo."

[197] Cf. Eitrem 131: "θέμις vero ὕβρει v. 541 recte opponitur, odit enim deus iuvenis omne genus superbiae violentiaeque, cf. Phlegyas ὑβριστάς v. 278, ut de Typhone taceam, v. 304 sqq."

[198] See below, p. 90.

response. Concealing her wrathful indignation (256 κραδίην ἐχολώσατο) under a pretence of friendship, she addresses Apollo in respectful terms (257 Φοῖβε ἄναξ ἑκάεργε) and then announces her intention to offer some sound advice (ἔπος τί τοι ἐν φρεσὶ θήσω). Rather than plunge into that advice directly, however, she first grounds it (258 ἐπεί) in an acknowledgement of Apollo's avowed purpose, an acknowledgement which in its near-verbatim repetition of his own words seems designed to convince him of her sympathetic concern. She rounds out this *captatio benevolentiae* by restating her intention to give advice, but she does so in such a way as to remind Apollo of the active role that he must play in listening (261 ἀλλ' ἔκ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι).

Once she has secured Apollo's attention and established her credentials, Telphusa then broaches her dissuasive argument, the gist of which is encapsulated in the first word, πημανέει. Having apparently divined Apollo's desire for a χῶρος ἀπήμων, she warns him that despite appearances her immediate vicinity is far from being such a place: he will be continually "troubled" or "vexed," she says, by the heavy traffic about her spring and by the distractions it will present to those who visit his oracle (262-266). The latter point is significant in revealing Telphusa's estimation of Apollo's character; she evidently surmises that an exclusivity and a self-importance that cannot conceive of sharing honors with a resident nymph is even less likely to tolerate secular diversions deflecting attention away from what should be the cynosure of all eyes, the "great temple and the many possessions within it." In fact, as we have seen, Apollo is concerned about more important issues in the selection of a temple-site than potential slights to his self-esteem.[199]

When Telphusa has set forth these convincing objections to Apollo's plan as originally announced, she turns with a dismissive ἀλλά to the new course of action that she is proposing. "But if you will allow yourself to be persuaded by me at all," she begins—and then breaks off to reflect briefly on the significance of πίθοιο: because Apollo is so clearly her superior in strength and valor (266-267 σὺ δὲ κρείσσων καὶ ἀρείων ἐσσὶ ἄναξ ἐμέθεν), persuasion, not force, is her only hope. After that compliment to the god's σθένος she completes the suspended protasis of line 267 with a bold imperative ("do your building in Crisa, beneath the folds of Parnassus") buttressed by the assertion that the very distractions that would disturb him *here*, namely chariots and the κτύπος ἵππων, *there* will be

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blissfully absent.[200] She concludes by praying that under such favorable conditions (272 ὥς) he may obtain his heart's desire, the sole recipiency of abundant honors and offerings.

Telphusa's speech, like Leto's to Delos, is a small masterpiece of rhetoric, for like Leto—and conspicuously unlike Apollo—she speaks unerringly to the interests and desires (as she conceives them) of her auditor.[201] Like Delos' reply to Leto, on the other hand, Telphusa's speech attests brilliantly to the poet's skill in *ethopoiia*, although the character it portrays is antithetical to that of Delos in every point. Whereas the joy (61 χαῖρε) that Delos feels on hearing Leto's proposal finds immediate and spontaneous expression in her reply (cf. 63 ἀσπασίη), Telphusa carefully masks the anger that is *her* response (256 ἐχολώσατο) under a show of sympathetic acquiescence. Faced with Apollo's overwhelming might, Delos and Telphusa both have reason to take thought for self-protection, but whereas Delos expresses her fears openly and takes straightforward steps to obviate them at their source, Telphusa never acknowledges the nature of her grievance and resorts to duplicitous indirection for a solution.

Most importantly, however, Telphusa's nature is no less emphatically stamped by pride and spite than Delos' is by modesty and generosity. Without κῦδος or greatness herself, Delos is quick to pay those qualities homage when they appear before her (62 Λητοῖ κυδίστη θυγάτερ μεγάλοιο Κρόνοιο). Although she enjoys nothing but ill report among men (64-65), she does not for that reason begrudge Apollo his πολυωνυμία (82). She is concerned, out of self-respect, that Apollo give her that which is her due as his foster-mother, but she has no desire to keep him to herself or to hold him back from his far-flung destiny as a "mighty lord among gods and men" (80-81); and having set forth her proposal to Leto, she accepts less than she asked for without complaint, indeed with joy exceeding her original response (90). But Telphusa? Although she extols Apollo's immeasurable superiority in highly flattering terms (267-268), inwardly she cannot fail to feel contempt for a god who so trustingly falls victim to her clever stratagem.[202] Reason is given for supposing that she is personally

[200] On the view that lines 207f. provide a *terminus ante quem* for the *Hymn* (586, when chariot-racing was introduced at the reorganized Pythian games), see Defradas 57, J. Fontenrose, *TAPA* 100 (1969) 126, Kirk 164.

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vain—the "fair-flowing water" of her spring is thrice mentioned (376, 380, 385), and it is to that attribute of loveliness that Apollo directs his attention when he visits her with condign punishment (383 ἀπέκρυφεν δὲ ῥέεθρα, 387 ἤσχυνε ῥέεθρα)—and her vanity is apparently linked, as often happens, with an attitude of grudging ill-will toward the merits and advantages of others.[203] The *cholos* that she so craftily dissimulates proves on careful inspection to be more complex and less excusable than the righteous anger felt by an innocent victim of injustice. At the point when her persuasive powers have worked their effect on Apollo the poet lays bare her real intention and (by implication) the psychological motivation that lurks behind it (275-276):

> Ὣς εἰποῦσ' Ἑκάτου πέπιθε φρένας, ὄφρα οἱ αὐτῇ
> Τελφούσῃ κλέος εἴη ἐπὶ χθονὶ μηδ' Ἑκάτοιο

Not only is Telphusa unwilling to give up her own independent claim to fame (an understandable reaction under the circumstances, perhaps), but she also would like to deprive Apollo of *his* κλέος if she could, not merely locally but in the world generally (ἐπὶ χθονί). In sending Apollo off to Pytho she is of course ridding herself of a rival claimant to regional pre-eminence, but she is also doing something far more sinister. Her deceitfulness (376 ἐξαπάφησε, 379 ἐξαπαφοῦσα) lies not in what she says—Pytho is indeed free of the "vexations" with which her own vicinity is afflicted—but in what she fails to say: that although Pytho may be ἀπήμων in one sense it is plagued by "trouble" of another more terrible (and more dangerous) sort, a monstrous serpent that wreaks great harm on men and flocks ἐπεὶ πέλε πῆμα δαφοινόν (304).[204] The monster's close association with Typhon, that other πῆμα βροτοῖσιν whom Hera produced to challenge and overthrow Zeus, suggests the hope that Telphusa entertains, namely that Apollo will meet his match and be undone. How more effectively to ensure that her rival has no fame "on earth," after all, than by contriving his elimination from the earthly scene?[205]

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[203] Cf. Förstel 245, who recognizes Telphusa as "eifersüchtig" and "ein mythisches Exemplum von erfolgloser und durch Apollon gerecht bestrafter Hybris."

[204] That Telphusa's silence on the matter of the serpent is the deceit for which she is punished is recognized by Dornseiff, *AM* 13, Kirk 176, and Förstel 242, who remarks: "Dieses entscheidende Motiv muss in Gänze vom Hörer durch Kombination erschlossen werden; der Dichter spricht weder selbst davon noch läßt er Apollon bei der Ankündigung der Bestrafung davon reden." Apollo says nothing, it is true, but the poet himself has taken care to make his point through the χῶρος ἀπήμων/πημανέει/πῆμα δαφοινόν series, which Förstel and others (but not Eitrem 132) fail to observe.

[205] "Die Quellennymph gibt ihren Rat nicht nur in eigennütziger, sondern in geradezu feindseliger Absicht; sie will Apollon nicht bloß loswerden, sondern auch ins Verderben schicken" (Förstel 245-246).

Lines 287-304: Temple and Dragon

Once he has arrived at Pytho Apollo proclaims his intention to establish an oracle in a verbatim repetition of lines addressed earlier to Telphusa (287-293 = 247-253). More significant than this repetition, however, are several unmistakable echoes, in diction and thought, of the first half of the *Hymn*. Apollo's opening lines, for example, recall both Delos' request for an oracle in lines 80-81 (ἐνθάδε μιν πρῶτον τεύξειν περικαλλέα νηὸν ἔμμεναι ἀνθρώπων χρηστήριον) and Leto's assurance in lines 57-58 that the island will become a center for pilgrimages (ἄνθρωποί τοι πάντες ἀγινήσουσ' ἑκατόμβας ἐνθάδ' ἀγειρόμενοι), while Apollo's final words ἐγὼ νημερτέα βουλὴν πᾶσι θεμιστεύοιμι χρέων ἐνὶ πίονι νηῷ echo his statement of intent in line 132 (χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν). In combination these three echoes serve to remind the audience that the oracular gifts that Apollo recognized in himself and publicly proclaimed immediately after his birth were beyond the capacity of humble Delos to encompass; only now that the god has so decisively outgrown her narrow limits can they begin to find expression. In lines 290-291, moreover, where Apollo sketches the geographical range from which pilgrims will come to his oracle, the polar doublet of "land and sea" is once again in evidence as it was in lines 21-24 and 142, although here the overt contrast (ἠμὲν ... ἠδέ) lies between "Europe and the sea-girt islands" on the one hand and, on the other, the "fertile isle of Pelops" which combines in itself both continental and insular features. The point is once again to suggest the universality of Apollo's sway: the whole of the (Greek) world is, as it were, the Delphic parish. The same point is made in different terms by the six lines on the building of the temple (294-299), in which the range of participation expands from the god alone (who lays out the foundations), to heroes and specialists (Trophius and Agamedes, who lay the first courses of stone), to the generality of men, the ἀθέσφατα φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων. The phrase ἀοίδιμον ἔμμεναι αἰεί (299), moreover, extends the perspective temporally to future generations, among whom are the present singer and his audience; the very pronouncing of the words in hymnal performance proves the truth of what they assert.[206]

With the discovery of a suitable site and the building of the temple, the first stage in Apollo's quest to establish a *chresterion* for mankind draws to a close. The analogous point in the birth-narrative is when the bargain with Delos has been struck and Leto has found sanctuary. But just as a second obstacle to the birth immediately arises in Hera's malicious

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[206] As West 165, note 2, observes, "No inference as to date can be drawn from 294-9 [as is done, e.g., by AHS 244], for the temple is not said to be going to stand for ever, but to be famous for ever."

detention of Eileithyia, so here the poet suddenly directs attention to the fact that for the oracle to operate in peace Apollo must first destroy a great serpent that guards the "fair-flowing spring" nearby.[207] From the curiously off-hand and unemphatic way in which he does this, however, it is clear that his interest in the incident lies less on the level of plot than on the level of rhetoric: he is aiming rather to magnify Apollo's *dynamis* than to enthrall his audience with suspenseful story-telling.[208] Thus while the essential narrative fact is reported briefly and baldly at the start (301-302 δράκαιναν κτεῖνεν ἄναξ Διὸς υἱός), the baneful significance of the dragon is "amplified" by such stylistic devices as asyndeton (302 ζατρεφέα μεγάλην τέρας ἄγριον), repetition (302-304 πολλὰ ... πολλὰ ... πολλά), and alliteration (304 ἐπεὶ πέλε πῆμα δαφοινόν).[209] Since the strength and stature of a defeated antagonist redound in the end to the credit of his victorious opponent, to magnify the serpent is to magnify Apollo himself; the more awesome she appears as a foe, the more glorious is his triumph.[210]

Lines 305-355: The Digression on the Birth of Typhon

Like the account of Odysseus' scar in *Od.* 19.392-466, which Aristotle implicitly segregates from the plot or σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων of the epic because it is not connected by probability or necessity to the "single action" of Odysseus' return,[211] lines 305-355 of the *Hymn* constitute a formal digression or παρέκβασις demarcated from the surrounding context by ring-form.[212] As the digression on the scar begins

392 αὐτίκα δ' ἔγνω
οὐλήν, τήν ποτέ μιν σῦς ἤλασε λευκῷ ὀδόντι
Παρνησόνδ' ἐλθόντα μετ' Αὐτόλυκόν τε καὶ υἷας

and ends

ὁ δ' ἄρα σφίσιν εὖ κατέλεξεν
465 ὥς μιν θηρεύοντ' ἔλασεν σῦς λευκῷ ὀδόντι
Παρνησόνδ' ἐλθόντα σὺν υἱάσιν Αὐτολύκοιο,

so the tale of Typhon's birth begins

305 καί ποτε δεξαμένη χρυσοθρόνου ἔτρεφεν Ἥρης
δεινόν τ' ἀργαλέον τε Τυφάονα πῆμα βροτοῖσιν,
ὅν ποτ' ἄρ' Ἥρη ἔτικτε χολωσαμένη Διὶ πατρί

and ends

ἡ δ' ἔτεχ' οὔτε θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιον οὔτε βροτοῖσι
δεινόν τ' ἀργαλέον τε Τυφάονα πῆμα βροτοῖσιν.
αὐτίκα τόνδε λαβοῦσα βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη
355 δῶκεν ἔπειτα φέρουσα κακῷ κακόν, ἡ δ' ὑπέδεκτο.

Lines 306 and 352 (δεινόν τ' ἀργαλέον τε Τυφάονα πῆμα βροτοῖσιν) are the invariable core of the ring-form, like λευκῷ ὀδόντι Παρνησόνδ' ἐλθόντα in the *Odyssey* passage, while δεξαμένη/ὑπέδεκτο and ἔτικτε/ἔτεχ' chime in the same way as σῦς ἤλασε/ἔλασεν σῦς and μετ' Αὐτόλυκόν τε καὶ υἷας/σὺν υἱάσιν Αὐτολύκοιο. The closing of the ring in 351-355 serves to isolate the digression and to return the minds of the audience to the point at which the major narrative was interrupted.[213]

Although on the level of plot the story of Typhon's birth neither has nor pretends to have a "necessary or probable" connection with Apollo's slaying of the dragon,[214] its relevance on the level of rhetoric is not far to seek: it "amplifies" the serpent's wickedness, emphatically asserted in lines 302-304, by adducing one specific instance from the past.[215] Far

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[207] On the connection (or lack thereof) between temple-building and dragon-slaying cf. Förstel 256-257.

[208] Jacoby 742 notes how the killing of the serpent is "nicht erzählt, sondern als ein bekanntes Faktum syntaktisch erst der Beschreibung der Schlange, dann ihrem Sterben untergeordnet" (cf. Förstel 249).

[209] According to W. F. J. Knight, *AJP* 62 (1941) 311 these four words are "very weak, if not tautologous" and "merely fill up the line with an obvious formula"; but see pp. 000 and 000 and note 204. On asyndeton as a type of auxesis cf. Arist. *Rhet.* III. 12.4.

[210] Cf. Quintilian VIII.4.20, in discussing the type of *amplificatio* that he calls *ratiocinatio* (see above, note 30): "So again one thing may be magnified by allusion to another: the valour of Scipio is magnified by extolling the fame of Hannibal as a general, and we are asked to marvel at the courage of the Germans and the Gauls in order to enhance the glory of Gaius Caesar" (tr. Butler).

[211] Cf. G. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) 298-299.

[212] The episode was all but universally condemned as an interpolation by editors and scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (cf. Gemoll 164-165); among those who have rejected it in this century are Wilamowitz (note 170) 75, note 3, Allen-Sikes 65, Altheim 445, Bethe 12, Jacoby 744, Càssola 505, Kirk 176. Some have allowed it to stand but suggest that, for one reason or another, no real sense can be made of it, e.g. Drerup 126, who believes that the episode's *raison d'être* lies hopelessly shrouded in the mists of Delphic cult legend; Schmidt-Stählin (note 176) 235, for whom the passage, though "lang und überflüssig," is not an interpolation but "eine Entgleisung in den hesiodischen Stil"; Humbert 92, note 1, who asserts that the poet has followed (ineptly) "un procédé qui rappelle ceux de la digression lyrique"; and van Groningen 54 and 317, who speaks of an extreme example of "intercalation archaïque" in which "une association d'idées fortuite cause l'insertion d'un élément inorganique."

[213] Cf. Frolíková, "Remarks" 106, Unte 74, Förstel 259-260. On *Od.* 19. 392ff. cf. W. A. A. van Otterlo, *Untersuchungen über Begriff, Anwendung und Entstehung der griechischen Ringkomposition* (Amsterdam 1944) 16 and *De ringcompositie als opbouwprincipe in de epische gedichten van Homerus* (Amsterdam 1948) 10; see also van Groningen 52.

[214] Thus complaints like those of Baumeister 117 ("haec nullo plane vinculo cum summa rei coniuncta sunt"), Gemoll 165 ("inhaltlich ... völlig fremd"), and Jacoby 744 ("ohne jede Verbindung mit der Apollongeschichte") have no force.

[215] The auxetic force of the episode is recognized by Ludwich 190, Floratos 305, und Unte 80, who makes the point succinctly: "Durch diesen Mythos ... wird die Gewaltigkeit und Schrecklichkeit der Drakaina gesteigert und die Größe der von Apollon vollbrachten Leistung erhöht." On καί ποτε cf. Dornseiff, *AM* 17: "Durch diese Formel

from being selected at random, moreover, the example is apparently intended to define the serpent's nature by drawing an analogy between her and a monster of even greater stature and notoriety, who dared in his pride and violence to challenge the supremacy of Zeus. As a witness to bad character Typhon derives his persuasive authority from two sources. On the one hand, the labelling of the monsters as πῆμα δαφοινόν and πῆμα βροτοῖσιν at the start of the digression and the pointed juxtaposition of κακῷ and κακόν at the end imply that Typhon and the dragon are kindred spirits whose association follows naturally from the attraction that like exerts on like.[216] On the other hand, the responsibility that the dragon bears for Typhon's nurture and upbringing (305 δεξαμένη ... ἔτρεφεν, 354 ὑπέδεκτο) unites them closely as θρέμμα and τροφός, and probability suggests that the partners in so intimate a relationship will reflect each other's nature.[217] The point in either case is the same: if Typhon was a paragon of destructive malice, so too must be the serpent who reared him—and all the more worthy of praise is Apollo's deed of blood.

It is Typhon's typological significance as an exponent of demonic disorder, moreover, that accounts for the poet's concentration upon events prior to and resulting in his birth, namely Hera's indignation at Zeus' begetting of Athena and the action that she takes in retaliation. The analysis of character that this narrative offers is as relevant to an understanding of Typhon's nature as Typhon is relevant to an ethical evaluation of his foster-mother, for the same probability of likeness obtains in the two relationships. Before examining the episode in detail, however, it is instructive to glance briefly at the other major *Typhongeschichte* in archaic poetry, *Theog.* 820-880.[218]

... erhält ein damit eingeführtes Thema des Aussehen, als sei es aus einer großen Menge von Dingen oder Taten leichthin herausgegriffen, die wegen Raummangel nicht erschöpft werden kann."

[216] Cf. Förstel 471, note 681. For "like to like" cf. *Od.* 17.217f. νῦν μὲν δὴ μάλα πάγχυ κακὸς κακὸν ἡγηλάζει, ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, Theocr. 9.31f. τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, ἴρηκες δ' ἴρηξιν, Arist. *Rhet.* I. 11.25 ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα, ἀεὶ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν; and see E. L. Leutsch and F. G. Schneidewin, *Paroemiographi Graeci* I (Göttingen 1839) 44, 253, 350.

[217] For "like from like" cf. Leutsch and Schneidewin I 107 κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ᾠόν, Eupolis fr. 115 (Edmonds) οὐ δεινὸν οὖν κριοὺς μὲν οἷς γεννᾶν τέκνα, ὄρνις θ' ὁμοίους τοὺς νεόττους τῷ πατρί, Eur. fr. 75 (Nauck) ὡς ἀληθὲς ἦν ἄρα ἐσθλῶν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐσθλὰ γίγνεσθαι τέκνα, κακῶν δ' ὅμοια τῇ φύσει τῇ τοῦ πατρός, Hes. *Erga* 235, Pl. *Menex.* 237a, Plu. *Mor.* 63e. Arist. *Rhet.* I. 9.33 (εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι) shows that the probability of likeness can be felt to inhere not merely in biological descent but also in upbringing and education. Clearly the direction of the inference can be reversed if the situation so requires; cf. *Rhet. ad. Alex.* 1441a on praising a man whose immediate family are men of merit although his early ancestors were not.

[218] Like the Typhon episode itself, *Theog.* 820-880 have been condemned as an interpolation by many scholars; cf. for example P. Mazon, *Hésiode* (Paris 1928) 15f., F. Jacoby, *Hesiodi Theogonia* (Berlin 1930) 19f., Solmsen (note 121) 53, van Groningen 281. For arguments in defense of the passage, however, see M. van der Valk, *Mnemosyne* 4th ser. 6 (1953) 279-282, Stokes (note 121) 33-36, H. Schwabl, *Hesiods Theogonie: eine unitarische Analyse* (Vienna 1966) 106-123, West (note 26) 379-383.

Immediately apparent is the difference in dramatic focus between the two accounts. While our hymnist devotes the bulk of his narrative to the series of events that culminate in Typhon's birth, with only the briefest of glances at his later deeds, Hesiod concentrates on Typhon's battle with Zeus and his eventual suppression by the thunderbolt. Where the versions overlap, in the birth itself, they are at radical variance: in the *Hymn* Hera is Typhon's sole parent, while Hesiod makes him the offspring of Earth and Tartarus. Moreover, what Hesiod presents as three discrete narrative elements—the emergence of Typhoeus/Typhon (820-880), the menace of a stronger son (886-900), and Hera's wrath at the birth of Athena (924-929), are by our hymnist telescoped, as it were, into a single unified *praxis*. As a consequence of this rearrangement the threat to Zeus's cosmos which in the *Theogony* is posed first by a spontaneous eruption of demonic energy from the subterranean regions, then by an unborn son destined to carry on the inherited pattern of generational strife and overthrow, in the *Hymn to Apollo* is posed by the Queen of Heaven herself, Zeus's own consort. The divergence is startling and invites closer examination.

The episode begins, as is typical in epic and lyric digressions, with a summary statement of its essential point: Hera produced Typhon in indignation (307 χολωσαμένη, 309 χολώσατο) at the appearance of Athena in the world.[219] In her formal complaint to the assembled Olympians she presents the issue in quasi-legal terms. Zeus, she says, has deprived her of certain rights (312 ἀτιμάζειν) that are her due as wife (313 ἐπεί μ' ἄλοχον ποιήσατο κέδν' εἰδυῖαν), and in so doing he has incurred responsibility, as the moral aggressor (312 ἄρχει, 313 πρῶτος), for any retaliatory measures she may choose to take.[220] Having thus stated the gist of her case, she then goes on to fill in the details: while Zeus has now produced, "apart from her" (314 νόσφιν ἐμεῖο), a goddess "outstanding among all the blessed immortals" (315), her own son Hephaestus[221] is crippled and

[219] Cf. Dornseiff, *AM* 16. L. Illig calls the "knappen Inhaltszusammenfassung" that introduces a longer narrative its κεφάλαιον; cf. *Zur Form der pindarischen Erzählung* (Berlin 1932) 20.

[220] For forms of ἄρχω and/or πρότερος (πρῶτος) in reference to the aetiology of conflict cf. *Il.* 4.66f., *Theog.* 166 and 172, Herod. I. 4.1, 130.3, III. 49.2, IV. 119.2, VI. 119.1, Thuc. IV 73.2.

[221] As noted by AHS 248, Humbert 92, Càssola 506, ὃν τέκον αὐτή means "my very own son" (cf. *Il.* 22.353), not "whom I bore by myself"; the poet adopts the Homeric (*Il.* 14.338, *Od.* 8.312), not the Hesiodic (*Theog.* 927f.) account of Hephaestus' parentage. Cf. F. Franke, quoted by Baumeister 160: "Enimvero de eo conqueritur Iuno, quod Iupiter, postquam ex ipsa, coniuge sua, deformem Vulcanum procreasset, ex se solus pulcerrimam deam genuit."

weakly—so distasteful to her, in fact, that she once tried to get rid of him by hurling him into the sea, where, however, he was unfortunately rescued by Thetis and her sisters. Turning then from the assembly at large to address Zeus alone, she restates her case in a series of indignant questions, the drift of which is that as his duly recognized consort (325-326 σὴ κεκλημένη ἔμπης ἦα ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν) she has the right to bear his offspring. From reproaches she moves on to threats, warning him that in answer to his "contrivance" (322 μητίσεαι) she will herself "contrive" (325a μητίσομαι, 326 τεχνήσομαι) the birth of a son "who shall be outstanding among immortal gods"—and will do so without recourse either to adultery or to the marriage-bed. In a parting shot she declares her determination to withdraw from Zeus's company completely.

Although Hera's grievance is ostensibly the violation of her conjugal rights, her argumentation and her subsequent actions reveal a deeper motivation behind the legal issue. Of particular significance are the resemblances in diction between lines 315 (ἣ πᾶσιν μακάρεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν), 316 (ὅ γ' ἠπεδανὸς γέγονεν μετὰ πᾶσι θεοῖσι), and 327 (ὥς κε θεοῖσι μεταπρέποι ἀθανάτοισιν), which suggest that her sense of injury springs less from Zeus's "betrayal" itself than from the pre-eminent quality of its result, an all-too-painful reminder of her own previous feeble effort.[222] In the circumstantial account of her attempt to be rid of that embarrassment, climaxed as it is by the bitter sarcasm of line 321 (ὡς ὄφελ' ἄλλο θεοῖσι χαρίσσασθαι μακάρεσσι), she reveals the depth of her disappointment and chagrin—feelings which, exacerbated now by Athena's conspicuous brilliance, can be assuaged only by a second, and outstandingly successful, essay at procreation. That her intentions far outstrip the retributive principle of ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα, however, is made starkly clear when—*flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo*—she withdraws from the world of the Olympians and turns for aid to the primal powers of Earth and Sky and the Titans in Tartarus. Only to the extent that she asks to be granted a child "apart from Zeus" (with 338 νόσφι Διός cf. 314 νόσφιν ἐμεῖο) does her private prayer agree with the public statement of her grievance. No longer content that her offspring should merely rival Athena in brilliance, she now demands that he rival—no, that he *excel*—Zeus himself in strength, to the same degree as Zeus was mightier than Cronus (337-339):

> αὐτοὶ νῦν μὲν πάντες ἀκούσατε καὶ δότε παῖδα
> νόσφι Διός, μηδέν τι βίην ἐπιδευέα κείνου·
> ἀλλ' ὅ γε φέρτερος ἔστω ὅσον Κρόνου εὐρύοπα Ζεύς.

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[222] On the significance of the repetition cf. Frolíková, "Remarks" 106, Unte 72.

In this open avowal of her heart's desire the depth and ferocity of Hera's malice are laid bare once and for all. In light of Hesiod's cosmogonical scheme, to which these lines are most probably an allusion, the hyperbolic ὅσον Κρόνου εὐρύοπα Ζεύς has truly staggering implications. What Hera wishes to achieve is not a restoration of the *status quo*, as she maintained in her public statement to the assembled Olympians, but rather its complete destruction through the overthrow of Zeus. Her earlier ζηλοσύνη against Leto, "destined to bear a faultless and mighty son" (100-101), her χόλος against Zeus, whose daughter "is pre-eminent among all the blessed immortals" (315), are now revealed to be merely symptomatic of a comprehensive hostility to order itself. Such is the driving force that brings Typhon into the world; such is the malice that entrusts him to the serpent, one πῆμα to another, for nurturing; such is the ferocity of Apollo's ultimate antagonist. Her defeat-by-proxy at the hands of archer-god is the clearest imaginable testimony of his power and glory.

The echoes of lines 305-306 in 352-354 are enough to ensure that the pronoun in ἡ δ' ὑπέδεκτο poses no difficulty in its reference; the poet has clearly returned full-circle to the δράκαινα, his original subject of discourse.[223] Yet before resuming the narrative previewed in lines 300-301 he glances fleetingly at the mature Typhon's career in crime (355 ὃς κακὰ πόλλ' ἔρδεσκε κατὰ κλυτὰ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων (355).[224] By recalling the serpent's own wicked deeds (302-303 ἣ κακὰ πολλὰ ἀνθρώπους ἔρδεσκεν), this line underscores, like κακῷ κακόν in line 354, the rhetorical function of the digression as a whole, which is to provide a qualitative analogy for Apollo's monstrous foe and thus, by magnifying her importance, to magnify his triumph. Implicit within the episode, however, is another analogy equally relevant to the hymn's encomiastic purpose. Commentators have noted with vexation that the poet gives no hint of the fate which Typhon, as a consequence of his misdeeds, met at the hands of Zeus.[225] When one remembers, however, that the hymn *qua* hymn is an encomium of Apollo and that all its parts should contribute in some way to that end, the poet's silence on this point makes perfect sense. Had he recounted, or indeed even mentioned, that titanic struggle

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[223] Cf. Förstel 261: "Wenn nach V. 355 eine Pause gemacht und dann V. 356 mit betontem Neueinsatz gesprochen wird, ist eine Fehlbeziehung der Pronomina ausgeschlossen."

[224] In defending ὅς against Wolf's emendation ἥ Càssola 507 notes that "al rapsodo non bastave dire che Tifone nacque come flagello dei mortali; occorreva aggiungere che in realtà inflisse molti mali agli uomini."

[225] "Die Typhaongeschichte läuft auch völlig inkonklusiv aus" (Jacoby 744); "Nothing more is said of Typhon. If lines 305-355 had been original in their present context, we should have expected an account of his fate" (Allen-Sikes 110).

between the greatest of the gods and a monster so formidable that only the thunderbolt could quell him, he would have put Apollo's killing of the serpent very much in the shade; the auxetic thrust of the whole digression would have been redirected toward Zeus and the encomiastic focus consequently blurred.[226] As victories over the forces of demonic disorder, however, the two exploits are clearly parallel; indeed, when through the exercise of his power as an archer "the son of Zeus" (301 ἄναξ Διὸς υἱός) secures the site of his oracle against the depredations of the dragon, in order thereby to proclaim the "unerring will of Zeus" (132 Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν) to mankind, he is as much a defender of Zeus's cosmic ordinance as Zeus τερπικέραυνος himself.[227] By touching on the deeds that led Typhon to his doom the poet contrives to have his audience discern a relation of analogy between Apollo and Zeus as enemies of disorder, but by avoiding any direct allusion to the tale's notorious dénouement he allows Apollo's achievement to shine undimmed by what must inevitably be disadvantageous comparison.[228]

Lines 356-387: The Dragon-Slaying and the Punishment of Telphusa

The auxetic force of the Typhon-episode is in lines 356-357 brought explicitly to bear on Apollo. So terrible is the serpent that all who en-

[226] "Auf [Typhon's] Unthaten einzugehen, lag begreiflicherweise überhaupt nicht in dem Plane seines Lobliedes auf Apollo" (Ludwich 190)—a fact which does not, however, necessitate reading ἥ in 355 as Ludwich does (see above, note 224); to allude in a single parenthetical line is hardly "einzugehen."

[227] "Von den beiden älteren Mißgeburten, den Trägerinnen dieses dämonischen Unheils, vernichtete Zeus die männliche, Apollon die weibliche" (Ludwich 190); "Zeus und Apollon stehen hier zusammen gegen Hera und ihre Ungeheuer Typhaon und Drakaina, über die sie beide die Oberhand gewinnen" (Unte 80); cf. also Förstel 227, 263.

[228] An analogous instance of tact in a similar rhetorical situation can be found in Pind. *P.* 8.15ff, where Typhos and Porphyrion are brought forward to exemplify the truth that hubris for all its grandiose assertions still does not escape suppression in the end:

> βία δὲ καὶ μεγάλαυχον ἔσφαλεν ἐν χρόνῳ.
> Τυφὼς Κίλιξ ἑκατόγκρανος οὔ νιν ἄλυξεν,
> οὐδὲ μὰν βασιλεὺς Γιγάντων· δμᾶθεν δὲ κεραυνῷ
> τόξοισί τ' Ἀπόλλωνος· ὃς εὐμενεῖ νόῳ
> Ξενάρκειον ἔδεκτο ...

Though a personified Hesychia is the power ultimately responsible for the downfall of the monsters, the instruments explicitly mentioned are "the thunderbolt and the bow of Apollo." As conqueror of Typhos, Zeus is not named but rather is left to be inferred from his weapon; the only personal agent specified is Apollo, who slew Porphyrion, like the serpent, by means of bow and arrow. The ode celebrates a Pythian victory, won by Aristomenes at games held in honor of Apollo; to bring Zeus in by name at this point would violate encomiastic decorum and upset the delicate transition, effected through a relative pronoun, which shifts the focus from Hesychia to the victorious Aristomenes.

counter her meet their "day of doom"—but only up to the moment when Apollo lets fly at her with a "mighty arrow":

> ὃς τῇ γ' ἀντιάσειε, φέρεσκέ μιν αἴσιμον ἦμαρ
> πρίν γέ οἱ ἰὸν ἐφῆκεν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων
> καρτερόν (cf. 301 ἀπὸ κρατεροῖο βιοῖο) ...

He is the first to oppose her successfully; such is his power and his skill with the bow that he accomplishes what no one else has been able to do.[229] Summarily reported by the aorist κτεῖνεν in 301, moreover, the serpent's death is now graphically portrayed as a process through time by means of imperfective forms (κεῖτο, ἑλίσσετο, λεῖπε) and present participles (ἐρεχθομένη, ἀσθμαίνουσα, κυλινδομένη, ἀποπνείουσ').[230] The leisurely description of her final agonies provides a dramatic backdrop for the vaunt of triumph that follows.

Models for Apollo's ἐπευχή can be found throughout the battle books of the *Iliad.* A typical element in these vaunts is the vow that the victim's body will not be buried but rather left on the spot to be devoured by birds and dogs[231]—or, in the case of Achilles' boast over Lycaon, which offers the closest parallel to *h. Ap.* 363-369, by the fish of Scamander (21.122-135). As Achilles' first words are ἐνταυθοῖ νῦν κεῖσο μετ' ἰχθύσιν, so Apollo begins ἐνταυθοῖ νῦν πύθευ ἐπὶ χθονὶ βωτιανείρῃ. Like Achilles, who boasts that Scamander himself will be of no assistance to Lycaon and his fellow Trojans (21.130-131 οὐδ' ὑμῖν ποταμός περ ἐΰρροος ἀργυροδίνης ἀρκέσει), Apollo taunts his foe in her helplessness. No compatriot from the realm of demonic disorder can aid her now, he says, neither Typhoeus/Typhon himself, her own θρέμμα, nor Chimaera, who according to Hesiod is Typhon's daughter;[232] instead the earth and the sun will rot her on the very spot where she has fallen (σέ γ' αὐτοῦ πύσει γαῖα μέλαινα καὶ ἠλέκτωρ Ὑπερίων). Ending his vaunt as he began, with a reference to putrefaction, Apollo paves the way for the *aition* of lines 371-374, which by means of abundant repetition (αὐτοῦ, κατέπυσ'/πῦσε, μένος, Ἠελίοιο) both underscores its etymological rationale and sets a seal of closure, as it were, on the account of Apollo's first settlement at Pytho.[233]

[229] On actions performed "alone or first" as an auxetic *topos* see Arist. *Rhet.* I. 9.38.

[230] On the various unusual linguistic features of this passage see Càssola 507-508, Förstel 469, note 674, A. Hoekstra, *The Sub-Epic Stage of the Formulaic Tradition* (Amsterdam and London 1969) 30-31.

[231] E.g. 11.453, 16.836, 22.335f.

[232] Hesiod too uses both forms of the name, Τυφάων (306) and Τυφωεύς (821, 869); as Jacoby 745, note 1, remarks, the variation "beweist nicht für Interpolation." Cf. also Förstel 261.

[233] On lines 370-374 as "Abschluß und Rahmen der gesamten Drakaina-Typhon-Geschichte" cf. Unte 76.

Before the god is free to turn to his final task, however, one piece of unfinished business must be attended to. Telphusa, he now realizes, did not play straight with him; she led him to suppose that Pytho was, unlike her own region, truly a χῶρος ἀπήμων, a "place free from trouble," whereas in fact he found it afflicted not by the mere noise and commotion of daily traffic but by a veritable πῆμα δαφοινόν, an embodiment on earth of the demonic forces that oppose the order of Zeus. When in his ἐπευχή Apollo exults in the fact that the serpent will not be able to wreak havoc on those who bring him hecatombs (364-366), he points up the absolute necessity of her elimination from the scene: if his intention to "proclaim the will of Zeus to men" is to be realized, men must be able to visit the oracle undisturbed by the threat of physical violence. Thus with the serpent's death Pytho not only receives its proper name but also becomes at last a true χῶρος ἀπήμων, free from secular distractions on the one hand and the depredations of brute force on the other, and so a place fit for Apollo's purposes.[234]

The fact remains, however, that Telphusa intended a different result. Filled with indignation at her perfidy (377 κεχολωμένος), Apollo retraces his steps until he once more stands beside her spring (378 = 246). Having evidently divined the *phthonos* that prompted her deception (275-276 ὄφρα οἱ αὐτῇ Τελφούσῃ κλέος εἴη ἐπὶ χθονὶ μηδ' Ἑκάτοιο), he informs her flatly that she will no longer have all local fame to herself (381 ἐνθάδε δὴ καὶ ἐμὸν κλέος ἔσσεται οὐδὲ σὸν οἴῃς). The force of καί and οἴῃς must not go unremarked, for they point to a certain magnanimity in Apollo's attitude toward his defeated rival. Although Telphusa is indeed "shamed" or "disfigured" (387 ἤσχυνε), her lovely free-flowing waters being buried under a fall of boulders, and although she loses the purely private glory, limited but all her own, which her *phthonos* sought to protect, she gains by way of compensation a different—and further-reaching—kind of fame in and through the cult of Apollo Telphusius.

The punishment of Telphusa, culminating, like the killing of the dragon, in a cult-name aetiology, ties up the loose ends left hanging when Apollo, ignorant of Telphusa's deception, went off to Crisa and so rounds out the first half of the *praxeis*-section. The narrative *praeteritio* with which this sub-section (216-387) begins does not reach its conclusion until Apollo arrives at Pytho in 282ff., but meanwhile a new pattern of concentric "rings" has begun to emerge. Thus the poet's focus shifts successively from Telphusa (244-276) to Pytho and the serpent (281-304) to

[234] Cf. Menander *Sminth.* 441.27ff. (on the dragon Python): οὗτος ἀβάτους μὲν ἐποίει Δελφοὺς τοῖς ἅπασιν, ᾤκει δὲ τὸν τόπον οὐδείς, ἦν δὲ τὸ Θέμιδος μαντεῖον ἔρημον. ἄτοπα δὲ καὶ ἀμήχανα ὁ θεὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πάσχειν ὑπολαβὼν καὶ βουλόμενος πανταχόθεν αὐτοῖς θεσπίζειν τὰ συμφέροντα δι' ὧν ὁ βίος εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔμελλε, κτείνει καὶ τοῦτον μιᾷ τοξείᾳ.

Typhon (305-306) to Hera (307-350) and then back through Typhon (351-355) and the serpent and Pytho (356-374) to Telphusa (357-387).[235] The etymological *aitia* that conclude the last two units in this pattern chime with one another as a kind of conceptual refrain, and in combination with the ring-form itself this refrain effect creates a strong sense of closure for the sub-section as a whole.[236]

Lines 388-450: The Election of the Ministers (with the Third Geographical Catalogue)

Although Apollo has now built his temple and safeguarded the temple-site by ridding it of the serpent, he still has not fully realized the intention with which he set out from Olympus in line 216. In order for the temple to become a *chresterion* it must be staffed with priests who can serve as intermediaries between the god and the generality of men he seeks to benefit. The emphatic temporal signpost καὶ τότε δή (388) marks the moment at which Apollo turns his attention to this final task. Like the poet himself in lines 19ff. and 207ff., Apollo begins by framing an *aporia*: "he pondered in his heart what men he should bring in to serve as his ministers in rocky Pytho." In the midst of this deliberation, the reporting of which functions as a kind of *propositio* for the last hundred lines of the poem,[237] Apollo notices a "swift ship on the wine-dark sea," filled with Cretans "many and good." To judge both from the tense of ῥέζουσι and ἀγγέλλουσι (394) and from the presence of the generalizing τε (393), the relative clause by which the Cretans are characterized is to be understood not as part of the unfolding narrative but as a parenthetical flash-forward to "present general" time. The men who (then) were sailing on business from Knossos to Pylos are also those who (now) "conduct sacrifices for the lord and report his θέμιστες, whatever he says by way of prophecy (χρείων) beneath Parnassus."[238] By recalling Apollo's statements of pur-

[235] Failing to observe the ring-form, Bethe 11 finds the narrative through 387 "bemerkenswert ungeschickt ... sie irrt ab und knickt die Geschichte von der Bosheit und Bestrafung der Tilphussa 246-304 und 356-387 im Wendepunkt."

[236] Although the multiplicity of Apollo's cult-titles (πολυωνυμία) announced by Delos in line 82 has little programmatic force for the hymn's overall organization, as Dornseiff, *AM* 14 asserts, it clearly does serve a structural function here. Dornseiff also finds the etymologizing "geistreich und humoristisch" and refuses to believe that the poet intended it in "heiligen Ernst." Though characteristically overstated, this view is certainly to be preferred to that expressed by, e.g., Defradas 64 ("dans ses grandes lignes, on peut dire que la *Suite pythique* est un essai d'explication de trois noms rituels d'Apollon"; cf. Kolk 27, note 16), which is contradicted by the brevity with which the *aitia* are treated and by their disposition in the narrative.

[237] On lines 388-390 as a "Themastellung" cf. Jacoby 745.

[238] Cf. van Groningen 318 ("une légère anticipation"), Förstel 152. Earlier editors (e.g. Matthiae, Hermann, Baumeister) eliminated the prolepsis by transposing 394-396

pose in line 132 (χρήσω) and lines 252-253 (= 292-293) (θεμιστεύοιμι, χρέων), this temporal prolepsis reminds us what he is seeking, and why, at the same time as it reveals the successful outcome of the quest. Equally important, moreover, is the way that it underscores the purely secular and private nature of the activity in which the Cretans are presently engaged (397 ἐπὶ πρῆξιν καὶ χρήματα)[239] through contrastive juxtaposition with the religious duties to which they are about to be summoned. As the poet himself is at pains to remind his audience in the second *propositio* (208-215), Apollo's quest is undertaken for the general benefit of mankind. When by Apollo's determination his quest intersects with that of the Cretans (399 αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσι συνήντετο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων), the merely private and commercial must be, and is, forgotten.

The account of Apollo's dealings with the Cretans that unfolds from that moment of encounter seems to be composed of three separate "movements," each with its distinctive tempo. The first of these movements (400-450), beginning with Apollo's metamorphosis into a dolphin and ending with his epiphany to the Cretans in human form, is marked throughout by great *energy*, *speed*, and *wonder*. Springing (400 ἐπόρουσε) onto the ship in bestial guise, Apollo lies there thrashing, "a huge and fearful portent" (401 πέλωρ μέγα τε δεινόν τε). While the Cretans sit "dumb with fear" (404 ἀκέων ... δειμαίνοντες) and make no move to touch tackle or sail, the ship sails on, "roused by a swift south wind" (408 κραιπνὸς δὲ νότος ... ἔγειρε). By the time it has reached Taenaron the men have recovered their wits enough to attempt a landing, wishing to ponder the "great marvel" (415 μέγα θαῦμα) from the safety of the shore and to see whether the "portent" (416 πέλωρον) will remain on the deck or leap (417 ὀρούσει) back into the sea. The ship does not heed the rudder, however, but continues to coast the Peloponnese, guided "easily" (421 ῥηϊδίως) by Apollo.[240] Once it reaches the gulf of Corinth, a great wind from the west "rushes upon" them (434 ἐπαιγίζων) and drives them "with all possible speed" (434 τάχιστα) along their way. As soon as they arrive at Crisa Apollo leaps forth again (440 ὄρουσεν), this time "in the likeness of a star, though at mid-day"; showers of sparks fly off from him and a great brightness goes up to heaven. Instantaneously transported to Pytho and there entering the *adyton* of his temple, he "kindles a flame, showing forth the splendor of his darts," till all Crisa is filled with radiance and the Crisaean women cry aloud in "great fear"

to follow 390 and adopting the alternative readings ῥέξουσι and ἀγγελέουσι, an expedient which, however, leaves 393 incomplete in sense; Jacoby 745 condemns all four lines as an interpolation.

[239] On the Cretans' "alltäglichen und ganz unheroischen Zweck" cf. Förstel 268.

[240] On the occasionally problematic itinerary see Càssola 510, Baltes 37-39.

(447 μέγα δέος). Finally, "in the likeness of a man in this first youth," Apollo returns to the shore "in one flying bound, swift as thought" (448 νόημ' ὣς ἆλτο πέτεσθαι).

Thus summarized, the whole sequence constitutes a vivid demonstration of Apollo's power as this is expressed through his own actions and mirrored in the response of others. Particularly to be noted in this respect is the evocation of a tremendous *purposiveness* throughout. From the moment that the dolphin appears in their midst the Cretans are moved by a will far greater than their own, a will bent with absolute concentration on a *telos* as yet inaccessible to their understanding. This singleness of mind is graphically portrayed in the "travelogue" of lines 409-439, the last of the hymn's three journeys. Like the summary of Leto's wanderings (30-50) and the account of Apollo's search for an oracle-site (216-286), these lines form a *praeteritio* of sorts, a literal "passing by" of place after place that sets the final destination into high relief.[241] The two earlier journeys, however, were implicitly or explicitly punctuated by stops. Here, "refusing to obey the rudder" when the Cretans try to put in at Taenaron, the ship neither wavers in direction nor slackens in speed until, with a rhythmically audible bump (439 ἡ δ' ἀμάθοισιν ἐχρίμψατο ποντοπόρος νηῦς), it runs aground at Crisa, now revealed as the exclusive goal of the will that moves it. But whose is this will? Apollo's, certainly—but not his alone. As the ship rounds the northwestern corner of the Peloponnese it is "glorying in the fair wind of Zeus" (427 ἀγαλλομένη Διὸς οὔρῳ); when it enters the Corinthian gulf a west wind springs up "by the decree of Zeus" (433 ἐκ Διὸς αἴσης) and blows vehemently "with the purpose (ὄφρα) that the ship might come with all speed to the end of its journey"; as it skims down the home-stretch to Crisa it is "lord Apollo the son of Zeus" (437 ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων) who guides it. The closer the Cretans get to their destination, the more plainly it is revealed—to us, though not as yet to them—that Apollo's purpose is the purpose of Zeus as well, Zeus whose νημερτέα βουλήν Apollo will soon be expounding, through his chosen ministers, to humanity at large.

Also contributing to the power and impact of these fifty lines are Apollo's metamorphoses themselves, which as a series seem to represent the same encomiastic strategy of ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα that proved so effective in the first half of the *Hymn*. The first stage is Apollo's voluntary self-reduction to the condition of brute nature in the dolphin, a process by which tremendous energies are confined within an inarticulate and

[241] Cf. Race 50. Between παρημείβοντο (409) at the very beginning of the journey and παρενίσατο (430) toward the end, forms of παρά appear five times (410, 419, 425 twice, 426).

(despite the shaking of the ship's timbers) essentially *passive* form. The evocation of power in latency may in fact be intended to recall those first moments of Apollo's life when he lay swaddled and bound, a helpless infant.[242] When, however, at the end of the voyage Apollo leaps from the ship "in the likeness of a star," those latent energies are released with a sudden violence that is all the more dazzling for the contrast with what precedes. Yet this revelation of unbridled power is itself converted into foil when, in order to communicate with the Cretans, Apollo assumes his habitual (and, one might say, his quintessentially Apolline) form of a handsome youth with flowing locks. As beast of the sea and star of heaven, the first two metamorphoses seem to mark the lower and upper limits, so to speak, of Apollo's divinity, equally "inhuman" extremes between which his final anthropomorphic and earthly epiphany lies in tension.[243]

Lines 451-512: Apollo and the Cretans

With Apollo's assumption of human form the high-pitched excitement of the preceding fifty lines is temporarily suspended, and a distinct slowing down of narrative tempo can be felt in the verbal exchange, the ship-beaching, and the feasting that follow. The fact that the material itself is inherently less dramatic accounts in part for the change in pace, but perhaps even more important is the sudden proliferation of conventional formulas and motifs and, from Apollo's second speech onward, the marked tendency toward near-verbatim repetition. Whereas the auxetic force of lines 400-450 lies above all in the tremendous thaumaturgy that they so vividly describe, the final scenes of the poem achieve their effect by repeatedly setting the divine and the human conditions into contrastive juxtaposition: freedom from all care and unlimited capacity for action on the one side, subjection to physical necessity and finitude of intellect and will on the other. At the same time the several exchanges be-

[242] ἀσπαίρω, the verb used to describe the infant Apollo's writhing in 128, is applied to the struggling of fish out of water in *Od.* 12.254, Herod. IX. 120.1.

[243] Comparison with *h.* 7, which also describes a thaumaturgical epiphany, is illuminating. The elements that the two tales have in common—the shipboard setting, the metamorphosis into animal form, the human reactions of wonder and terror—bring their differences into sharp relief. Dionysus changes shape in order to punish men who have doubted and offended his divinity; Apollo does so as the first step in a series of actions intended to secure, and educate, ministers for his oracle. Dionysus, moreover, takes bestial forms readily and naturally, being perhaps the most deeply rooted in physicality of all the Olympians (cf. E. R. Dodds, *Bacchae*, 2nd ed. [Oxford 1960] xii, xx; on Dionysus' bestial transformations cf. Dodds' note on *Ba.* 1017-19). Apollo, in this as in other ways Dionysus' polar opposite, is pre-eminently a god of spirit (cf. W. Otto, *Die Götter Griechenlands* [Frankfurt 1934] 78-80), whose reduction to the condition of brute nature is therefore the more remarkable.

tween the god and his chosen ministers have much to say about the nature and purpose of the oracle as an institution, the place it occupies (or should occupy) in the world, and the role it plays (or should play) in human life.

The disjunction between human and divine is first adumbrated ironically in Apollo's opening address (452-461), where the god's true comprehension of the situation in which the Cretans find themselves is masked by the conventional inquiries of his assumed persona:

ὦ ξεῖνοι τίνες ἐστέ; πόθεν πλεῖθ' ὑγρὰ κέλευθα;
ἤ τι κατὰ πρῆξιν, ἦ μαψιδίως ἀλάλησθε
οἷά τε ληϊστῆρες ὑπεὶρ ἅλα, τοί τ' ἀλόωνται
ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι κακὸν ἀλλοδαποῖσι φέροντες;

When Polyphemus asks Odysseus the identical questions (*Od.* 9.252-255), he has reason to be in doubt on every point, including the last; he has, after all, just caught Odysseus in the act of burglary. When Nestor poses the questions to Telemachus and Athena/Mentor (3.71-74), he is transparently confident that it is indeed on business that they have come, not as wandering pirates; but as to their identity, their place of origin, and the exact nature of their business he is in genuine need of enlightenment. Apollo, by contrast, knows the answers to *all* his questions, since it is he himself who has so rudely interrupted the Cretans on their journey to Pylos ἐπὶ πρῆξιν καὶ χρήματα.[244] Professing surprise at their stupified inaction (456), Apollo urges them to disembark and let down the rigging, "that being the way of men who must earn their bread whenever they put in to shore in a dark ship, sated with toil, and longing for sweet food overcomes them":

αὕτη μέν γε δίκη πέλει ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων
ὁππόταν ἐκ πόντοιο ποτὶ χθονὶ νηῒ μελαίνῃ
ἔλθωσιν καμάτῳ ἀδηκότες, αὐτίκα δέ σφεας
σίτοιο γλυκεροῖο περὶ φρένας ἵμερος αἱρεῖ.

Apollo describes their situation in terms of the utmost generality, and with ironic force: like all men the newcomers must eat to live, and like most men they must work to eat, so why do they not get on with it instead of sitting there in stunned amazement?[245] The Cretans have been in the

[244] "Commerce" represents the peaceful, "piracy" the violent aspect of the realm of practical action or *ascholia* in which the Cretans have hitherto lived and moved but which they soon will be compelled to abandon in favor of Pytho's *schole* and *apemosune*. In the festival on Olympus the two varieties of *ascholia* can be brought into harmony with the spirit of leisure through Apollo's lyre—a fact figured by Hermes and Ares "at play" (above, note 173)—but wherever that spirit would rule on earth, in the world of men, they must be excluded altogether. See below, pp. 98-99, 103-104, and Appendix 2.

[245] Whether derived from ἀλφάνω "earn" or ἄλφι(τον) "grain" (Frisk 81), ἀλφηστής seems properly to suggest the lot of ordinary humankind as against that of the gods (*Od.*

grip of a mystical experience outside of time; the god now bids them to take on—for one last time, though of that fact they are not yet aware—the burdens of common humanity.

Emboldened by Apollo's speech—and by his appearance too, no doubt, after the uncanny portents of dolphin and star—the Cretan leader greets the young stranger, asks some questions of his own, and then answers those posed by Apollo. "O stranger," he begins—and then breaks off to express a reservation: "although (ἐπεί) in fact (γάρ) you do not resemble mortals in stature or form, but rather the immortal gods" (464-465).[246] When Odysseus begins his appeal to Nausicaa (*Od.* 6.149-162) by asking whether she is a goddess or a mortal, he patently has no real doubt on the issue (he abandons the former hypothesis after a mere three lines) and is simply paying a compliment to her beauty. When, home on Ithaca, he says to the disguised Athena σοὶ γὰρ ἐγώ γε εὔχομαι ὥς τε θεῷ καί σευ φίλα γούναθ' ἱκάνω (13.230-231), the turn of phrase seems once again to be no more than suppliant's hyperbole. The Cretan's case is clearly different; considering what he and his fellows have just been through, he has every reason to suspect that the young man before him is more than he seems. Yet, though he does not conceal his hesitation, he decides (prudently, no doubt) to take the stranger at face value (466 οὖλέ τε καὶ μέγα χαῖρε, θεοί δέ τοι ὄλβια δοῖεν). First inquiring into the identity of the land and its inhabitants like the mystified Odysseus in *Od.* 13.233 (τίς γῆ, τίς δῆμος, τίνες ἀνέρες ἐγγεγάασιν), he then explains as best he can how they came to be there. The deflection from their original purpose (469 ἄλλῃ φρονέοντες, 472 ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἄλλα κέλευθα) to which they have unwillingly submitted (471 οὔ τι ἑκόντες, 473 οὐκ ἐθέλοντας) he attributes to divine intervention (473 τις ἀθανάτων), but he does so without explicitly suggesting that the god whom he thinks he perceives in the young man's form is in fact the agency responsible.

1.349) or of near-gods like the Phaeacians (6.8). On the use of the dual in lines 456, 487, and 501, attributable to "die metrische Bequemlichkeit und sprachliche Unkenntnis des Verfassers," cf. A. Debrunner, *Glotta* 15 (1926-27) 16-17, Hoekstra (note 230) 28-29, Càssola 513.

[246] "The combination of ἐπεί and γάρ is remarkable" (AHS 261); Baumeister 174 suggests that two Homeric phrases (οὐ μὲν γάρ, ἐπεὶ οὐ μέν τι) have coalesced into one (so too Kirk 177). For the elliptical ἐπεί which is ultimately equivalent to "although" LSJ s.v. B.4 give only late prose examples, but cf. lines 312-313 of this same poem: ὡς ἔμ' ἀτιμάζειν ἄρχει νεφεληγερέτα Ζευς/πρῶτος, ἐπεί μ' ἄλοχον ποιήσατο κεδνα ἰδυῖαν. "(As he should not do) since I am his wife" (Allen-Sikes 105). Franke (quoted by Baumeister 174) complains: "si dux ille Cretensium Apollinem non pro deo habuit, sed propter eius pulcritudinem cum diis comparavit, ineptum est quod eum propter illam cum diis similitudinem salvere iussit; sin pro deo habuit, aliquanto ineptius addidit θεοὶ δέ τοι ὄλβια δοῖεν." Once ἐπεί is understood as elliptical, however, the slight confusion of thought makes perfect sense as a reflection of the Cretan's predicament.

In his second speech (474-501) Apollo lays irony aside for the moment in favor of plain statement and command, but the immense gulf between human and divine continues to be emphasized. The very structure of the first five lines is expressive in this regard:

ξεῖνοι, τοὶ Κνωσὸν πολυδένδρεον ἀμφινέμεσθε
τὸ πρίν, ἀτὰρ νῦν οὐκ ἔθ' ὑπότροποι αὖθις ἔσεσθε
ἔς τε πόλιν ἐρατὴν καὶ δώματα καλὰ ἕκαστος
ἔς τε φίλας ἀλόχους, ἀλλ' ἐνθάδε πίονα νηὸν
ἕξετ' ἐμὸν πολλοῖσι τετιμένον ἀνθρώποισιν.

By means of the contrastive pairs τὸ πρὶν/ἀτὰρ νῦν and οὐκ/ἀλλά the Cretans' natural attachments as political and social beings are stripped from them one by one, and in order of increasing poignancy (πόλιν, δώματα, ἀλόχους).[247] As in the encounter at mid-sea the Cretans' private mission as merchants had to yield to the imperious demands of Apollo's public quest, so here they are given no choice but to accept as compensation for personal loyalties irrevocably lost the position of public responsibility that they will enjoy as guardians of so "rich" a temple. Presumably Apollo could have recruited his priests locally had he so desired; since he chose instead to bring strangers in from outside, "far from friends and native land" (526 τῆλε φίλων καὶ πατρίδος αἴης), we must conclude that he regards the consequent deracination and forced retirement from ordinary human concerns as a positive advantage, promoting in the ministers a disinterested and single-minded devotion to their office.

Only when Apollo has thus set at naught all desires and purposes that the Cretans may have entertained on their own behalf does he deign to reveal his identity, with the impressive simplicity of phrasing typical of such epiphanies (480 εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ Διὸς υἱός, 'Απόλλων δ' εὔχομαι εἶναι).[248] That he should introduce himself as "the son of Zeus" before he gives his name is not without significance; we have already noted how Zeus's tacit sanction pervades the whole account of the Pythian enterprise. The dismissing of merely human will as irrelevant continues in line 481 (ὑμέας δ' ἤγαγον ἐνθάδ' ὑπὲρ μέγα λαῖτμα θαλάσσης), where the echoes of the Cretan leader's speech (473 δεῦρ' ἤγαγεν, 469 ἐπεπλέομεν μέγα λαῖτμα) remind us how insistently he dwelt upon their involuntary submission to an alien purpose (469 ἄλλῃ φρονέοντες, 471 οὔ τι ἑκόντες, 473 οὐκ ἐθέλοντας). Even when Apollo attempts to assure the Cretans of his benevolence

[247] Cf. Defradas 76: "Et la mission qu'Apollon donne à ses prêtres est dure: elle les oblige à rompre avec tout leur passé, à abandonner leur ville, leur maison, leur femme."

[248] Cf. *h. Dem.* 268 εἰμὶ δὲ Δημήτηρ τιμάοχος, *h.* 7.56 εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ Διόνυσος ἐρίβρομος, *Od.* 11.252 αὐτὰρ ἐγώ τοί εἰμι Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων, and see N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 248.

by sketching the spiritual rewards of their new vocation—they will not only "hold his rich temple," as he promised in lines 478-479, but they will also 'know the counsels of the gods" and, by divine dispensation, "receive honor all their days" (482-485)—his tone remains lofty and the Cretans' absolute obedience is taken for granted.

Having thus outlined in general terms the future that lies before them, Apollo then turns with a conventional exhortatory formula (486) to the here and now. He issues a series of commands: to beach and unload the ship (487-489); to build an altar at the sea's edge and there invoke him, with the proper rites, as Apollo Delphinius (490-496); finally, having eaten supper and poured libations to the Olympians, to follow him, singing the paean, to Pytho and his "rich temple" (497-501). At the heart of these instructions is a third etymological *aition* (493-496), distinguished from those that precede it by the fact that on the present occasion the new cult-name is proclaimed by Apollo himself rather than merely reported by the poet. The structural functional of the Πύθιος and Τελφούσιος etymologies was to create a sense of closure as the first stage of Apollo's quest drew to an end. By recalling those earlier passages the Δελφίνιος etymology serves to link the drafting of the ministers with the killing of the serpent and the punishing of Telphusa as three incidents in a single, ongoing process that will culminate in Apollo's first oracular utterance in the final lines of the hymn.

As the Cretans set about the tasks that Apollo has laid upon them, the narrative tension, already much relaxed in the preceding dialogue, grows even slacker. Still more markedly than lines 487-498, of which they are largely a repetition, lines 502-512 are a thoroughly conventional patchwork of formulaic lines and phrases from the storehouse of epic diction. The single non-stereotypic element in Apollo's instructions, the institution of the cult-name Δελφίνιος, is reduced to a bald εὔχονθ' ὡς ἐκέλευε (510), while the account of the ship-beaching is augmented with yet more traditional details. It is in light of Apollo's earlier sententious reference to the δίκη ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων that this underscoring of the typical, the predictable, even the humdrum, becomes explicable and significant. To furl the sails, to lower the mast to the mast-crutch, to drag the ship onto the sand and prop its sides—"such is the way of men who earn their bread," but the Cretans are doing it all for the last time. The world of ἄνδρες ἀλφησταί, of πρήξεις and χρήματα, in which they were so deeply immersed when Apollo encountered them at sea, is a world that, once they have feasted to their satisfaction, they will be leaving forever. A regular function of the formulaic line αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἕντο in epic is to mark the moment when the business of food-preparation and food-consumption makes way for the postprandial leisure so well suited

to the pleasures of song and dance, recitation by an ἀοιδός, or simple conversation.[249] In the context at hand this conventional force is intensified: once the Cretans have "put aside desire for food and drink" they are ready to say farewell to the realm of secular "busy-ness" itself, and the dancing and singing that follow are not mere entertainment but the very means by which they are transported to the realm of leisure and "freedom from trouble" in which they will henceforth live.

Lines 513-544: Pytho and the Final Exhortation

When the Cretans have completed the tasks enjoined upon them, Apollo takes up the lyre and leads them, with "beautiful high-stepping stride" (516 καλὰ καὶ ὕψι βιβάς), from the shore to Pytho. Their tireless energy and speed (520 ἄκμητοι, αἶψα) are in marked contrast to the stunned fatigue that Apollo discerned in them earlier and strike, if only faintly, the same note of wonder sounded throughout the account of the voyage. Once they have arrived with such miraculous ease at Pytho, Apollo shows them the "rich temple" that has been the *telos* of both his and their journeying from the outset and mention of which has recurred throughout the hymn as a kind of leitmotif.[250] At this point the discrepancy between human and divine perspectives, with all its auxetic implications for the poet's celebratory purpose, comes once again to the fore. At the same time, in the final exchange between the god and his ministers and above all in Apollo's solemn warning against *hubris*, the major ethical themes of the poem are brought together and given definitive expression. In the process a resolution is found to the question raised but not answered by our analysis of the temple-quest, namely why Apollo deliberately selects as the site of his oracle a place so poorly endowed with natural resources that his ministers will be forced to rely on others for their physical sustenance.

At the sight of the χῶρος ἐπήρατος to which Apollo has led them the Cretans' hearts are "stirred" (524 ὠρίνετο), and their leader sets forth their hesitations with a dignified humility reminiscent of Delos. Just as she tempers her profound awareness of the disadvantages under which she labors with an equally profound commitment to her essential rights, so he neither presumes to contest Apollo's will (527 οὕτω που τῷ σῷ φίλον

[249] E.g. *Il.* 1.469ff. (song and dance), *Od.* 3.67ff., 4.68ff., 16.55ff. (conversation), 8.72ff., 8.485ff. (*aoidos*). Relative to any of these activities eating is "business"; relative to others (battle, for example) it may be itself a "leisure" activity; cf. *Il.* 19.155ff., where Odysseus seeks to persuade Achilles to pause for refreshment before joining the fray.

[250] πίονα νηόν first appears in 52, with πιοτέρη (48) and πῖαρ (60) in the immediate vicinity; thereafter it occurs in 253, 293, 478, 482, 501, 523. Jacoby 748 calls it "geradezu Stichwort."

ἔπλετο θυμῷ) nor refrains from pointing out that in their involuntary separation from all that is familiar (526 τῆλε φίλων καὶ πατρίδος αἴης) he is in justice responsible for their material well-being. Gazing at the "lovely spot" before them, the Cretans recognize that for all its scenic loveliness it is not the kind of land that is directly productive of life's necessities, and so their leader asks: "How are we going to make a living? *That* is what we ask you to consider."

πῶς καὶ νῦν βιόμεσθα; τό σε φράζεσθαι ἄνωγμεν.
οὔτε τρυγηφόρος ἥδε γ' ἐπήρατος οὔτ' εὐλείμων,
ὥς τ' ἀπό τ' εὖ ζώειν καὶ ἅμ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀπηδεῖν.[251]

The full force of ἅμα in line 530 must not go unremarked: perhaps even on land that is rich neither in crops nor in pasturage the priests could still scratch out a meager living by dint of hard labor, but they could not do so and *at the same time* have leisure to attend to their public duties.[252] The duties themselves they are willing (perforce) to undertake; their only concern is how, humanly, they can be expected to carry them out.

Apollo responds to the Cretans' expression of deep anxiety about their material needs with an exhortation that is both structurally and thematically the climax of the *Hymn*. Although his reply begins with an outburst of apparent impatience, his smile (531 ἐπιμειδήσας) shows that he is not seriously angry; as in his first speech (452-461), he looks down upon his ministers-elect from his position of incalculable superiority and benevolently mocks their human limitations.[253]

[251] Following Gemoll 180, AHS 265 render 529 "it is not desirable as vineland or pasture" and support the construction by reference to *Od.* 13.246 αἰγίβοτος δ' ἀγαθὴ καὶ βούβοτος. Since, however, ἐπήρατος has just been applied (521) to the Delphic landscape in its regular sense ("charming, lovely"), Ernesti's interpretation (quoted by Càssola 515 and adopted by Förstel 474, note 690) seems preferable: "questa (terra) amabile non è apportatrice di messi, nè ricca di pascoli." That a place may be ἐπήρατος without being εὐλείμων is clear from *Od.* 4.605ff. There is no contradiction between οὔτε τρυγηφόρος and ἀμπελόεσσαν in 438; there the poet is speaking of the Crisaean plain, here of the region immediately surrounding the temple. Confusion on this point leads Wade-Gery 65-66 to hypothesize that a pre-existing "*Dolphin* poem" was imperfectly revised after the First Sacred War when Crisa was in ruins and the plain, now "devoted" to Apollo, lay in uncultivated desolation.

[252] Cf. Franke (quoted by Baumeister 179): "*ut non possimus simul et victum ex eo commode capere et hominibus obsecundare*, i.e. hominibus deum consulentibus operam dare."

[253] In its quality and implications Apollo's smile resembles that of Aphrodite in Sappho 1.13ff. (μειδιαίσαισ' ἀθανάτῳ προσώπῳ). "Aphrodite smiles for a most obvious reason: because she is amused. A little impatient, but tolerant, as a mother with a troublesome child" (D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* [Oxford 1955] 15). Contrast Demeter's truly wrathful impatience in *h. Dem.* 251ff. (251 χολωσαμένη, 254 κοτέσασα μάλ' αἰνῶς). In diction and rhythm Apollo's apostrophe closely resembles *h. Dem.* 256f. Νήϊδες ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀφράδμονες οὔτ' ἀγαθοῖο αἶσαν ἐπερχομένου προγνώμεναι οὔτε κακοῖο, *Theog.* 26 Ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον (for other examples of the "derogatory address to mankind by a deity" see Richardson and West *ad locc.*). The fact that in both of these passages a single

νήπιοι ἄνθρωποι δυστλήμονες οἵ μελεδῶνας
βούλεσθ' ἀργαλέους τε πόνους καὶ στείνεα θυμῷ ...

His is the divinely privileged perspective from which the Muses regard the ἀνθρώπων τλημοσύνας in lines 190-193, and as one who enjoys δῶρ' ἄμβροτα, an existence free not only from the impingement of death and old age but from the daily bondage of physical necessity as well, he naturally find the earnest question "But how shall we *live*?" more than faintly amusing. Indeed, from the vantage-point of divine omniscience and divine exemption from contingency the Cretans' short-sighted immersion in the anxieties that constitute the human condition fully *deserves* the rebuke that Apollo, in mock-impatience, delivers them. After all, here he has just shown them their glorious destiny, which is to work directly with the gods for the benefit of all mankind, and all they can think of is what they will find to eat.[254]

With a single "easy word" (534 ῥηΐδιον ἔπος) Apollo brushes aside the practical worries that so absorb the Cretans: just as they danced up to Pytho swiftly and without fatigue because they were caught up in the spirit of the god, so they will find the problem of their livelihood solved without difficulty or labor, being supported, like the Delians, χειρὸς ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίης, by the unstinting, unbegrudged (cf. 536 ἄφθονα) generosity of those to come to worship and to consult the oracle.

ῥηΐδιον ἔπος ὔμμ' ἐρέω καὶ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θήσω.
δεξιτερῇ μάλ' ἕκαστος ἔχων ἐν χειρὶ μάχαιραν
σφάζειν αἰεὶ μῆλα· τὰ δ' ἄφθονα πάντα παρέσται,
ὅσσα ἐμοί κ' ἀγάγωσι περικλυτὰ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων·
νηὸν δὲ προφύλαχθε, δέδεχθε δὲ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων
ἐνθάδ' ἀγειρομένων καὶ ἐμὴν ἰθύν τε μάλιστα

ἠέ τι τηΰσιον ἔπος ἔσσεται ἠέ τι ἔργον,
ὕβρις θ', ἣ θέμις ἐστὶ καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,
ἄλλοι ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν σημάντορες ἄνδρες ἔσονται,
τῶν ὑπ' ἀναγκαίῃ δεδμήσεσθ' ἤματα πάντα.

The command σφάζειν αἰεὶ μῆλα involves both piety toward the god (in whose honor the sheep are sacrificed) and regard for the visitors (on whose behalf the sacrifices are conducted), as well, of course, as an undeniable element of self-interest (it is the priests who, once the sacrifices are over, will consume the meat).[255] Although Apollo does not

person is addressed with a generic plural (cf. H. Schwabl, *Proceedings of the African Classical Association* 2 [1959] 25-27) suggests that in *h. Ap.* 532 Apollo is apostrophizing not solely the ministers but mankind at large, whose common folly the ministers are exhibiting.

[254] For an illuminating discussion of the "Blindheit und Hilflosigkeit" exhibited by the Cretans in all their dealings with Apollo see Förstel 267-271.

[255] Jacoby 750 notes with penetration that while we may find it difficult "hier keine Anticlimax zu empfinden oder gar Hohn über die frommen Dummköpfe, die ihre

attempt to veil this self-interest any more than Leto did in persuading Delos, he is careful to balance the perquisites of priesthood against its duties; the repetition of φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων in lines 537-538 suggests that between the "tribes of men" who bring offerings and the ministers who receive those "tribes of men" there is a relationship of reciprocity and mutual obligation. True, the Cretans need never again earn their bread as ἄνδρες ἀλφησταί, but they must use that freedom in the discharge of official responsibilities: to guard and maintain the temple, to extend a proper reception to the visiting throngs, and—above all—to respect Apollo's "direction" or "purpose" (ἰθύν) in all things.[256] Moreover, his earlier promise of perennial honor by the gods' will (484-485 τῶν ἰότητι αἰεὶ τιμήσεσθε διαμπερὲς ἤματα πάντα) is now sternly qualified, its fulfillment revealed to depend on their own righteousness: if they indulge in "any idle word or deed, *hubris* of the sort that is customary among mortal-kind, thenceforward other men will be your masters, to whose compulsion you will be subject forever."

Inasmuch as lines 540-543 form the effectual conclusion of the *Hymn* (line 544 simply restates 534 in ring-compositional fashion, while 545-546 are an entirely conventional epilogic formula), it is perhaps not surprising that they prove to be unusually dense in meaning. It is clear from the immediate context (even if we posit a lacuna between 539 and 540, as it seems we must)[257] that the *hubris* Apollo has in mind pertains in the first instance to the ministers' performance of their sacred duties. We have already noted that one important criterion in Apollo's selection of a temple-site was accessibility: the philanthropic purpose that animates the oracle cannot be realized if men are unable to make their way to it with safety and dispatch. Correlative with this criterion is Apollo's insistence that his priests do everything in their power to facilitate communication between the god and those who come for consultation. If the

Priester in Faulhëit mästen," there is not the slightest hint of irony in the poet's handling of the issue. That the Delphic priesthood's mode of subsistence inevitably exposed them to charges of laziness, greed, and the like (see AHS 266 for testimonia) should not obscure the profoundly serious ethical implications of the question πῶς καὶ νῦν βιόμεσθα and of Apollo's solution thereto.

[256] For ἰθύν cf. *Od.* 16.304 ἀλλ' οἶοι σύ τ' ἐγώ τε γυναικῶν γνώομεν ἰθύν, Hesych. ἰθύν· ὀρθόν. φρόνεσιν. τρόπον. ὁρμήν. βούλησιν. διάνοιαν. T. W. Allen, *JHS* 17 (1897) 252 calls the word 'peculiarly appropriate to the will or guidance of the God, the straight path made plain through the oracle of Loxias."

[257] A lacuna is required in order to accommodate a verb governing ἰθύν and—unless εἰ δέ be read for ἠέ in 540—to introduce the protasis to 542f. Càssola 515-516 takes 540-541 with what precedes ("gli uomini verranno al mio tempio a chiedere consiglio, se vi sarà [da parte di chiunque] errore o colpa"); but see Förstel 441, note 538. Altheim 448, note 1, remarks: "Wäre die Drohung in vv. 542-543 nicht in konditionaler Form gegeben, so hätte Apollon seine Rede nicht als ῥηΐδιον ἔπος (v. 534), als Tröstung gegenüber den Besorgnissen der Kreter, bezeichnen können."

fundamental aim of the oracle is to aid humanity by revealing "the will of Zeus," then any obstruction or perversion of the channels of communication between divine and human levels—misappropriation or misuse of donations, for example, or deliberate distortion of Apollo's messages—must be a crime of the first magnitude, fully deserving of the drastic punishment that Apollo threatens.

Viewed within the context of the Pytho-narrative as a whole, however, Apollo's words on *hubris* take on a larger significance. Our analysis of that narrative, it should be remembered, revealed a clear-cut distinction in the poet's thought between what might be termed the sphere of contemplative leisure and the sphere of practical action. The latter is the world of ordinary human life, the world of traffic and business and bustle in which for the sake of earning a living men work the soil as farmers or sail the sea as merchants. The former is the world into which the Cretan ex-merchants are introduced at Pytho, a world from which hard physical labor and the preoccupations of civic and familial life are excluded and time and energy consequently set free for other less mundane pursuits. If it is evident from all he says and does that Apollo wishes his oracle to be situated *within* the realm of leisure, it is equally evident that he intends the oracle to speak *to* and *for* the practical realm and to depend on it for the subsidies that allow its continued operation. If it is in the variegated busy-ness of secular life, faced with the decisions which its countless contingencies make necessary, that human beings find themselves in need of illumination and advice, it is only in isolation from the distractions of that secular life that human beings are able, in co-operation with divine wisdom, to purvey such guidance to their fellows.

The mutually beneficial relationship that Apollo envisages between the two spheres, however, necessarily requires that the distinction between them be maintained and not confounded by over-reaching on either side—such over-reaching as would occur if Apollo's ministers were led by self-interest to take an active rather than a merely advisory role in worldly affairs, or if secular powers were to use the means at their disposal (wealth, political influence, military force) to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the functioning of the oracle. The disastrous turn of events that Apollo foresees combines both of these possibilities: a rash overstepping of limits on the part of the Delphic priesthood will provoke retaliatory intervention from outside, with eventual subjection to an alien power. If the oracle is to survive as an autonomous institution performing its intended function, a precarious balance must be maintained. The priests must devote themselves whole-heartedly to their philanthropic responsibilities *vis-à-vis* the secular world while preserving an attitude of disinterested detachment, and the secular world in turn must offer the

priests material support without attempting to exploit their dependency for purposes of coercion.

Understood most narrowly and concretely, then, the *hubris* against which Apollo warns his ministers is administrative malfeasance; understood more broadly, it is such malfeasance regarded as the breaching of an all-important separation between secular and non-secular realms. The narrower of these meanings is specified by the immediate context of Apollo's speech; the broader, by the drift of the Pytho narrative as a whole. A still more general significance emerges, however, when the lines at issue are considered within the context of the entire hymn. With the words ὕβρις θ' ἣ θέμις ἐστὶ καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων Apollo is propounding an apparent paradox, for (as we have already had occasion to observe) in epic usage *themis* denotes what is natural or customary (and therefore right) while *hubris* refers precisely to the *violation* of such norms.[258] The epigrammatic pungency and neatness of the line suggests that its juxtaposition of conceptual opposites is not the result of carelessness or cloudy thinking on the poet's part but is deliberately contrived to startle and provoke. In its effect, indeed, it recalls the equally startling and provocative characterization of Apollo as ἀτάσθαλος in line 67. When we observe that the two paradoxes, the *hubris* that is *themis* and the Apollo who is *atasthalos*, are formulated in similar thematic contexts—at issue in both instances are the natural infertility of a sacred spot (54-55, 528-530) and its inhabitants' dependence upon outsiders for sustenance (57-60, 535-537)—it becomes obvious that we are dealing with a well-developed nexus of ideas that invites—and requires—explication.[259] Implicit in the very structure of the *Hymn*, we have

[258] Deubner 254 terms the line "ein richtiges παραδόξον" and regards it as one the "verstandesmäßig-rhetorischen Züge" that distinguish "P" from the "durchweg poetischen und unrhetorischen Charakter" of "D". Regenbogen 54 calls attention to the "eigenartige Verwendung von Themis." See below, note 263.

[259] Cf. Jacoby 749: "Thematisch sind diese Stücke [535-537, 56-60] gleich: es handelt sich beide Male darum, daß ein von der Natur stiefmütterlich behandelter Ort von einem neuen Kult materielle Vorteile ziehen soll." The connection between the passages has not gone unremarked by others (e.g. Unte 96-97), but by the curious logic of the "analytic" mind it has usually been regarded as proof of "imitation" and thus of separate authorship for the two halves of the *Hymn* (e.g. Schmidt-Stählin [note 176] 235, van Groningen 318-319, West 164). Jacoby himself argues that the motif is handled differently by "Chier" and "Pythier": that while initially Leto does hold out the prospect of material enrichment, in the end it is the thought of winning *honor* that moves Delos and it is honor, not wealth, that Leto promises on oath (88 τίσει δέ σέ γ' ἔξοχα πάντων), whereas in Apollo's mouth the materialistic appeal remains unmitigated and unredeemed by loftier considerations. In fact, of course, Apollo has *already* set forth (in 478-479, 482-485) the spiritual rewards with which the ministers can console themselves (cf. in particular 485 αἰεὶ τιμήσεσθε διαμπερὲς ἤματα πάντα), and it is only their stubbornly pragmatic adherence to the maxim Δίζησθαι βίοτον, ἀρετὴν δ' ὅταν ᾖ βίος ἤδη that compels him to spell out the economic rationale of their new life.

argued, is the poet's conviction that the nature and purpose of the Pythian oracle can only be understood in terms of the god whose creation it is; thus it makes excellent sense that we should find ourselves compelled to cast our minds back to the account of Apollo's earliest moments in order to grasp the full significance of his final exhortation to his ministers.

In our discussion of the birth-narrative we noted how often the poet's praise of Apollo involves the contrast between Apollo's greatness and the straitened circumstances of his origin—and also how the same contrast, when viewed from a different perspective, can seem to undercut rather than to enhance the god's glory. The point of the intrinsic ambiguity, we argued, is not in any serious sense to depreciate Apollo but rather to raise the hypothetical possibility that a god of Apollo's aristocratic stamp might take offense at the elements of contingency and dependence inherent in the fact of birth—and in particular that he might be outraged to discover that he owes his present existence in the world to the humblest of all earthly places. As events fall out, however, this Apolline *atasthalia* is rendered forever contrafactual by the bargain that Delos strikes with Leto: the debt of gratitude that Apollo owes her—a debt that necessarily involves his recognition of natality as a limiting condition of divine existence—will be kept ever-fresh in the god's mind by the oath sworn on his behalf, committing him to honor the little island "pre-eminently among all."

Now Pytho, like Delos, is a rocky site that lacks all πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας and thus "neither bears crops nor has good meadows" (529). Given these physical drawbacks, the permanent subsidy that Apollo provides for his ministers is clearly indispensable: the men cannot extract an adequate livelihood from such ungiving soil and at the same time attend to their official responsibilities. Another place better suited by nature to the production of life's necessities might have allowed the Cretans *both* to support themselves *and* to perform the duties that have been laid upon them—but Apollo has deliberately rejected two sites of exceptional fertility in favor of a barren hillside. The conclusion that is to be drawn emerges readily from the foregoing discussion: in so arranging things that his ministers are forced to look to others for their sustenance—to live, like the Delians, "at the hands of strangers"—Apollo is seeking to duplicate for them the experience of existential dependency that so decisively stamped his own nature at its origin. But why?

In the course of rejecting Agamemnon's offer of gifts in *Il.* 9.401ff. Achilles casually invokes Apollo's temple at Pytho as a byword for abundant wealth:

οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον οὐδ' ὅσα φασὶν
Ἴλιον ἐκτῆσθαι, εὖ ναιόμενον πτολίεθρον,
τὸ πρὶν ἐπ' εἰρήνης, πρὶν ἐλθεῖν υἷας Ἀχαιῶν,
οὐδ' ὅσα λάϊνος οὐδὸς ἀφήτορος ἐντὸς ἐέργει,
Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος, Πυθοῖ ἔνι πετρηέσσῃ.[260]

Although the only offerings that Apollo explicitly mentions at the end of the *Hymn* are the "countless sheep" that pilgrims will bring for sacrifice, the contemporary audience could not fail to think also of precious objects such as Herodotus described in awed detail several centuries later and such as the poet himself alludes to proleptically in line 443 (ἐς δ' ἄδυτον κατέδυσε διὰ τριπόδων ἐριτίμων).[261] It is easy enough to imagine that as such riches pour into Delphi and as the prestige and influence of the oracle grow, the human beings under whose management it operates might come to forget the spirit of devotion and philanthropic service with which the institution was imbued at its founding and, taking credit to themselves for its splendor, be led by pride to overstep the proper limits of their office, using the power and the material resources entrusted to them for purposes other than those intended by their divine patron. Yet the life of leisure that the priests enjoy, their emancipation from the worldly cares that characterize the human lot, is from another perspective tantamount to the helplessness of suppliants or beggars, people who without resources of their own are forced to rely on the generosity of those more fortunate—as Leto (and through her, Apollo) was forced to turn for aid to Delos. Thus in settling the Cretans in a place so notably unproductive of basic human necessities, where all that they have they owe to others, Apollo sees to it that they are taught a daily, if implicit, lesson in ethics. Although they are privy to the counsels of the gods and have wealth and honor by the gods' will, they are not gods themselves but mortal men; although they may not have to work to eat like most men, they must, like all mortal creatures, eat to live; and it therefore behooves them to conduct themselves with fitting humility and circumspection. Whereas the fundamental limitation that Apollo confronts in rocky Delos is the fact of natality, the ineluctable pre-condition of divine existence, the limitation that, by Apollo's will, the ministers confront in barren Pytho is their mortal subjection to physical necessity, to the γαστρὸς ἀνάγκη: "How then are we to live?" Yet the ethical significance of the confrontation is in each case the same. If Apollo, immediately after being born, had ignored or denied the implications of his

[260] Cf. Call. *h. Ap.* 34-35 πολύχρυσος γὰρ Ἀπόλλων· καὶ δὲ πολυκτέανος· Πυθῶνί κε τεκμήραιο.
[261] See particularly Herod. I.14, 25, 51, 92. On the temporal perspective in line 443 cf. Jacoby 748.

natality by rejecting Delos as unworthy of his greatness, he would have proved himself to be *atasthalos*; if his ministers, in years to come, ignore or deny the implications of their material dependency by abusing their position of privilege, they will be guilty of *hubris*—and will bring on themselves deserved punishment.

At the outset of Apollo's final speech the poet calls attention to the discrepancy between the god's ostensible exasperation and impatience and the benevolent amusement (531 ἐπιμειδήσας) that he really feels. Furthermore, though Apollo affects to take the Cretans' concern with the question of livelihood as an indication that they *prefer* the hardships inherent in the human condition to the life of ease that he is offering them (531-532 οἳ μελεδῶνας βούλεσθ' ἀργαλέους τε πόνους καὶ στείνεα θυμῷ), his *parainesis* as a whole takes the opposite tack: the ministers may be privileged to live henceforward in godlike exemption from the cares and labors that most human beings perforce endure, but they must not for that reason lose sight of the fact that they are νήπιοι ἄνθρωποι δυστλήμονες nonetheless.

It is within the context of this pervasive irony that the epigrammatic paradox of line 541 reveals its point. As "that which is laid down" by god, nature, or society, θέμις has both normative and descriptive force, encompassing what simply *is* as well as what *ought* to be. When Odysseus says that Agamemnon is prepared to swear he has not had sexual intercourse with Briseis "as is the *themis* of men and women" (*Il.* 9.276; cf. 19.177), he does not mean that it would have been *right* for Agamemnon to do so under the circumstances (quite the contrary), merely that it would have been in accordance with "the way things are": given the facts of human biology and psychology, men and women will naturally engage in sexual activity when the opportunity arises. Similarly, when Apollo calls *hubris* the *themis* of mankind, his ostensible meaning is that human beings are by the nature of things inclined to arrogance and excess; rightly or wrongly, that is their "way."[262] Yet since *hubris* is precisely the reckless violation of *themis* in its morally charged rather than morally neutral sense, Apollo's phraseology involves an ironic ambiguity in which much of the hymn's ethical "message" is encapsulated: self-understanding, recognition of the limitations inherent in human nature, is man's best defense against the *exceeding* of limitations to which that same human nature predisposes him.[263]

[262] Cf. Hirzel (above, note 120) 41, note 3: "es solle gesagt werden, daß es [i.e. *hubris*] zur Ordnung der menschlichen Natur, zum menschlichen Wesen gehöre." So too Càssola 516: "I mortali tendono per nature a commettere colpe ed errori."
[263] Vos (note 120) 21-22 is excellent on 541: "dieser Vers die apollinische Lehre mit einer gleichen Prägnanz wiedergibt wie das bekannte γνῶθι σεαυτόν: der Mensch soll sein Wesen und seine Natur kennen; seine 'natürliche' θέμις ist die ὕβρις und deshalb braucht

Now Apollo's own self-understanding, we have argued, is symbolically represented both by Leto's oath, which forestalls the display of *atasthalia* that Delos fears, and by the part that Themis plays in Apollo's transformation from infant to fully actualized divinity; the oath and the *trophe* together suggest that an internalization of limit is part and parcel of Apollo's essential nature. In this light it is significant that his oracular activity is represented both by himself (253, 293 πᾶσι θεμιστεύοιμι) and by the narrator (394 ἀγγέλλουσι θέμιστας) as an imparting of *themis* to mankind.[264] The language suggests in addition that Apollo intends the Pythian oracle to have an ethical as well as a prudential function; while making clear what divine will has in store for men in the shape of future events (132 χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν, 484 βουλάς τ' ἀθανάτων εἰδήσετε), it also propounds general rules by which human conduct should be guided. Two such rules, we know, were in historical times inscribed on the temple at Delphi: "Know thyself" and "Nothing in excess."[265] Although neither maxim is directly alluded to in the *Hymn*, both are implicit in its thematic development. The warning against *hubris* and its consequences with which the poem ends has been prepared for by the account of Apollo's birth; the attitude that the god inculcates in his ministers at Pytho is an attitude that (with differences appropriate to his vastly superior ontological status) he himself has displayed in his relationship with Delos.

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er die von den Göttern verkündete θέμις um sich gegen diese ὕβρις zu schützen" (cf. Unte 97-98, Förstel 233, 271). A similarly oxymoronic play on words can be found in *Od.* 4.689ff.:

> οἷος 'Οδυσσεὺς ἔσκε μεθ' ὑμετέροισι τοκεῦσιν,
> οὔτε τινὰ ῥέξας ἐξαίσιον οὔτε τι εἰπὼν
> ἐν δήμῳ· ἥ τ' ἐστι δίκη θείων βασιλήων·
> ἄλλον κ' ἐχθαίρῃσι βροτόν, ἄλλον κε φιλοίη.
> κεῖνος δ' οὔ ποτε πάμπαν ἀτάσθαλον ἄνδρα ἐώργει.

On the one hand δίκη here literally denotes (as e.g. in *Od.* 11.218, 14.59) "eine Art Angemessenheit, nach der man von einer bestimmten Art von Personen in bestimmten Situationen ein bestimmtes Verhalten oder eine Beschaffenheit erwarten kann" (Fränkel, *WF* 172). On the other hand it cannot fail to derive a wryly ironic flavor from the immediate contextual concern (note especially ἐξαίσιον and ἀτάσθαλον) with just and unjust conduct (cf. *Od.* 14.84 ἀλλὰ δίκην τίουσι καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων): in this world, it is "king's justice" to act *un*justly. (For a rebuttal of the recent revisionist view that δίκη and its derivatives are devoid of moral significance in early Greek poetry, See M. Dickie, *CP* 73 [1978] 91-101.)

[264] The connection between Themis' role as τροφός and Apollo's declaration of oracular θέμιστες is noted by Eitrem 131.

[265] On the Delphic maxims and their significance for Delphic morality see T. Dempsey, *The Delphic Oracle; its Early History, Influence and Fall* (Oxford 1918) 140-143, E. G. Wilkins, *The Delphic Maxims in Literature* (Chicago 1929) 19-24, 49-73, H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle,* Vol. 1 (Oxford 1956) 387-389.

One thing left unclear by Apollo is the identity of the ἄλλοι ἄνδρες into whose control the Delphic priesthood, under the specified conditions, will pass.[266] For the threat to have its desired effect, of course, specificity is not required; indeed, the vagueness is itself impressive. Yet sufficient clues are provided to allow a guess as to Apollo's—that is, the poet's—meaning. The priests are strangers in the region, after all, imported from abroad rather than chosen locally; they have been awarded a position of responsibility and influence with many perquisites attached, not the least of which is a permanent exemption from physical labor; though Pytho itself is rough and barren, they have at their disposal the material bounty of Apollo's "rich temple," henceforward to be steadily augmented by the offerings of pilgrims. A plausible conjecture is that the Cretans' apparently unearned prosperity will arouse envy and ill-will among their less fortunate neighbors—particularly since neighbors are proverbially inclined toward *phthonos* even in the best of circumstances.[267] In this light Apollo's warning reveals a pragmatic as well as an ethical point: if in the discharging of their official duties the priests are unrighteous "in word or deed," neglecting Apollo's "direction" and the dictates of *themis*, they are likely to furnish their already resentful neighbors with a pretext for violent intervention in Delphic affairs.

Apollo leaves it to his priests to fill in the details of this hypothetical scenario from their knowledge of human nature and their keen sense of isolation in an alien land (cf. 526 τῆλε φίλων καὶ πατρίδος αἴης). The poet's own audience, however, are in a still better position to interpret Apollo's drift, for in Telphusa and Hera they have already been provided with two paradigms of the psychological phenomenon at issue. We have seen that although each is prompted to retaliatory action by what she perceives as an aggressive infringement of certain basic rights, in each case congenital spite and malice are proved to underlie the ostensible indignation

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[266] Although lines 540ff. have traditionally been understood as a *vaticinium ex eventu* of the First Sacred War (e.g. Dornseiff 15, Drerup 129, Wade-Gery 64, Kirk 164), West 165, note 2, prefers to read them as "a warning in time of imminent danger," and Förstel 201-202 remarks: "Die starke Betonung des Zwanges und der Unterwerfung ... paßt überhaupt nicht zu der Rolle, die nach den ... Zeugnissen die Amphikyonen zur Zeit des Heiligen Krieges gespielt haben; sie bezeichnet dagegen treffend das gespannte Verhältnis zwischen der Stadt am Meer [Crisa] und dem auf ihrem Gebiet gelegenen Heiligtum, das zum Heiligen Krieg führte." According to Parke and Wormell (note 265) 108, "the ominous warning of the last lines could only have been imagined after the fall of Crisa had shown that impiety against Apollo could be punished with an awful vengeance"—a statement which surely underestimates the imaginative powers of Greek poets in dealing with the consequences of *hubris*.

[267] Arist. *Rhet.* II. 10.5 notes that people "envy those who are near them in time, place, age, and reputation" (τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν); cf. Hes. *Erga* 23ff. (where both ζῆλος and φθόνος are at issue), Pind. *O.* 1.47. Of Delphi's prosperity and the reaction it provoked in neighboring states Strabo IX. 3.8 observes: ἐπίφθονος δ' ὢν ὁ πλοῦτος δυσφύλακτός ἐστι, κἂν ἱερὸς ᾖ.

at undeserved injury.[268] If all that Telphusa cared about were the vindication of her claim to local pre-eminence in the face of Apollo's highhandedness, she would not secretly desire to deprive him of his *kleos* elsewhere in the world. If all that Hera cared about were the vindication of her status as Zeus's consort, she would not secretly pray for a son stronger than Zeus to overthrow him. The recurrent pattern is psychologically verisimilar: being by general agreement a base and reprehensible emotion, envy is notoriously indirect in its manifestations, publicly disavowing its true nature and eagerly seeking occasions to vent itself under the guise of more respectable passions.[269] The relevance of the pattern to the situation of the Delphic priesthood is apparent. As the wealth and power of the oracle increase and its neighbors grow correspondingly more resentful, any act of πλεονεξία, any overstepping of the bounds laid down by Apollo for the oracle's operation, is likely to be seized upon with alacrity as an excuse for punitive action, 'and thenceforward other men will be your masters, to whose compulsion you will be subject forever.''

Apollo's warning to his ministers is, in effect, his first oracle, delivered to the very men whose responsibility such oracles will henceforth be. It is, as oracles often are, a statement of moral probability: *hubris* will sow the seeds of its own destruction.[270] The loss of autonomy of which Apollo speaks, it must be noted, is a conditional rather than an absolute certainty, with room left for moral choice; it will come to pass only if the priests abuse their sacred office, but if indeed they so abuse it, the consequence is inexorable. Combining clarity of vision with an impassioned ethical imperative, the *Hymn*'s final lines are thus a concrete demonstration of the fact that Apollo's philanthropic mission to ''reveal the will of Zeus to men''—a mission conceived and proclaimed in his first moments of conscious being—has at last been achieved.[271]

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APPENDIX 1

THE QUESTION OF UNITY

To judge from the available evidence, the scholarly ''problem'' of the *Hymn*'s unity did not exist until 1782, thirteen years before F. A. Wolff published his epoch-making *Prolegomena ad Homerum*, when in an appendix to his *Homeri Hymnus in Cererem* David Ruhnken declared:

> Certius est, Hymnum in Apollinem, qui in scriptis editisque libris unus est, in binos Hymnos dividendum esse. Versus enim 165. ἀλλ' ἄγεθ' ἰλήχοι &c. habet solitum Hymni epilogum et finem. Tum sequitur alterius Hymni initium vs. 179. ὦ ἄνα χαὶ Λυχίην χαὶ Μηονίην &c. Prior Hymnus Apollinis Delii, posterior Apollinis Delphici laudem complectitur. Priorem autem eo loco, quem indicavimus, finiri, non solum ratio docet, sed etiam veterum scriptorum auctoritas confirmat. Thucydides III.104 τὸν γὰρ Δηλιχὰον χορὸν τῶν γυναιχῶν ὑμνήσας ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπαίνου ἐς τάδε τὰ ἔπη, ubi verba ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπαίνου non significant *finem fecit laudis choro Deliaco tributae*, sed *finem fecit Hymni in Apollinem* ...

As the revolution in Homeric studies heralded by Wolff's monograph developed through the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its effect was inevitably felt in scholarly commentary on the *Hymn to Apollo*, which generated a steadily increasing variety of theories to account for the hymn's present form. For all their number and variety, these theories can be grouped into a few basic types, to which we may give the names ''juxtaposition,'' ''imitation,'' ''redaction,'' ''amalgamation,'' and ''continuation.''

Although Ruhnken's hypothesis of a fortuitous collocation of independent poems has proved unacceptably simplistic to most anti-unitarians, it was espoused in modified form by Baumeister, who regarded ''D'' as the work of a Homerid and ''P'' as a thorough-going *imitatio* by a ''disciplina Hesiodi,'' and by Drerup, who, however, rejected the notion of imitation and drew the line of demarcation between ''D'' and ''P'' at line 206 rather than 178. Hermann maintained that both ''D'' and ''P'' had undergone revision by later hands (''duplex recensio''), while the analytical zealots of the mid-nineteenth century regarded the poem as an accretion of miscellaneous fragments—a view revived in this century by Bethe. Perhaps the single most influential variant of Ruhnken's original hypothesis is the ''Fortsetzung'' theory proposed by Wilamowitz in an appendix to *Die Ilias und Homer* (1920) and adopted by Humbert in his Budé edition of the *Hymns* (1937); this postulates that a pre-existing ''Delian'' hymn was taken over and ''continued'' by a later (and in-

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ferior) poet with close ties to Delphi. Combining "continuation" and "redaction," Jacoby argued that the "Fortsetzer" made various changes of addition and omission in the Delian original in order to adapt it to his purposes. In his recent monograph Förstel appears to incline toward the "Fortsetzung" theory, but he leaves open the possibility that "P" was intended not as a continuation of "D" but as a "Gegenstück," one "das seinem Vorbild gleichkommen, es vielleicht überbieten sollte" (284). Like Jacoby, West has found extensive evidence of redaction, but to him (as to Burkert) "P" is earlier than "D" and served as its model. On the basis of linguistic evidence Janko has recently reaffirmed the priority of "D" as against West and Burkert and has suggested that the two hymns were "lopped" or "cobbled" into a "sorry unity" within the archaic period.

More relevant here than the various anti-unitarian theories themselves, however, are the arguments with which the theories have been supported and the assumptions that those arguments involve. Like the theories, the arguments fall into a few basic types: arguments (1) from *external evidence*, (2) from *content* or *theme*, (3) from *form* or *structure*, and (4) from *style*. The popularity of the different types has waxed and waned through the centuries. The appeal to ancient testimonia, to Ruhnken's "veterum scriptorum auctoritas," has by now been generally abandoned, although Jacoby based his case for the original independence of "D" largely on Ruhnken's interpretation of Thuc. 3.104. As long ago as 1937 Drerup recognized that the extant sources shed no useful light on the question of single vs. multiple authorship, and recently Förstel has arrived at the same negative conclusion after an exhaustive scrutiny of all the relevant passages.

Arguments from content, briefly adumbrated by Ruhnken ("Prior Hymnus Apollinis Delii, posterior Apollinis Delphici laudem complectitur") and extensively developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, also appear to be falling out of favor, at least in so far as they assume (1) that Apollo *Delios* and Apollo *Pythios* were not simply two aspects of a single pan-Hellenic deity but quite separate gods demanding exclusive allegiance from their worshippers, and (2) that audiences in the archaic period were so parochial in their interests that they would not tolerate subjects drawn from beyond their own immediate horizon. Recent proponents of the separatist position have acknowledged that these assumptions are highly questionable; thus according to Càssola 98 the themes of Apollo's birth on Delos and his founding of the oracle at Pytho "senza dubbio potevano essere trattati insieme a Delo, a Delfi, e in qualunque altra città greca," and Förstel 163 remarks: "Doch für die Griechen war es derselbe Gott, der auf Delos geboren war und das

Orakel in Pytho besaß ... Ein Festpublikum auf Delos konnte also sehr wohl Interesse an der Sage von der Gründung Pythos haben." (On the rise of pan-Hellenism in the archaic period and its bearing on the *Hymn to Apollo* see G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* [Baltimore and London 1979] 6-11. The notion, axiomatic to many separatists, that the lines on the Delian festival in general and on the chorus of Deliades in particular are too "local" in their appeal to be performable in places other than Delos [cf. Deubner 265, van Groningen 320] is contradicted by the poet's own promise to carry the maidens' *kleos* "as far as I wander on earth among the cities of men" [174-175].) One form of the argument from content that is still in current use (cf. West 161, Janko, *Homer* 99) is the notion that "D" and "P" presuppose different "worlds" or "geographical horizons." This argument has force, of course, only if the alternative explanation—that the co-existence in the hymn of Aegean and mainland "worlds" simply reflects its double subject—is ignored or discounted.

Of the two types of argument that remain, the formal and the stylistic, the first has occupied a special place in scholarship on the *Hymn* ever since Ruhnken claimed to discover in lines 165-178 a "solitum Hymni epilogum et finem." To say that the hymn's unity would never have been questioned were it not for the presence in that passage of three words, χαίρετε and αὐτὰρ ἐγών, is no doubt to exaggerate slightly—but only slightly. As I have had occasion to remark elsewhere (Miller 176), separatists have tended to take the "epilogic" character of 165-178 as something that needs no demonstration and to disregard evidence to the contrary when it is offered. Whatever the merits of the argument, however, its importance in the anti-unitarian arsenal cannot be overestimated. The most recent editor of the *Hymns* goes so far as to assert that the poet's "farewell" to the Deliades is the sole and sufficient proof of the independent existence of "D", proof in light of which all other arguments pro and con fall into irrelevance (Càssola 97). Not all separatists rate the argument so highly, however. Förstel, for example, recognizes that the unitarian interpretation of the passage cannot be excluded as a possibility: "So könnte die Partie [lines 165-178] als Übergangsstück aufgefaßt werden, das die Festbeschreibung oder besser den ganzen delischen Teil abschließt und zur Fortsetzung, dem pythischen Teil, überleitet" (162). Others (e.g. Jacoby 719, note 3, Janko, *Homer* 253) insist that 177-178 are epilogic in their original intent but that they have a potential for "Umdeutung" or "ambiguity" that was exploited by whoever attached "P" to "D". Of course lines 165-178 have not provided the only formal arguments for bipartition: others have been drawn from the various structural parallels to be found between

Delian and Pythian portions of the hymn (e.g. the two Olympian scenes, the two "aporetic priamels," the journeys in 30-50 and 216-286, etc.). As we noted above, however, agreement has not been reached as to which is the model and which the imitation.

Although Ruhnken himself made no reference to stylistic differences between "D" and "P", most separatists since his time have been disposed to adduce such differences as a useful supplement to the arguments from content and from form. The alleged poetic inferiority of "P" to "D" has long been a critical commonplace (e.g. Burckhardt-Biedermann 3, Wilamowitz 455, Drerup 129, Deubner 253, Defradas 55, van Groningen 320). In arguing for the priority of "P", however, West implicitly reverses the conventional esthetic judgment, finding "D" "peculiar," "perfunctory," "awkward," and the like in its handling of motifs from "P". According to Gemoll 111 the "lyric" quality of "D" and the "epic" movement of "P" are sufficient "es auch dem blödesten Auge klar machen, daß wir hier nicht mit einem einheitlichen Kunstwerk aus einem Geist und Guß zu thun haben." In this century several attempts have been made to establish stylistic differences by more "objective" (i.e. statistical) means (e.g. Huibregtse, Frolíková); the most recent of these is Janko's study of "diachronic development in epic diction." Of course "style" need not be a matter of language *per se*; Förstel bases his final decision for bipartition on such "stylistischen Unterschieden" as narrative technique and religious *ethos*.

As even the above sketch suggests, separatists not infrequently fail to agree on the value and cogency of the available arguments for dual authorship. More than fifty years ago Cessi noted how "i critici divisero, suddivisero, ricostruirono l'inno o gli inni omerici ad Apollo, ne reuscirono mai a trovare un solo punto su cui si accordassero pienamente le loro conclusioni" (866). This pronounced lack of consensus is not without its significance for the unitarian cause. Even more deserving of note, however, are the questionable and at times mutually contradictory assumptions upon which the arguments tend to be based. For example, those who espouse Ruhnken's view of 165-178 as a hymnal epilogue evidently assume that since χαῖρε and αὐτὰρ ἐγώ signal the end of a hymnal performance in the vast majority of "Homeric" hymns, they must do so in the lines at issue, it being impossible that the hymnist could be adapting traditional means to an innovative end. At the same time, however, they disregard the fact that the vast majority of "Homeric" hymns end with a direct (second-person) address to the deity concerned; they apparently find the poet's unprecedented relegation of Apollo to secondary status *vis-à-vis* the Deliades neither surprising nor problematic. Thus two presuppositions are at work here simultaneously: *poets are the slaves, not the masters, of the conventions within which they work*, and *poets are free to violate convention when and as they wish, without regard for religious decorum or the expectations of their audience.*

Or again: common to all arguments based on differences in diction, tone, narrative technique, etc. between "D" and "P" is the assumption that *stylistic differences within a literary work can be accounted for only by positing multiple authorship*. For example, if "D" exhibits features regarded as typical of lyric style and "P" is more straightforwardly linear and "epic" in its movement, then two poets must have been at work; no one poet could have been versatile enough to adapt his style to the varying needs of his subject-matter. This presupposition tends to co-exist with another: *structural and thematic similarities between different parts of a literary work can be accounted for only by positing multiple authorship*. If, for example, both "D" and "P" begin with an Olympian scene, an aporetic priamel, and a geographical catalogue, then two poets must have been at work, one imitating the other; if the natural infertility of a sacred spot and its inhabitants' dependence on outsiders for sustenance is at issue in "D" and "P" alike, then two poets must have been at work, one borrowing ideas from the other. Baumeister 112 makes this line of reasoning explicit: "Iam quum per se prorsus incredibile sit, poetam aliquem sui imitatorem exstitisse, prope necessario consequitur, alterum hymnum ad alterius exemplar esse confictum."

The *a priori* determination to find disorder and incoherence that these and similar assumptions evince is characteristic of those whose inclination is to "substitute analysis for exegesis" (Jacoby 684) and to "read with knife in hand" (Dornseiff, *AM* 48). The inevitable result of approaching a poem with a pre-formed conviction that it makes no sense is that abundant evidence will be discovered to bear that conviction out—evidence that scarcely admits of refutation so long as the presuppositions by which it was generated are allowed to pass unquestioned. Agreeing with Dornseiff that "die einfache wissenschaftliche Logik dem Leugner der doch überlieferten Einheit die Beweislast auflegt" (*Geistige Arbeit* 1.4 [1934] 8), I have in the present study rejected the separatists' initial presumption of sequential incoherence as unjustified by the facts of the case. My starting-point has been the hypothesis, generally accepted by unitarians and anti-unitarians alike, that the intrinsic purpose of the hymn *qua* hymn is to praise Apollo. (That this hypothesis is accepted by separatists is evident in the surgery they perform: both the "Typhon episode" and the "salute to Leto" have been evicted from their contexts because they seem to contradict the poet's announcement of Apollo as his theme, while one common argument for bipartition, as we have seen, involves the notion that Delian and Pythian Apollo are so

distinct as deities that praise of the one is irrelevant to praise of the other.) Taking the poet's encomiastic intention as that which alone is truly "given" to us from the start, I have sought to elucidate the hymn's formal structure and to determine the relevance of its individual parts to a comprehensive strategy of praise. In so doing, I have been led to consider as well the thematic content to which that formal structure gives shape, discovering in the process a well-developed nexus of ideas through which the poet has set Apollo's birth on Delos and his founding of the Pythian oracle into close and meaningful relation.

Although I believe that my study as a whole demonstrates the "unity" of the *Hymn to Apollo* as effectually as the nature of the case permits, I am aware that those who demand conclusive "proof" of unity are unlikely to be satisfied. To provide the proof that they require would involve showing beyond all doubt that everything in the hymn is in some radical sense *necessary* to the whole—that the hymn could have no other form or content. Such a demonstration is impossible, and for a simple reason: the poem *could* have been other than it is. Nothing prevented the poet from composing a hymn in which *only* Apollo's birth was celebrated, or *only* his founding of the oracle; the question is not whether either topic requires the other in order to be intelligible (clearly it does not) but whether the particular combination of the two with which we happen to be confronted makes structural and thematic sense. If it does, then the fact that the poem might have been quite different in its selection and arrangement of materials and still have made sense is irrelevant. In this connection Dornseiff aptly remarks: "Wenn man in den Werken der Weltliteratur alles das wegschneiden wollte, dessen Notwendigkeit innerhalb des betr. Werkes nicht nachgewiesen werden kann, dan würde die Weltliteratur klein werden" (*Echtheitsfragen* 73).

It may be objected, finally, that such unity as I claim to demonstrate in the *Hymn* does not preclude the possibility that two or more different poets *created the original materials* out of which the extant whole is composed. This objection I freely grant. Since, given the structural and thematic parallels between "Delian" and "Pythian" sections, a fortuitous juxtaposition of entirely independent poems (or poetic fragments) seems impossible, the present condition of the text must be explained, it seems to me, by one of four hypotheses.

1) One poet composed the entire hymn "from scratch," wielding traditional mythic materials and the conventions of his genre with such intelligence and skill that a unified work of art resulted.
2) One poet took over the work of another as raw material to be incorporated into a larger hymn, so thoroughly adapting this material to the formal structure and thematic concerns of the new composition that a unified work of art resulted.

3) One poet took another poet's work as a model and a starting-point for a larger hymn, so thoroughly subordinating his compositional activities to the formal structure and thematic concerns of the pre-existing piece that a unified work of art resulted.
4) One poet took another poet's work as a model for imitation in a separate hymn, and later a third poet, discerning the similarities in structure and theme between the two pieces, joined them together with sufficient modification of detail that a unified work of art resulted.

Although I myself find the first of these hypotheses attractive in its simplicity, and although *à propos* of (3) I am tempted to exclaim with Dornseiff "Welch ein Weiterdichter!" (*Nochmals* 13), I am quite prepared to admit that all are at least theoretical possibilities. What I am not prepared to admit is that the choice of any one explanation over the others makes a significant difference to the literary analysis of the hymn. Aristotle assures us that a dramatist who bases his plots on events that have actually happened is nonetheless to be regarded as the ποιητής or "maker" of those plots, "for there is nothing to prevent some actual occurrence being the sort of thing that would probably or inevitably happen, and it is in virtue of *that* that he is their 'maker'" (*Poet.* 9.10). A poet who reworks pre-existing poetic material with sufficient tact and skill that a new and meaningful whole emerges is surely no less effectively the "maker" of that material than is the tragedian who discerns in an actual sequence of events the perfect vehicle for his dramatic ideas. Nothing is more certain than that *someone* composed—that is, "put together"—the *Hymn to Apollo* in its present form, whatever the exact process of that "putting together" may have been, and it is that ποιητής whose artistic achievement has been the subject of this study. Some may find the achievement nothing to boast of, a "sorry unity" indeed; but then even a sorry unity is a unity.

APPENDIX 2

THE COSMOLOGICAL HIERARCHY AND APOLLO'S *TIMAI*

Implicit in the *Hymn to Apollo* is an ontological hierarchy comprising three levels or realms: the divine, the human, and the monstrous or demonic. Each has its proper locus in the physical world. The region assigned to the gods is the superterrestrial, whether "steep Olympus" (109 θεῶν ἕδος αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον) or "broad heaven" (325 ἀθανάτοισιν οἳ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσι). Mankind belongs on the "grain-giving soil" itself (69 θνητοῖσιν βροτοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν), "eating the fruit of the much-nourishing earth" (365 γαίης πολυφόρβου καρπὸν ἔδοντες). The subterranean regions "around great Tartarus" are, if not the proper *habitation* of monsters like the serpent and Typhon, then at least their point of emanation into the world of men. Leto's oath to Delos and Hera's prayer for a son, both utterances of great solemnity and power, embrace all three realms at once, Leto swearing by "earth and heaven and the dripping water of Styx" (84-85) and Hera invoking "earth and heaven and the Titan gods who dwell under the earth around great Tartarus" (334-336). In certain respects the divine and the human realms form a common society that stands apart from the monstrous/demonic; thus Delos speaks of the yet-unborn Apollo as destined "to lord it mightily over immortals and mortal men" (68-69 μέγα δὲ πρυτανευσέμεν ἀθανάτοισιν καὶ θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν), the Muses sing of the "immortal gifts of the gods and the sufferings of men" (190-191 θεῶν δῶρ' ἄμβροτα ἠδ' ἀνθρώπων τλημοσύνας), and the "terrible and grievous Typhon," who "resembles neither gods nor mortals" (351 οὔτε θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιον οὔτε βροτοῖσι), is produced by Hera as an enemy both of mankind (306, 352 πῆμα βροτοῖσιν) and of Zeus himself (338-339).

As a conceptual framework this hierarchy of ontological levels is of course not unique to the *Hymn to Apollo* in the archaic period. Hesiod's *Theogony*, for example, is from one perspective largely concerned with the slow differentiation and eventual permanent separation of the upper and lower realms, the divine and the monstrous, so as to make room for and thereafter maintain as distinct the intermediate realm occupied by humanity (which is Hesiod's subject in the *Works and Days*). The points of particular interest in the use that our poet makes of the schema are, first, his articulation of significant distinctions and subdivisions within the central human realm, and second, his superimposition upon the fully articulated hierarchy of yet another conceptual scheme, namely the three *timai* (lyre, bow, oracle) that define the dimensions of Apollo's nature.

As represented in the *Hymn* the human realm is not only open to intrusion from above (e.g. Apollo's epiphany to the Cretans) and from below (e.g. the serpent's depredations at Pytho) but itself approaches the divine and the monstrous/demonic at its extremes. On the one hand the harmony and perfect order of Olympian existence, where discord and violence are banished by festal decorum and a spirit of play rules (cf. 201 παίζουσ', 206 παίζοντα), has its earthly counterpart in the Delian *panegyris*, where the Ionians gathered to honor their god through sport and dance and music appear to an impartial observer as "immortal and ageless forever" (151 ἀθανάτους καὶ ἀγήρως ἔμμεναι αἰεί). On the other hand the hypothetical pirates who wander over the sea "bringing evil to people of other lands" (455 κακὸν ἀλλοδαποῖσι φέροντες) are committing, though admittedly in a less spectacular way, the same deeds of misanthropic destruction as the serpent (302-303 ἣ κακὰ πολλὰ ἀνθρώπους ἔρδεσκεν ἐπὶ χθονί) and Typhon (355 ὃς κακὰ πόλλ' ἔρδεσκε κατὰ κλυτὰ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων), while Typhon's rebellious defiance of Zeus as the patron of cosmic order has a human analogue in the Phlegyan *hubristai* who "have no respect for Zeus" (278 Διὸς οὐκ ἀλέγοντες). When the distinction between the spheres of leisure and of practical action that was established by our analysis of the Pytho-narrative is also taken into account, the following hierarchical scheme emerges:

- I. The Divine Realm: harmony, perfect order; play purely for play's sake (the Olympian festivals)
- II. The Human Realm:
  - A1. playful activity tending toward a transcendence of the human condition and the assimilation of society to the harmonious condition of the divine (the Delian festival)
  - A2. leisure (*schole*), i.e. freedom from the practical concerns and material needs inherent in the human condition, benefiting society through the alleviation of other aspects of that condition, e.g. contingency, ignorance (Pytho)
  - B1. "business" (*ascholia*), i.e. immersion in practical concerns, benefiting society directly through the satisfaction of material needs and indirectly through the subsidizing of *schole* (Telphusa, the Cretan merchants, the φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων who visit Pytho)
  - B2. destructive activity tending toward the deterioration of the human condition and the assimilation of society to the chaotic condition of the monstrous/demonic (the Phlegyans, the pirates)
- III. The Monstrous/Demonic Realm: chaos, absolute disorder; destruction purely for destruction's sake (the serpent, Typhon)

In this cosmological hierarchy each of the three *timai* that Apollo proclaims in lines 131-132 has its particular domain or sphere of influence. In the atmosphere of harmonious festivity and play that reigns in heaven the bow, as an instrument of violence, is egregiously out of place; thus when Apollo enters the hall of Zeus in his capacity as τοξοφόρος he must be disarmed and his offending weapon hung up in idleness before he can be integrated into the divine assembly. When he arrives already playing his *phorminx*, however, no adaptation or adjustment is required; "immediately the immortals concern themselves with lyre and song" (188 αὐτίκα δ' ἀθανάτοισι μέλει κίθαρις καὶ ἀοιδή), and in the interlude of dance and music that ensues Apollo is found at the center setting the pace (201-202 αὐτὰρ ὁ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων ἐγκιθαρίζει καλὰ καὶ ὕψι βιβάς).

Yet the lyre extends its influence not only over the world of the Olympians but also over those segments of the human realm that participate, to a greater or lesser degree, in the harmonious order of divine existence (i.e. II. A1 and A2 on the chart). The various points of similarity between lines 188-206 and 147-164 (see above, pp. 68-69) suggest that, despite the lack of explicit reference to the lyre in the latter passage, Apollo *kitharistes* is presiding over the Delian festival no less effectively than the Olympian, in spirit if not in person. If the role of the lyre in the Delian *panegyris* is merely hinted at, however, its association with Pytho is both overt and emphatic. When Apollo makes his musical entrance into the hall of Zeus it is from "rocky Pytho" that he has come (182-187); when he escorts the Cretans from the shore to his temple and, in so doing, translates them from the world of business and practical action to the world of contemplative leisure in which they will henceforward live, the lyre is the means he uses (514-517). Like the mention of Pytho in line 183, the echoes of lines 201-202 in 515-516 (ἐγκιθαρίζει καλὰ καὶ ὕψι βιβάς = κιθαρίζων καλὰ καὶ ὕψι βιβάς) hint at the congruencies and interconnections that obtain between the world of the gods and the privileged sector of the human realm through which divine counsel is mediated to mankind.

If at the top of the cosmological hierarchy the bow is emphatically excluded as an active principle, at the bottom it just as emphatically finds its *raison d'être*. Before Pytho can become a fit habitat for the Cretans in their new life of untroubled leisure, it must be freed from the τέρας ἄγριον and πῆμα δαφοινόν that haunts the nearby spring; and it is by means of a "mighty arrow" (357-358 ἰὸν ... καρτερόν) launched from Apollo's "mighty bow" (301 κρατεροῖο βιοῖο) that this deed is accomplished. In boasting that neither Typhon nor Chimaera will avail to prevent the serpent's death Apollo represents his exploit as a victory gained over one whole level of being, the monstrous, as this opposes and disrupts the ordered existence of gods and men. We know from other sources, of course, that Apollo's bow is not limited in its field of operation to the realm of the monstrous but is, like the lyre, wielded within the world of human affairs as well; thus in the first book of the *Iliad*, for example, it punishes Agamemnon's contemptuous treatment of the suppliant Chryses. In the *Hymn*, however, the fierceness of Apollo *toxophoros* toward human rather than monstrous malefactors is only hinted at, as for instance by the impetuosity with which he shuns the city of the hubristic Phlegyans (278-281). When Apollo appears amid the divine assembly with his bow at the ready he does so, we have argued, because he has been using it elsewhere (see above, pp. 14-16); but nothing is said to indicate whether his target has been political or social injustice (i.e. II. B1) or criminal violence (II. B2) or cosmic rebelliousness (III), but any and all are possible.

Thus the lyre, as an instrument of harmony, and the bow, as an instrument of destruction, are mutually exclusive in their effects and in their spheres of influence; these comprise in the one case the divine realm (I) and the upper strata of the human (II, A1 and A2), in the other the lower strata of the human realm (II, B1 and B2) and the monstrous/demonic (III). The oracle, by contrast, partially *overlaps* the domains of the other *timai* (both lyre and bow play a role in its founding) but is itself limited in its effects to a single realm, namely that occupied by humanity. It is not without significance that wherever the word χρηστήριον appears in the *Hymn* it is qualified by the addition of ἀνθρώπων or ἀνθρώποις (81, 214, 248, 259, 288, and cf. 132). An institution whose purpose is to give guidance about the future is necessarily irrelevant to gods, who already know about it, and to monsters, who do not care; its intended beneficiaries are instead mortal beings who entertain expectations and form projects but whose mental vision is ineluctably time-bound and defective (cf. Förstel 230ff.). Not all men in all conditions, however, are in these respects equally needy or receptive. The prudential and ethical advice that the oracle has to offer will be of little interest, for example, to those caught up temporarily in an experience of timeless union with the divine (e.g. the Ionians in festival, II, A1), or to those whose involvement in or commitment to violence entails a reckless diregard of consequences (e.g. the pirates who wander the seas μαψιδίως, "setting their lives at hazard," II, B2). Thus what remains as the oracle's proper domain is the two midmost sectors of the human realm, the sphere of contemplative leisure and ἀπημοσύνη out of which it operates and the sphere of practical action to which it speaks (above, pp. 73-74, 98-99, 103-104).

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